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AN IRREDUCIBLE PLURALISM OF PRINCIPLES

INTRODUCTION

Serious lawyers take legal arguments seriously.1 After all, lawyers
argue seriously to courts, to court-like entities, such as administrative
agencies, and to each other all the time. No one denies that legal
argument plays a material role in resolving many, many cases.
Everyone agrees: legal argument should be sensible, persuasive, and
attuned to the important balance which must always exist between
tradition and stability on the one hand, and change and idealism on
2
the other.
Thus, sound legal argument is like a prism. It faces the past
(upon which it relies), the present (where it resolves cases), and the
future (toward which it is oriented). Legal argument artfully
presented to courts essentially takes one archetypal form no matter
how it is dressed-up:
Your honor. These are the facts. Here is the law. Here is how the
law applies to the facts. Please decide this case in accordance with
your duty to apply the law correctly. The legally-correct conclusion
in this case is the one which happens to favor my (very
sympathetic) client. More importantly, it is the only just result.
Almost every time an argument of this form is given, counsel will be
arguing that the court is bound by the past. In presenting arguments
in this way, counsel attends to the past by focusing on precedents,
emphasizing stability, and accentuating predictability. In effect,
counsel will be arguing that law, as it already exists, yields a single
answer to a dispute at bar. Similarly, recommendations for changewhether limited or substantial-must be based on the proposition
that while good things are to be found in the past, better things are to
be found elsewhere. From a formal point of view, the very best of
these arguments proceed by saying that apparently-binding precedent

1. See Richard S. Markovits, Taking Legal Argument Seriously: An Introduction, 74 CHI.KENT L. REV. 317 (1999).

2. "On the one hand, the law must have stability and predictability so that people may
order their conduct and affairs with some rationality. On the other hand, the judge must
consider the harm of compounding error by reflectively applying a clearly erroneous
decision...." Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Petty, 848 S.W.2d 680,
689 (Tex. 1992) (Cornyn, J., now the elected Attorney General of Texas, dissenting for himself
and three other justices). The issue that concerns Justice Cornyn is, as he describes it, the
"deeply troubling" matter of what the judge of a court of last resort should do with a precedent
"she believes to have been incorrectly decided." Id.
For no very good (or very bad) reason, many of the citations in this article come from
Texas courts. There are citations here and there from other jurisdictions, but it seemed
appropriate to focus on one state, and Texas is as good as any.
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was perfectly good in its time, but that times have changed, and,
hence, so has the binding force of the once-good precedent. New
conditions nullify old rules and stimulate new ones. In effect, counsel
again argues that there antecedently exists a valid principle of law
that is binding, if only that fact could be recognized. Form is
revelatory again. Rhetorically, legal argument always presupposes
that there is an "out-there-ness" to legal rules. In serious legal
argument, there is never the sense that legal rules are something we
make up as we go along. Even new rules emerge from the past and
are presented by courts as rooted in the past.
Sometimes, poets of the common law say that it is a seamless
web. They are implying that it is complete, that it is internally
consistent, that there are no discordant tensions among its various
parts, and that there are no fragments, as it were, floating loose. Of
course, Legal Realism has taught that these kinds of inspiring poetics
are false.3 Indeed, the very idea that the common law evolves suggests
that it cannot be complete at any given time and that it is not
perfectly consistent. Nevertheless, the archetypal form of advocacy
just recounted presupposes the antecedent existence of correct legal
answers just waiting to be found and then applied to the case at bar.
Legal Realism notwithstanding, frequently there are correct answers
to legal questions. As in every other significant human activity, form
is important. Invariably, the form of advocacy reveals significant
truths.
Lawyers give similar arguments to each other as cases develop:
Look, Charlie. You have to figure out what you think the law is
yourself. I've worked it out, for my part. Of course, neither of us
will know until the jury decides and the court rules. Nevertheless,
even you may have to concede that the law favors us. Also, think of
how the jury may look at the facts of this case, not to mention how
they may contrast our clients.
Obviously, there is no explicit appeal to justice here. Nevertheless,
there is a covert appeal-through how the jury may look at the
facts-and every lawyer would understand that the theme of justice is
inherent in the argument. The tactful-perhaps, "good-ole-boy"suggestion is that there is a right result in that it favors the speaker's
client. As stated, this is the archetypal form of advocacy that lawyers
3. See generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995);
JAMES HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970: A HISTORY (1990); LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); WILFRED E. RUMBLE, AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968); WILLIAM
TWINING, CARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
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give when they are taking legal argument seriously.
Of course, lawyers always try to make their clients out to be as
sympathetic as possible. Sometimes commentators suggest that this is
the heart of lawyer argument: "My client is a neat guy (or at least not
as bad as the other fellow), so please-oh please! -give him what he
needs." Legal argument seldom actually works like this, although
poor jury argument occasionally does. The reason why lawyers always
try to make their clients look at least a little sympathetic, is that, as
Mary Poppins put it, "A spoonful of sugar helps the medicine go
down."' One wants to make it as easy as possible for a judge to apply
the law correctly. If the judge is blinded by passion or hatred against
someone-perhaps because he really has been a wretch-then the
danger of error increases.
Of course, lawyers give other kinds of arguments as well. They
start with invocations of fear ("I'm going to kick your ass."); they
refer to subjugation arising out of the asymmetry of resources ("My
client means for this to drag on for years."); they refer to asymmetries
in competence ("I've tried a bunch of these cases, my friend, and I've
never lost one yet."); they refer to the impassioned willfulness of the
client and his determination to prevail ("George, my client, is one
mean son of a bitch, and he means to have revenge here."); and they
refer to special connections with the judge ("The trial judge was my
brother's law partner for years. My! My! What do you make of
that?"). These are serious matters, and lawyers may be arguing, but
nobody thinks that these sorts of exchanges are legal argument.
Insofar as justice is an inherent part of archetypal serious legal
argument-whether express, implied, or downright covert-some
version of the so-called Doctrine of Natural Law is vindicated.5 The
name of this doctrine-the "Doctrine of Natural Law"-is misleading
to the contemporary English speaker. It derives from the practice
among Roman Catholic theological philosophers to distinguish
between revealed moral law (knowable only with special divine help,

4. MARY POPPINS (Walt Disney 1964). For convincing evidence that a lawyer's choice of
language matters, see JOHN M CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW,
LANGUAGE, AND POWER (1998).
5. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); John

Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY
ESSAYS 134 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). For historical background on the Doctrine of Natural
Law, see STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY: GROTIUS TO
HUME (1991); and ORIGINS OF THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION (Arthur L. Harding ed., 1954).

For a contemporary Roman Catholic exposition of the doctrine, see A.P. D'ENTRPVES,
NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2d rev. ed. 1970).
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e.g., scripture or revelation) and natural moral law (knowable by any
normal, rational human being through the use of natural faculties). In
the modern world, there are two significantly different versions of the
Doctrine. On the stronger version, there is no legal obligation to obey
the law if it conflicts in significant ways with important naturallyknowable moral principles. 6 On the weaker version, any legal system
worth the name-and in particular the Anglo-American legal
system-is shot through with moral principles. Being "shot through"
with naturally-knowable moral principles does not imply anything
violent or disruptive. Indeed, the way moral principles get into the
legal system is by seepage and permeation. Thus, the weaker version
of the Doctrine of Natural Law could be called the Doctrine of Moral
Seepage. How morals seep into law is not well understood and has
not been systematically studied.7 Probably there is significant seepage
before the formation of an actual legal system. Hence, there will
never be a time when the legal system was not thoroughly penetrated
by moral principles.
There is another set of versions of the Doctrine of Natural Law.
Classically, according to that doctrine, there were certain basic moral
propositions that could be known to be true. This knowledge was
acquired through reason in some manner. This approach to moral
epistemology is controversial. Consequently, there are several
different epistemologies for the Doctrine of Natural Law. This is true
on either the stronger version or on the weaker one. First, there is the
classical epistemology: there are moral propositions that are known
by the natural light of reason. Second, there is a "faculties"
epistemology: certain moral propositions are known to be true, but
not by reason. Instead, they are known by a special-perhaps
intuitive-faculty. Or perhaps we do not know how they are known,
we just know they are known by the mind but not through the faculty
of reason. Third, there is a view that basic moral principles are not
known at all. They are simply embraced, or, perhaps, they are

6.

See DAVID LYONS, MORAL ASPECTS OF LEGAL THEORY 6-7, 70-71, 82-87 (1993).

7. The place to start is with the role of informal norms in social regulations and what
sociologists call the social construction of reality. See J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal
Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105
(1993); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995);
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV.
338 (1997). Also see IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? (1999); RICHARD
F. HAMILTON, THE SOCIAL MISCONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: VALIDITY AND VERIFICATION IN
THE SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY (1996) for problems and JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION

OF SOCIAL REALITY (1995) for a sustained critique.
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expressions of what David Hume called the "calm passions."8 If the
last version is the correct one, then if human beings in different
societies have different fundamental "calm passions," or if the "calm
passions" are malleable by social forces, then moral systems would be
relativistic to some degree. 9 This would spell the bankruptcy of the
traditional Doctrine of Natural Law. Morality would become
relativistic through and through because its fundaments would be
socially conditioned. This last account of the nature of morality is

probably the prevailing one in our own day. Interestingly, there can
be a society-by-society moral relativism and the Doctrine of Moral
Seepage could still be true. The contention of that theory would then
be that, whatever the fundamental moral principles of a society were,
they could be counted upon to seep into the legal system, and the
legal system should embrace them. The exact sense of the "should" in
the last sentence is unclear and controversial. That, however, is a

matter for a different essay.
The rhetoric of advocacy involves the person arguing as well as
the argument. A lawyer's finding of good things in the past must be
authentic. It cannot be ersatz. Phoney promotions of the authority of
the past are likely to be found out; judges are adept at sniffing out this
sort of thing; inauthentic argument often fails. 10 Just as form is
revelatory, so is persona. Sometimes lawyers say they argue legal
propositions they know to be false.' Although I have only anecdotal
8. See 2 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 76 (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose
eds., London, Longmans, Green, & Co. 1874).
9. But probably not completely. See SISSELA BOK, COMMON VALUES 12-13 (1995)
(defending the existence of some universal values).
10. A point commonly made in manuals on legal argument and in sermons on advocacy is
that counsel is more effective when he believes in the justice of his client's cause. In general, this
requires counsel to believe that the law favors his client's position. This is commonly-received
wisdom among lawyers. See generally Stephen D. Easton, The Power of Truth: An Honest
Attorney's Guide to Winning Jury Trials in a Dishonest World, 62 TEx. B.J. 234 (1999). Under
the section-heading "Ya Gotta Believe," Professor Easton of the University of Missouri at
Columbia wrote this:
You cannot be an effective advocate if you do not believe, in your gut, that your
client's position is just, correct, and fair. If you do not believe that a verdict against
your client would be a manifest injustice, you are in serious trouble.
This does not mean you should believe that your client is perfect or that-he made
no mistakes. But if you do not believe your client should and must win the trial, you
should find someone else to try the case or urge your client to settle. The jurors need to
see and feel the strength of your conviction.
Id. at 238. Of course, all commonly-received wisdom is subject to doubt. Sometimes, cynical
lawyers reject this view and claim that they are extraordinary thespians. Interestingly,
Stanislavsky Method Acting calls for something like (near) belief that the actor really is the
character he says he is.
11. See LAURENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND: WHAT LAWYERS TALK ABOUT WHEN THEY
TALK ABOUT LAW 72, 127 (1997).
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evidence, this is not my experience or that of people who talk to me
seriously.

I.

SERIOUS LEGAL ARGUMENT

So what is it to take legal argument seriously? This simple-

sounding idea has many variants. Consider the following alternatives.
First, taking legal argument seriously is arguing seriously. It means

that when one is giving a legal argument, one should not be joking
around; one should give legal arguments with a straight face. Humor

and ridicule have hardly any place in legal argument. Even wry wit is
suspect and usually ineffective, even if memorable. Serious legal
argument precludes levity. Snottiness is verboten; snide remarks are
usually ill-advised; sneering is almost always a bad idea. Even scoffing
is to be avoided. Very restrained sarcasm is permitted; scorn is not.
Even irony is dangerous ground, though for contradictory reasons.12
Second, taking legal argument seriously is believing that superior
legal arguments determine the results in cases. On this view, a good

argument will always trump a bad one, so that the better argument

13
will always win.
Third, taking legal argument seriously is embracing the view that
substantively-good and rhetorically-good legal argument quite often
12. Obviously, this is not all that is meant when someone suggests that legal argument
should be taken seriously. The point is not to argue seriously (i.e., earnestly, logically, and after
good preparation), the point is to be serious when thinking about the role of argument in legal
affairs. Nevertheless, as an admonition about advocacy, the foregoing is probably correct for the
most part. An exception: reductio ad absurdum arguments have a place. They produce absurdity
when well done, and absurdity is both funny and a form of ridicule. On a different level,
incivility in front of a court also tends to suggest a lack of seriousness, not to mention weakness.
In any case, there are two approaches to the idea that legal argument should be taken seriously.
One derives from rhetoric, the other from jurisprudence.
13. Obviously, this is both a jurisprudential view and an admonition about rhetoric. This
conception of legal argument is both false and unrealistic. (1) As an empirical point about
rhetoric, the best argument does not always win. Some lawyers are quite adept at presenting
arguments, and some are not so good, and yet the inferior arguer may have the more-just case.
(2) Sometimes, the facts favor one litigant so clearly over the other that no amount of brilliant
argumentation will save the day. Occasionally, the same is true with respect to the law. (3) On
very rare occasions, judges have been bribed. At other times, they are stupid, biased,
inattentive, or in the grip of a false theory. (4) There are two concepts of good legal argument.
(a) In one sense, a legal argument is a good one when it is rhetorically well-structured and
highly polished in delivery. In legal context, rhetorically-good arguments will cite obviouslyrelevant cases in a sensible way. (b) In another sense, a legal argument is a good one
substantively and normatively. A good legal argument is one that entails a conclusion consistent
with the legal system, including its surface provisions, its patterns, and its deep structure. These
arguments attend to precedent with both depth and integrity. They attend to context and
change. Empirically, such arguments do not always win. In a perfect legal system, they would
always prevail. In sense (b), legal argument should be taken very seriously indeed. Of course, it
does not always happen in the real world. No legal system is perfect.
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has something important to do with how cases are decided. There is

usually not a one-to-one relationship, but there is some important
relationship. 4
Fourth, legal arguments are best framed in terms of truth, sound
legal principle, sound and widely-embraced social and moral values,
and without the overstatement of any of the foregoing. The best legal

arguments are well-crafted ones, both in their oral and in their written
aspects. Humility and modesty in presentation are not requirements,
though the absence of arrogance is. This is what it really is to take
legal argument seriously. 5

Fifth, the legal system, at its core, is about rights and obligations

16
(or "duties"), as well as-perhaps-some correlative concepts.
Establishing who has which rights and who has which obligations is
essential to legislation and administrative rule-making. Similarly,

adjudication is about the vindication of rights. Curiously, explicit
rights-discourse and duties-discourse are de-emphasized in
contemporary legal argument. Often, negotiation letters do not
expressly refer to the rights of the plaintiff as against the defendant.
Frequently, there is no explicit reference to the defendant's legal

obligations. The gist of the matter is quite clear, but the words "right"
and "obligation" are frequently not used when they well could be.
The same is true of a great deal of both briefing and oral argument

before courts, at least in civil litigation. Part of the reason may be
attributed to the general "revolt against formalism" which has
characterized the modern world.17 Rights-talk and obligations-talk

14. This proposition is obviously true, and it is a sense in which legal argument should be
taken seriously.
15. All of this is probably true. Judges stop listening and reading attentively when there are
errors or exaggerations. Passion in legal argument is best understated. Here I intend to contrast
legal argument with jury argument. No legal argument should ever be presented in a cavalier
manner. Attention to all these rhetorical virtues is one sense in which legal argument should be
taken seriously. A lawyer's reputation is created and judged on how well-crafted are his
arguments and presentations. This point applies both to written and to oral argument. Of
course, what constitutes style and good craftsmanship varies with the forum. None of these
truths implies that effective advocacy requires that the lawyer be consciously attuned to
philosophical or jurisprudential matters. Lawyers need not be philosophical moralists, logicians,
or scholars of jurisprudence. Many fine advocates have never heard of John Rawls, Ronald
Dworkin, Duncan Kennedy, or Tim Scanlon, and few have ever read much of them.
16. See generally WESLEY NEwcOMB HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
(Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919); JUDITH JARVIS THOMPSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990).
For a very unusual, but exciting, account of legal rights, see LLOYD L. WEINREB, OEDIPUS AT
FENWAY PARK (1994).
17. See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY
(1973); MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM

(1976).
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have a brittle, crystalline feel to them which suggests that legal rules
are antecedently complete. Rights-talk is inconsistent with the idea
that there is a good deal of judicial discretion. It is fashionable to

address courts as though they have substantial discretion, even when
they do not. It is unfashionable to argue to a court that it is bound by
antecedently-existing law and, therefore, hemmed in. The fear is that
the judge will say to himself, "I'll show this fellow how hemmed in I
am!" and then decide an issue adverse to counsel simply to teach him
a lesson in humility. Fashionable advocacy, these days, which may
also be prudent advocacy, often proceeds by invitation and fairlygenteel suggestion, as opposed to slam-dunk, deductive argument
18
based on black-letter, and obviously applicable, rules. 19
There are two concepts of how legal argument may be taken
seriously. First, it can be taken seriously as a rhetorical matter. This
18. The best advice I ever got about oral argument was from Justice Ben Overton of
the Florida Supreme Court. "Oral argument is the time when all the judges have read
the brief and the record and are prepared to decide the case," he said. "You should
think of your argument as the beginning of the judicial conference, and you are
privileged to be there."
Oral argument is a conversation you have with the court at the beginning of its
deliberations on your case. More than that, it is part of a continuing conversation that
the court has with lawyers about the development of the law.
Talbot D'Alemberte, Oral Argument: The Continuing Conversation, LITIGATION, Winter 1999,
at 12, 12. Obviously, slam-dunk, deductive argument designed to force people to conclusions is
no way to conduct a conversation.
19. Unquestionably, so far as adjudication is concerned, disputes over rights and
obligations are central. Why the rhetoric of the law uses these terms and concepts less
frequently than one would expect is a bit of a mystery. Much rights-talk these days is a shade
suspect. According to the media, criminals are always standing on their rights. The ACLU is
continually yammering about the right of free speech. Television shows contain rather
unattractive characters saying things like, "I know my rights." In addition, duties-talk sounds
rather old-fashioned, even Victorian. Rhetorical style has no necessary implications for logical
structure. Nevertheless, form is revelatory. But of what? It is probably no accident that most
advocates are not able to integrate classically-pure legal argument-argument that has to do
with cases and statutes-with public-policy argument. Often, high-level arguments in
adjudicatory contexts proceed by attaching public-policy arguments to the end of legal
arguments. Often, that is how law students are taught to do it in moot court classes, and their
conceptions do not mature as they grow as advocates. More's the pity! It should not be thought
that the language of duty is entirely alien to legal argument. It is impossible to give a jury
instruction on simple negligence without reference to the term "duty," and the formulation of
other torts is similar. Nevertheless, it is far less common to hear arguments presented in terms of
the duty of the alleged tortfeasor to be reasonable and how breaches of that duty have violated
the rights of the victim. Here is a speculation. The way the rhetoric of negligence works may
provide a key to why rights-talk and duties-talk have been displaced. To some extent, the forces
of darkness have been successful in reconceptualizing negligence in terms of some sort of costbenefit calculation. This is fairly easy to do because negligence essentially involves the idea of
reasonable conduct. How else could one think about the reasonableness of conduct except in
terms of what it costs to do it, the benefit of doing it, the costs of doing it carefully, and so forth?
It is very difficult, however, to translate more complex duties-talk and rights-talk into the
language of cost-benefit calculations. Cost-benefit discourse sounds much more like making
policy than it does like vindicating rights or establishing breaches of duty.
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has to do with how much impact an argument can have on an actual
decision and what a lawyer can do when crafting and presenting an
argument to maximize that impact. The second concept of taking
legal argument seriously is a normative conception. On this
conception, legal argument is taken seriously when it is thought that
logically-valid and legally-revelatory arguments that plumb the
depths of the law are more likely to contribute to the production of
correct legal solutions to the problems presented. Of course, there are
always rhetorical difficulties in setting forth a truly deep vindication
of any legal proposition. Sometimes, such vindications are simply too
complicated. In addition to rhetorical difficulties there are also
economic problems. Sometimes, it is too expensive to do the research.
It may be, therefore, that it is possible to take legal argument
seriously only in cases where the economics of the case will withstand
the expense. Another rhetorical problem in serious legal argument is
audience reaction to deep presentations. Argument must be attuned
to the audience. Finally, as indicated, in order to take legal argument
seriously, it must be recognized that, at its core, legal argument is
about certain kinds of duties and certain kinds of rights. This is
particularly true in the context of adjudication. To the extent that the
rhetorical practices of our times require some muffling of the
language of rights and the language of duties, rhetoric impedes truly
serious legal argument. Rhetoric is important, but rhetoric enslaves.
Nevertheless, one should do the best one can.
All forms of serious legal argument must involve the explication
of past court decisions. Both rhetoric and jurisprudence recognize and
embrace this fact. The past is a great generator of both rights and
duties. Extracting binding precedent from the past is one hallmark of
legally-revelatory common law argumentation. It is the way lawyers
in common law legal systems take legal argument seriously. 20 In the
vast majority of circumstances, the common law will yield an answer
that is uniquely determined, i.e., the one right answer.21 Because the
common law, and its cousin, statutory interpretation, constitute a
large, detailed, and complex system of norms, under the vast majority
of circumstances, correct application of the common law will yield a
uniquely-appropriate answer. 22 So far, this contention is
20. See generally Markovits, supra note 1.
21. See generally RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE LEGAL
ARGUMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1998).
22. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

(1982).
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uncontroversial. Do interrogatory answers have to be sworn? There is
an answer. Are captains of industry allowed to monopolize with wild
abandon and raise prices extravagantly? There is an answer. Are Girl
Scout troops permitted to exclude female children who are HIVpositive for that reason alone? All of these questions, and, indeed,
most dispositive legal questions that come up in the law courts, have
determinate answers that can be found out (i.e., discovered) and
about which there is little or no doubt. There are exceptions.
A. DeterminateAnswers
There are areas of the law where everyone knows there are no
determinate answers. Whenever a judge has discretion, there cannot
be a uniquely determinate answer. In this area, a judge gets reversed
for abusing his discretion, not for getting an answer wrong. On the
other hand, there is a determinate range of answers, and the judge's
decision must fall within that range, or else she will be reversed for an
abuse of discretion. The granting of injunctive relief is an explicitly
discretionary matter. It is not always clear from the language of the
governing rules that answers are indeterminate. Discovery rules are
frequently formulated in black-and-white terms, yet everyone knows
that there is a good deal of play in the application of those rules.
District-court discovery decisions are reviewed against an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. The range of acceptable decisions is
discretionary, and practitioners, for the most part, have a "feel" for,
or "sense" of, the range of acceptable answers. This "feel" becomes
more and more articulated as the applicable rules (such as discovery
rules) are used more and more over the years. Sometimes this "feel"
is widespread among lawyers, only to be overthrown by an appellate
court. Of course, this "feel" is also relative to individual judges. Some
judges are loath to grant temporary injunctions in, for example,
covenant-not-to-compete cases, 23 while they are perfectly prepared to
grant injunctions in domestic-violence cases. Some judges are
relatively open when it comes to discovery matters and are willing to
let lawyers press the outer limits of the rules, while other judges
23. The common law rules governing the validity of covenants not to compete are far from
black and white. Covenants not to compete will not be enforced as written unless they are
reasonable under the circumstances; this is the law in most states. Some judges regard it as
unreasonable to prevent a person from working in his trade just because it will hurt a large
company. Obviously, economic, moral, and personal values are at the forefront of such cases.
See generally Michael Sean Quinn & Andrea Levin, Post Employment Agreements Not to
Compete: A Texas Odyssey, 33 TEx. J. Bus. L. 7 (1996).
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maintain a much tighter control. Still, even with these judges, there is
a range of possible decisions outside of which judges may not go.
Someone might argue that for every well-developed legal system,
there are right answers even for questions where the standard of
review is abuse of discretion. If some answers are better than others
within the permissible range, an appellate court will not reverse the
trial court if it is in the range, but that does not mean the trial court
will be absolutely right. There was a better answer. Of course, this is
true. Sometimes, there may be right answers, but it is too expensive to
figure out what they are. On the other hand, it is sometimes simply
indeterminate what the right answer is. This truth does not follow
from the fact that we use an abuse-of-discretion standard in some
cases. That standard could be a response to the needs of efficiency.
Nevertheless, its use does suggest that the legal system does not
always contain uniquely-correct and findable answers in these sorts of
situations.
Of course, all this depends upon what question is asked. If one
asks, "Are there uniquely correct, findable answers in every case
which is governed by an abuse-of-discretion standard?" Then the
answer is "No." If one asks, "Can one pretty confidently give a range
of answers that, if given, will be wrong, when an abuse-of-discretion
standard is applicable?" The answer is pretty certainly "Yes." If one
asks, "Is there a range of answers which will be deemed acceptable?"
The answer is "Yes." If one asks, "Can one formulate a principle that
will express the theme to be found among the correct answers?" The
answer is again "Yes." The theme-expressing principle may or may
not be the rule of law that the trial court is expected to apply in
finding its answer and against which the trial court's actions will be
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Such a principle might either be a
rule of law or it might be the considerations outside any rule of law
that justify the rule. In covenant-not-to-compete cases, for example,
the extra-legal justifications might have to do with the morality of
promising, the need for protecting working people, the need for
protecting start-up companies, and so forth. None of these would be,
strictly speaking, a legal consideration, although they justify legal
considerations. At the margin, it may be difficult to tell the difference
between legal considerations and nonlegal considerations. Often, it is
easy to tell the difference. As in most matters, however, these types of
considerations shade off into one another, and there will be an
unclear domain. One wonders if there is pressure toward clarification
in that domain. In any case, it is not true to say that it is always clear
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whether the proposition is a legal consideration or a nonlegal one.
There is another way to conceptualize this situation. Perhaps, in
at least some cases where the abuse-of-discretion standard is used,
there are some things like general rights but not specific rights. Thus,
in a righteous covenant-not-to-compete situation involving a
departing employee, perhaps the former employer has the right to
some remedy, but not a right to an injunction. Or, better yet, perhaps
he has a right to an injunction of some sort, but not a right to
specifically this or that injunction. Even better, perhaps he has a right
to an injunction of, say, six months, but it also might be appropriate,
under the circumstances, for him to receive a longer injunction. In
other words, the departing employee (or his new employer) does not
have a right that the injunction be shorter than six months, although
he might have a right that it be shorter than a year. Thus, in at least
some abuse-of-discretion situations, perhaps there are gray areas
where rights are simply not at stake. This is a very difficult idea to
work out, especially where there are multiple remedies. It is difficult
to state, in traditional legal terms, why somebody should be awarded
a remedy if he does not have a right to it.24
Except for the abuse-of-discretion situations, almost the only
occasions when anyone seriously questions the presence of
determinate answers arise in close cases. Sometimes, these are new
situations with novel problems. Sometimes, they are old situations
with novel problems. An extremely interesting example of this sort of
thing came up in Texas this year. One of the issues in Douglas v.
Delp25 was whether someone who lost a business as the result of
attorney malpractice could recover mental-anguish damages from the
attorney. The court classified the loss of business as economic loss (an
obvious-enough truth, although it is probably not mere economic loss)
and, through Governor Bush's appointee, Associate Justice Deborah
G. Hankinson, held that "when a plaintiff's mental anguish is a
consequence of economic losses caused by an attorney's negligence,

24. Courts seem to recognize this problem and they say very strange things about it.
Injunctions are governed by an abuse-of-discretion standard, for example, and in one case the
Texas Supreme Court remarked: "No injunction decree will ever be perfectly just to both sides."
San Antonio Bar Ass'n v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 291 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Tex. 1956)
(unauthorized practice of law case). On one level, this remark is so obviously true as to be trite.
On another level, it entails that every injunction will be unjust to one or both parties. Surely that
is an odd doctrine to embrace. Probably, a court could not embrace it if, and to the extent that,
injunctions pertain to legal rights.
25. 987 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. 1999).
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the plaintiff may not recover damages for that mental anguish. '' 26
Attorney malpractice is obviously an odd situation, and most

instances of attorney malpractice cause nothing more than economic
loss, although there are significant exceptions where personal losses
are involved. Nevertheless, the question is a relatively novel one,
because in most jurisdictions, for many years, the recovery of mental
anguish required physical injury, except in a narrowly-defined range
of cases. The holding in Delp raises a very interesting question: do
judicial decisions involve internally-right answers?
Cases positing new rules, cases reversing old rules, cases writing
on blank slates, and cases considering novel questions are significant
for legal education, and this has both salutary and deleterious effects.
These are the ones that are studied in law school, for the most part, so
many law students become lawyers thinking that lots and lots of

issues are open to argument, are essentially contestable, and are
obdurately indeterminate. Many professors, because these are the
cases they teach, think about, and write about all the time, perhaps
believe that the law itself is radically indeterminate. Studying these

cases can be intellectually very exciting: the issues are often new,
judges seem innovative and courageous, the results and the
arguments are endlessly debatable, minds are enriched, spirits are
nourished. Such discourse is also clever, and it gives the speaker lots

of room to show off. One can take any word and show that it has
fuzzy edges, queer usages, and odd definitions. 27 The truth of the

matter is that most cases that come up in litigation are, from the
standpoint of legal rules, quite clear. Most litigation has to do with

factual disputes. Lawyers may twist and turn (or squirm) almost
26. Id. at 885.
27. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) (explaining that all
terms are open-textured to some degree). But see BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL
DETERMINACY (1993) (disputing the implications of Hart's theory). Millions of dollars have
been spent, for example, in recent years arguing about the meaning of the word "sudden." A
number of dictionaries say that "sudden" means "unexpected." Of course, not every unexpected
event happens abruptly or quickly. Most people think that in order for an event to be sudden, it
must be, in some sense, quick or abrupt. Dictionaries say both things, and litigants have been
squabbling over the matter for years. See generally H. Michelle Caldwell, Insurance Contracts
and Semantic Inquiry: The Limited Pollution Exclusion in Light of Amelia Bedelia, 5 ENVTL.
CLAIMS J. 349 (1993); Michael Sean Quinn & H. Michelle Caldwell, Insurance,Ambiguity, and
the Sophisticated Insured, 4 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 89 (1991) [hereinafter The SophisticatedInsured];
Michael Sean Quinn & H. Michelle Caldwell, Insurance Contracts and Semantic Inquiry: The
Case of the Limited Pollution Exclusion, 4 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 275 (1992). One recent case turned
on the meaning of a single word. The word was "occupy." One side took the view that "occupy"
meant physical presence, while the other side took the view that it meant something else. See
Kelley-Coppedge, Inc. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 980 S.W.2d 462, 464, 467 (Tex. 1998) (mistakenly
holding five-to-four that "occupy" does not mean mere physical presence).
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experimentally at the start of a lawsuit as they learn the law of a new
area and try to interpret it as favorably as possible, but most often, as
a law suit matures, a near consensus emerges as to which law applies
and what that law means. The existence of consensus is not always
obvious from the briefs, but what is not apparent from the writings is
28
usually acknowledged in the hallway discussions.
Sometimes all this goes wrong. What counts as a genuinely new
situation is a matter of some dispute, and lawyers will occasionally try
to make cases appear to be more controversial (or significant) from a
legal point of view than they really are. I once opened an oral
argument to a panel of the Eighth Circuit by stating that I was
bringing them a case of "national significance." Each of the judges on
the panel immediately looked up and, I thought, became much more
alert. I then tried to support my claim by stating that this was the first
case in which an important provision of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act was to be interpreted.29 The judges immediately and discernibly
became much less interested, and a kind of disgusted look crossed the
face of the presiding judge. So far as these federal judges were
concerned, construing the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and "national
significance" were inconsistent notions. Self-importance has its limits.
I was a young lawyer then, and I have not tried that kind of nonsense
since.
Many cases which come before even courts of last resort are not
genuinely new, novel, or even close. Such cases come to intermediate
appellate courts because appeal is a legal right, because some people
do not know when to give up, because negotiations are continuing
and more time is needed, because lawyers are giving bad advice,
because hope springs external from some wallets or purses, and so
forth. Such cases come before high courts (where jurisdiction is
discretionary) because they involve points upon which there is no
authoritative pronouncement, or because some lower court got it
wrong. Here is an example: for some time, it has been the law in
28. A column appears from time to time in a lawyers' newspaper in Texas called THE
TEXAS LAWYER. The title of the column is Power Practice. The linkage between the effective
practice of law and power is obvious. Nevertheless, a recent contribution to this column made a
number of perfectly-sensible points about how to deal with new discovery rules. It had nothing
to do with power. It had everything to do with elucidating rules, using them effectively, not
making mistakes, and being rational. See Mark C. Lenahan, Practice Makes Perfect: Tips on
Avoiding New Rules Pitfalls, TEXAS LAW., Apr. 12, 1999, at 33. Writers like to talk in terms of
power even when the real topic is rationality. In the minds of many lawyers, anything having to
do with strategy and tactics is really about power.
29. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601 to -607 (Michie 1997). For the court's discussion, see
Hi-Line Electric Co. v. Moore, 775 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1985).
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Texas, as it is in many places, that general contractors can be liable
for premises-defects created by their independent subcontractors if
the general contractor had a right to supervise the subcontractor (say,
as a result of the contract documents), even if it did not do so.30 In
early 1999, the Texas Supreme Court was presented with a case in
which employees of the independent subcontractor had said that they
would have done what the general contractor told them to do, if he
had spoken." The question before the court was whether such
testimony constituted some evidence that the general contractor had
a right to control the subcontractor. Both the trial court and
intermediate-level court of appeals had held that it did. The supreme
court quite correctly held that it did not. The fact that I will obey you
does not imply that you have a right to command me. This case was
not novel; it was not new; it was not even close. Many, many cases
before courts of last resort are just like this one. The Supreme Court
of the United States is perhaps an exception.3 2
B. Postulatesof Adjudication
This is not to deny that there exist legitimate contests over what
the law is, i.e., what the legal principles of the system actually are. It is
not to deny that under some circumstances competing answers as to
what the law should be may all be attractive. And it is not to suggest
that there is an internally-right answer, i.e., a right answer given the
nature and character of the legal system (and, therefore, its societal
matrix), for absolutely every legal question. We know that claim
cannot be true, given the amount of "play" (or "give") in the abuseof-discretion standard of review. There are internally-right answers
for many legal questions presented to courts, however, and it is a
necessary Postulate of Adjudication, to be delineated shortly, that
there are wrong answers in every case. Even the abuse-of-discretion
standard presupposes this truth.
Sometimes empirically-false propositions are valuable regulative
ideals. Lawyers, judges, public-affairs intellectuals (including those
who reflect upon the law, government, and politics), government
officials, and many others distinguish between legislation and
adjudication. Some knowledgeable people would say that this
30. See, e.g., Clayton W. Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Olivo, 952 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1997).
31. See Coastal Marine Serv., Inc. v. Lawrence, 988 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1999).
32. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of
Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PiTr. L. REV. 693 (1995).
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distinction is inherent in the idea that governmental powers are
separate. 33 Now, adjudication is a very special enterprise. It is to be
distinguished from making policy; it is to be distinguished from laying
down rules in the abstract to govern the future; it is to be

distinguished from the administration of institutions. Similarly,
adjudication is not adjustment, and judges are not adjusters.
Adjudication is not simply authoritative conflict resolution. It is that,
of course, but by conceptual necessity it is objective and rational
34
authoritative conflict resolution, with a dedication to truth.

Several other fundamental postulates (and regulative ideals)
distinguish adjudication from other activities. We have already

discussed the first one: (1) There are objectively-wrong answers
(given the nature and character of the legal system) for every legal
question. Here is the second one: (2) There are objectively-right
answers for a great many legal questions. And the third one: (3)
Resolving the presently-disputed case correctly is the principal

function of adjudication. Courts must focus upon the cases before
them. Legal disputes concern who has a right to what. In general,
legal disputes concern who failed to do his duty. The third essential
characteristic of adjudication yields a fourth one: (4) Adjudication is
about rights and duties.35 The fifth Postulate of Adjudication is: (5)
33. Often, courts are criticized for being legislative, i.e., for paying too much attention to
the future and to broad rules rather than to deciding the cases before them. In the early history
of America, legislatures sometimes adjudicated. See generally Christine A. Desan, The
Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1998).
34. There has been a good deal of scoffing among legal intellectuals at the idea that there is
such a thing as truth, that some propositions are true while others are false, and that it can be
known that some are true while others are false. The soon-to-be-pass6 movement known as
"Post-Modernism" takes up this theme with vigor. See generally THE TRUTH ABOUT THE
TRUTH (Walter Truett Anderson ed., 1995). For a different approach, see FILIPE FERNANDEZARMESTO, TRUTH: A HISTORY AND A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED (1999). Legal intellectuals
who embrace Post-Modernism will find the very idea of taking legal argument seriously
humorous, and they will laugh to scorn the Postulates of Adjudication. The foundation for their
mirth is both radical and moderate. The radical version would result from skepticism about
truth, rationality, and logicalpersuasion. The more moderate version would rest on a critique of
adversariality. The more moderate view would hold that "binary," oppositional argumentation
is incapable of getting at subtle and nuanced truth. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 5 (1996). When legal argument is placed in not-very-subtle mouths, the moderate PostModernist has a point.
35. Some observers suggest that when the abuse-of-discretion standard applies, there is
adjudication which is not about either rights or duties. This is an extremely-difficult position to
formulate and defend. It is necessary to develop an account of appropriate judicial action and
inappropriate judicial action in the absence of a claimant having a right. This is no easy matter.
Obviously, sometimes litigants have a right to a judgment. Are we to suppose that if a litigant
does not have a right to a judgment, then whatever the court does, within specifiable limits, is a
matter of grace? This polarity does not sound right, and yet we lack the legal vocabulary to
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Courts should proceed in as reasonable and rational a manner as is
pragmatically possible given the requirements of adjudication.
Adjudication is authoritative resolution on the basis of reasons.
Adjudication should never be arbitrary. (6) Not only should courts
use reasoning and rely upon reasons, but those reasons should be
normatively sound. They should be good reasons-the best available

reasons, indeed. (7) Courts should rely only upon reasons that are
somehow importantly rooted in community practices. Some of these
norms are statutes. Others are common law rules. Some of those

norms are deep canons of law. Some are extra-legal. Usually, systems
of norms widely governing conduct in communities and in societies
can be counted on to be relatively moral.3 6 Thus, at its foundation,
virtually by conceptual necessity, adjudication focuses on individual,
disputed cases and strives for both rationality and morality. To some
extent this postulate is a manifestation of the Doctrine of Moral
Seepage.

Advocacy within

the context of adjudication

necessarily

presupposes these postulates. If adjudication is to be both rational

and moral, it will attempt to find, if not the best resolution between
the parties, then at least a very good one, given the law. But for any

two proposed resolutions to a conflict, one of them is likely better
than the other. Advocacy in the context of adjudication presupposes

discuss further options.
36. Even cases in which there are widespread social atrocities tend to confirm this. The
atrocities are at variance with well-established moral norms in the society and with much of the
deep structure of that society's law. That is one of the facts that makes the atrocity shocking.
The case of Nazi Germany was like this. Of course, at the same time, there were social
tendencies which supported the atrocities. In the civilized world, those tendencies are almost
never univocal.
Japanese military leaders had adopted the ancient samurai ethos of Bushido to develop
a military code that engendered what two scholars have described as "a range of
mental attitudes that bordered on psychopathy," including the notion of "surrender as
the ultimate dishonor, a belief whose corollary was total contempt for the captive."
That contempt the Japanese troops now vented savagely on the American and Filipino
captives they herded along the route of the "Bataan Death March," a grizzly sixty-fivemile forced trek to crude prisoner-of-war camps near the base of the Bataan Peninsula.
Japanese guards denied water to parched prisoners, clubbed and bayoneted stragglers,
and subjected all the captives to countless humiliations and agonies. Some 600
Americans and as many as 10,000 Filipinos died along the route of the march.
Thousands more perished in the filthy camps. This death march presaged the pitiless
inhumanity that came to possess both sides in the ensuing three and a half years of war
in the Pacific.
David M. Kennedy, Victory at Sea, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1999, at 51, 56. Obviously, there
has been substantial shame experienced for this kind of conduct. That suggests the existence of
an underlying morality of decency which was temporarily overwhelmed by war. Of course, I am
not suggesting that the details or even the contours of that morality of decency would be the
same for all societies.
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that this is true, and the goal of adjudicative advocacy is to persuade
the decision-maker to adopt a good solution favoring one side or the
other. Thus, all adjudicative advocacy is result-driven. This is the
essence of the adversary system. Lawyers represent clients. At the
same time, adjudicative advocacy is also driven by the idea of finding
a good resolution to a dispute-of the resolutions proposed by the
parties, the better one (or the best one, if there are more than two
parties). (Of course, adjudication is not restricted to the approaches
suggested by the parties, although that is where courts mostly focus.)
Remember, I have argued that the rhetoric of advocacy works
best if the lawyer actually believes what she is saying. Hence, for the
most part, lawyers either believe propositions, ab initio, or talk even
themselves into positions. It is not as though lawyers generally start
off disbelieving some legal proposition and then convince themselves
that the proposition is true in order to advocate it effectively. The
process is much more incremental than that. The lawyer starts off
skeptical; she takes on the client; she doubts; she embraces the client's
cause; she sees the direction in which she must go; she comes to
believe. Miracle of miracles!
One of the psychological and spiritual dangers facing dedicated
advocates is repeated self-deception. I believe that a variety of my
observations suggest that repeated lying and repeated self-deception
are inconsistent with leading a happy life. For most people, overall
happiness over time requires a sense of integrity. Dishonesty in its
various forms undermines the sense of integrity.
How a lawyer must believe in the legal arguments he gives is
somewhat complicated. Believing in an argument is certainly not the
same thing as being convinced of the truth of its conclusion. Many
times, I have given to courts arguments of which I was personally
uncertain. At the same time, I was certain that other courts (or
perhaps even this court on other occasions) had found these kinds of
arguments compelling, convincing, or at least persuasive. No advocate
should be so arrogant that he regards his personal belief as the litmus
test for whether an argument should be given or embraced. Every
advocate has to concede that his vision of the law may be partial or
wrong. Under these circumstances, it will become the advocate's job
to formulate the argument in question in as convincing a way as
possible, anticipating and refuting or defusing objections, and to keep
his own personal qualms out of the rhetorical transaction. Still, as I
said earlier, most of the time this means that the lawyer will end up
believing the legal position he advocates-at least for a time. It is a
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disconcerting experience the first time you stop believing a legal
position you formerly believed with your whole heart.
Lawyers, in my experience, do not tend to advocate for positions
which they do not think courts can rationally accept.37 Most good
advocates will not knowingly give fallacious legal arguments. Of
course, such arguments are given all the time, but that results from
weakness of mind, not from intent. Nobel laureates and their ilk may
not suffer from this weakness, but all lawyers do-at least now and
again. There are no exceptions.
Sometimes, poor lawyers, or people who do not know very much
about what lawyers actually do, think that the duty lawyers have to
advocate zealously for their clients requires lawyers to produce for
judicial inspection every argument they can unearth or devise,
including perfectly-wretched ones. Sometimes, half-baked instructors
of advocacy at weak Continuing Legal Education programs suggest
that advocates should give judges shopping lists of available
arguments and that they should be arranged in descending order of
plausibility, judged by the lawyer's lights. This is a simple-minded
conception of advocacy which is completely unworthy of the grander
traditions of the profession. Zealous advocacy does not require that
every non-nauseating argument be submitted. It requires that good
legal arguments be submitted. Of course, "good" here does not mean
only those arguments that one knows in advance lead to internallyright answers. However, it does mean-subject to the intellectuallyand morally-corrupt but fortunately very narrow suggestions set forth
above-that only arguments which one believes have a very good
chance of persuading the reasonable judge should be given. As stated,
frequently the dedicated advocate will end up believing these
arguments herself, at least for a time.
Of course, most legal argument is not about legal principle in the
abstract, although, occasionally, legal argument is about whether a
broad principle should be subject to some new exception. For the
most part, legal argument turns on how a principle should be applied
to the facts of a given case. Often that argument turns on a kind of
argument which is more difficult to formulate succinctly, to wit: given
a background legal culture, which facts in a given case should be
thought of as predominant, pre-eminent, and pervasively influential?
37. There is an exception. It arises when an advocate knows that a judge is a fool or that a
judge has an impassioned and irrational attraction to a stupid position. In that case, the lawyer
will give the argument the judge wants to hear. Most good lawyers can barely stomach doing
this, however.
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Such arguments are difficult to formulate succinctly or, as it were, to
wind around legal principle. They also seldom play a role in anything
which should be called precedent, and it is here where the most
enduring disagreements among lawyers persist. Not long ago, a
distinguished Texas appellate advocate, Rusty McMains, addressing
the Dallas Bar Association, stated unequivocally that "the supreme
court does not understand insurance law." This lawyer is given to
provocative statements. At the same time, he probably meant what he
said. In addition, what he probably meant was that the supreme court
did not have a feel for how facts fit together in insurance cases. He
was saying that the members of the court do not have an educated
sensibility about which facts are significant in insurance cases
(broadly conceived) and which ones are not. He is saying they do not
have a sense for factual patterns and their significance. Of course, a
jurist must have a sensitive, sensible, and reliable conception of
different factual paradigms and their variations. This is one reason
why broadly-experienced lawyers are frequently better judges than
inexperienced or only narrowly-experienced ones.
Some lawyers, especially when they talk to each other or when
they are giving iconoclastic speeches, enjoy repudiating the
framework of rationality I am suggesting. Some lawyers enjoy saying
cynical things to each other, which extol the role of power in
persuasion over the role of rationality.3 8 Some of this is braggadocio
and swaggering. But not all. The Postulates of Adjudication are by no
means perfectly fulfilled in the real world. Courts make mistakes,
even courts of last resort. Venue matters. Reputation matters. Whom
you know sometimes matters, as does how you know them.
Connections can be important. Campaign contributions are not
always causally insignificant. Judges are people; therefore, they have
personalities, passions, and predilections. Persona can be as
important as rationality. (This follows from the fact that argument
must be embodied correctly, as well as formulated correctly.) The
same case may be decided differently if different facts contained
within the case are highlighted differently, conceived differently,
emphasized differently, embraced differently, and so on. The fact that
adjudication is a series of completely-human institutions does not,
however, imply the falsity of the postulates. It simply recognizes the

38. For an interesting general, though speculative, account of these matters, see PETER
SLOTERDIJK, THE CRITIQUE OF CYNICAL REASON (Michael Eldred trans., University of Minn.

Press 1987).
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complexity of the real world and the fallen state of man. The status of
these postulates is further complicated by the tension that inevitably
and always exists between stability and change in the system of norms
that should govern adjudicative decision-making. Nevertheless,
genuine adjudications happen; our legal system is not even remotely
corrupt (except for occasional pockets here and there); and sensible
decisions are reached all the time. Often, all objective observers agree
that the court reached the only truly correct answer. Often, after
allowing a period for recovery and an interval for refocusing on the
forest (as opposed to the trees), even the defeated lawyer will agree.
A lot of criticism of this decision or that holding focuses not so much
on the decision itself as on where the court might go with the rule it
employed or laid down. Such slippery-slope anxieties are not
necessarily really a critique of the decided case.
C. Puzzles and Paradoxes
Obviously, taking legal argument seriously does not require
believing that the law always, always generates-or even mostly
generates-uniquely-correct answers. It requires only that the law
have a strong tendency in that direction. The idea of internallycorrect answers, however, is significantly linked to important
jurisprudential ideas. Precedent is one of them, while the systematic
nature of the common law is another. Indeed, these two ideas are
themselves intimately connected. To use the words of Melvin
Eisenberg, the common law all at once tries to satisfy standards of
"social congruence, systemic consistency, and doctrinal stability."3 9 It
is impossible to generate internally-right answers without attending to
these characteristics. One important way to do this is to attend to
precedent and systems of precedent. But these are not the only values
that shape the law's search for uniquely-right answers, and not all of
the values at stake are consistent, as Eisenberg implies. How can
there be right answers when there are uneliminable tensions within
the common law itself, the most important of which is the triangular
tension among (i) history-tradition-predictability, 4 (ii) rationality
39. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 50 (1988) (a book
framing "a theory of common law adjudication," id. at vii).
40. See the dissent of Justice Lloyd Doggett in Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air
Control Board,852 S.W.2d 440, 452-79 (Tex. 1993) (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting). This
question is especially problematic for a judge when the judge agrees that the particular change
requested by the advocate is warranted but is concerned about the amount of change which has
preceded the case in question and which will likely come afterward. (Justice Doggett now sits in

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:655

(and appearing reasonable in the present), and (iii) future-oriented
moral rectitude?
The proper use of precedent is crucial to forming and using this
triangle correctly. To do this the concept of precedent must be
understood correctly. In order to explore precedent, it is necessary to
elucidate some quite-theoretical legal meta-doctrines. 41 In particular,
the meta-doctrine of stare decisis (also known as the Doctrine of
Binding Precedent) is riddled with vagueness, ambiguity, and
multiplicity. 42 As a direct result, the basic nature (and, hence, the
principles) of legitimacy for common law regimes seems murky. If the
fundamental principles out of which the authority of a legal regime is
generated are vague and ambiguous, then must not the legitimacy of
the regime itself be uncertain and, therefore, ambiguous in various
ways? Actually not. It is, in part, vagueness, ambiguity, and
multiplicity that give stare decisis its social and political power.
Knowing how to manipulate this murkiness constitutes one (rather
43
mysterious), but very important, dimension of effective advocacy.
Does not its murkiness give ruling elites the leeway they need to
change the law incrementally? After all, the ambiguities in the law
will be more known to educated legal elites than to others. But how
can vagueness and murkiness support the idea that legal argument
should be taken seriously or the idea that sound legal arguments will
mostly produce internally-right answers? Are not murkiness and
ambiguity the friends of subjectivism, relativism, and mush?
There is a paradox here. Two fundamental values underlying the
Postulates of Adjudication, and, therefore, underlying legal practice,
rhetoric, and philosophy are Truth and Justice. (That these terms are
frequently capitalized- "T" and "J" - testifies to how fundamental
they are.4) To say that truth is a fundamental value is to say, first, that
we should base our actions (and, hence, our beliefs) on true
propositions and not false ones, and, second, that we should look for
Congress.)
41. Meta-doctrines are doctrines about doctrines, or, better, doctrines about deciding
doctrines. They might also be called theories about thinking about theories, principles about
arguing principles, or rules about applying rules.
42. See generally Hayden C. Covington, The American Doctrine of Stare Decisis,24 TEX. L.
REV. 190 (1946).
43. The ambiguity inherent in stare decisis also illustrates the extent to which implicit
consent makes the functioning of government-in this case the judiciary-possible. Implicit
consent is itself a notoriously-obscure concept, as every student of political theory and
fundamental jurisprudence knows.
44. See RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE
AMERICAN LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE, POWER, AND GREED 3,21-22 (1999).
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truth and hope to find it. Therefore, courts should base their decisions
on correct apprehensions of the law, i.e., upon true propositions of
law, and not false ones, and they should insist upon looking for truth.
Surely, vagueness, ambiguity, and multiplicity are enemies both of
truth and of all sound truth-seeking processes. Just as surely, this
claim is true for institutions seeking truth no less than for evidentiary
procedures and people. Of course, Aristotle was right: one ought not
to seek more precision than can be found.45 Nevertheless, one ought
to seek all the precision one can afford. In contrast, states of affairs
will be adjudged just on a widespread basis (in social life at least) only
if major standards of justice have certain imprecisions, vaguenesses,
and ambiguities at their foundations. 46 Justice is always blurry.
Consensus, and, therefore, legitimacy, is possible only upon this basis.
Precision in evaluating the morality of social and political states of
affairs creates disagreement and precludes agreement. (Many are the
young lawyers who discover, to their initial chagrin, that huge
numbers of deadlocks in contractual negotiations can be solved only
through ambiguity and vaguenesses.) Hence, truth (which reqnires
precision) and justice (which requires inexactitude) cannot both be
obtained in any political regime vaguely resembling democracy. Most
people will find these observations disturbing, if not offensive. For
better or for worse, most people are Platonists in the sense that they
believe that the moral order is not only "out-there" objective but
through-and-through consistent at its foundations.
The argument just sketched suggests that detailed truth and
precise justice are inconsistent in any large social system, especially a
pluralistic one. There are more, and somewhat different, problems.
Justice hinges on finding legal truth, but what counts as legal truth is
determined by a measuring rod that cannot be read univocally.
Justice requires truth, but knowing the truth about what-the-law-is
cannot be had. How can this be? The meta-doctrine of stare decisis
values getting adjudications right, doing justice, focusing on
practicality, achieving wide-spread fairness among the populace,
achieving a public perception that adjudication is more or less
45. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1094b11-14 (H. Rackham trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1982).
46. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996).
Sunstein argues, in effect, that doing justice in common law legal systems is possible only
through the use of what he calls "incompletely theorized agreements." See Cass R. Sunstein,
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). This means that cases are
best decided without much reference to broad principles, clear rules, grand theories, and the
like. According to Sunstein, if justice requires a theory of justice, no legal system can be just.
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rational, and creating and maintaining a belief on the part of the
public that common law adjudication is moral, on the whole. At the
same time, the doctrine of stare decisis tries to accommodate itself to
both stability and change. These are tall orders, which- ultimatelycannot all be accomplished at the same time. It is for this reason that
the common law is in perpetual, complex tension. Tensions must be
glossed over to get cases adjudicated or settled. Hence, the world
demands murkiness. But how can there be right answers in these
situations?
D. Digressionon Lawyers and Truth
The preceding discussion should not be confused with the
currently-popular suggestion that the activities of lawyers have almost
nothing to do with either truth or justice. "Kick-ass" lawyers love to
say things like this either when they have just won a case or when
they are recruiting clients. Cynical lawyers love to insinuate that cases
they have won should have been lost (and would have been, in the
hands of lesser persons) and that their clients should bring them
business because they will work miracles. Such lawyers imply that
facts have little to do with the resolution of lawsuits, that jurors are
incapable of grasping the truth, and that justice is invariably
ephemeral if not downright illusory. This is power-trip rhetoric andfor the most part-should not be taken seriously as an account of the
legal profession. Some legal academics, however, share the view, if
not the rhetoric. Sanford Levinson adopts this view wholeheartedly:
"[N]othing could be further from the day-to-day life of the lawyer
than the search for truth. '471 have put Levinson's Theorem to a large
number of litigators. By far, the majority of them think the claim is
not just a little bit untrue, but radically false.
Most disputes involving legal rights are resolved before suit is
filed. Frequently, the role of the lawyer in these disputes is to find out
what the facts are. Although law schools do not do much of a job of
intentionally training law students in fact-finding, lawyers are, for
some mysterious reason, frequently better than are people trained in
other disciplines at isolating and articulating undisputed facts, in
describing factual disputes and evaluating their implications, and in
fitting facts together with rules. Often, when lawyers get involved and
figure out what (some of) the facts are, disputes are resolved. The
47. Sanford Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know (and What Do They Do with Their
Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer and Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 441,455 (1985).
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same thing is often true after cases are filed. This observation is
especially true when the lawyers know each other. Frequently,
discovery is a process of finding out what witnesses think is true. In
the average case, much more time is spent finding out what the
witnesses believe they saw, heard, and so on than is spent
undermining these views. (Of course, some time is spent limiting or
eliminating testimony.) In that context, the question is whether the
witness's testimony is credible. Questions of credibility turn on
whether a witness should be believed by a rational fact-finder. The
central focus of that part of discovery known as "document
production" is focused on finding out what a range of documents say.
Surely, that is a step in finding the truth.
Settlement is no different. Of course, there is a good deal of
posturing that goes with the processing of any lawsuit. This is
especially true of settlement negotiations. However, virtually all
experienced litigators know how to ignore such carrying on, and I
confess that I do not understand its psychological and social
functions. It has zero impact on knowledgeable and dedicated
litigators. Mediation as a settlement device is all the rage these days,
all over the country. Mediation is extremely effective at encouraging
both direct and indirect dialogue among lawyers and sophisticated
litigants. One of the key questions in any settlement negotiation is:
"What is the fact-finder likely to believe at the end of the day?" Most
of the subsidiary questions which arise under this general rubric
pertain to facts, credible testimony, arguments from experts, and the
like. All of these are connected to the truth. (Of course, the talents of
opposing counsel are figured into the mix, and often if opposing
counsel has an impressive record of winning jury trials, he is
portrayed as a rhetorical magician who can make the worse argument
appear the better. Often, it is quite clear that this rhetoric is a selfdeceptive cover. It is a way for defendants with liability to authorize
settlement, without having to admit to themselves and to their
superiors that someone has misbehaved.)
Levinson follows his Theorem with this remark: "The task of the
lawyer is that of the ancient Greek orator-the production of belief
on the part of an audience, regardless of the merits of the belief. It is
belief alone, and not knowledge, with which the lawyer is
concerned." 48 This cynical observation is quite false. This is so for two
reasons. First, lawyers argue. Argument does not cause belief in free
48. Id.
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and relatively-rational agents. There is all the difference in the world
between hypnotically inducing belief and convincing someone that a
proposition is true. To be sure, lawyers are in the business of
persuading. They are in the business of convincing. But, for the most
part, their job is to convince by means of arguments. Even many socalled emotional appeals in jury trials are actually arguments. For
example, when the plaintiff's lawyer argues that a certain accident has
ruined the life of the plaintiff-destroyed love, wrecked beauty, laid
waste to a marriage, destroyed effective parenting, and so forth-the
plaintiff's lawyer is trying to get the jury to take seriously the
emotional dimensions of the injury allegedly caused by the plaintiff's
allegedly-actionable conduct. The second reason why lawyers care
about knowledge and not just about belief is that in the vast majority
of cases, the most reliable way in which to bring about belief is
precisely to bring about knowledge of certain facts and to limit the
significance of other alleged facts. Belief is certainly important. Factfinders define facts based on what they believe them to be. But one of
the most reliable ways to induce the sort of belief upon which
someone will base a significant decision is to provide rational grounds
for that belief. After all, knowledge has something to do with justified
49
true belief, even if that is not the actual definition of knowledge.
Of course, these remarks do not imply that the adversary system
always, or even quite frequently, guarantees justice. In every
rhetorical situation, there are both facts and spin. They cannot always
be distinguished reliably, although they are obviously distinct
conceptually. It is surely one of the responsibilities of a lawyer to
place as attractive a spin as possible on whatever facts are introduced
into evidence. It is also a lawyer's responsibility to deconstruct, as it
were, the spin placed upon the facts by opposing counsel. Some
lawyers are better spin-doctors than others. Sometimes, very good
lawyers make mistakes. Sometimes, excellent lawyers overlook
things. And not every lawyer is either excellent or very good. Of
course, some of these defects will be present in any human system.
Others are a product of the adversary system. Under no
circumstances, however, do the problems and deficiencies in the
adversary system establish the Levinson Theorem. In fact, it should
not be treated as a theorem at all.

49. See generally PLATO, TH{EAETETUS, reprinted in 6 PLATO, GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD (Benjamin Jowett trans., Mortimer J. Adler ed., Encyclopedia Britannica
1996).
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II. COMMON LAW DECISION-MAKING AND THE NATURE OF
PRECEDENT: BEGINNINGS

Perhaps the defining characteristic of common law decisionmaking is that precedent is taken seriously. If one takes legal
argument seriously in a common law system, one must take precedent
seriously, and one must take arguments from precedent seriously. 0 So
far as common law causes of action are concerned, the foundation of
legal rights and legal duties is precedent. Consequently, insofar as the
common law is concerned, the source for all rights-talk and all dutiestalk is precedent. Of course, there may be extra-legal glosses on the
meaning of various precedents, or upon the meaning of key concepts
to be found in those precedents. Nevertheless, precedents themselves
are internal to the law, the glosses-such as those which are currently
suggested from economic theory5' -come from outside the law.
The common law consists of judge-made law. Judges do not view
themselves as nabbing decisions or reasons out of thin (or even thick)
air. Common law judges work very hard to create texts that will make
their decisions appear to be anything but pluckings. Sometimes, the
judges will try to suggest that they have been driven to a conclusion.
Sometimes they will argue that their conclusion is the only reasonable
one. Sometimes they will suggest that it is the best decision, or-at
least-a very good one. Common law judges try to do this on the basis
of the facts proved and on the basis of the law as they understand it.
Frequently, both the law and the facts are laid out at some length.
This form of common law decision-making presupposes the idea that
not just any principle can be counted as a legal principle, that
principles cannot be interpreted to mean just anything, and that there
is an "out there-ness" about legal principle. In general, judges will try
to suggest that the legal principle they are applying in a given case
was not created by them for that case but antecedently existed,
somehow, "out there," outside the mind of the individual judge
making the decision. The meta-doctrine of stare decisis, of course, is
designed to serve this function. Even in cases of first impression,
judges will say they are trying to determine whether a jurisdiction
50. For a helpful summary of typical discussions of the nature of precedent, see RICHARD
A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION

39-55 (1961) ("many consider precedent to constitute the essence of the case-law system," id. at
56).
51.

See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES &

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC

STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW (1987).
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recognizes this or that rule, principle, or cause of action.
A. Stare Decisis
Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase "stare decisis" this
way: "To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases. 52 This authoritative
source is the starting point whenever a lawyer tries to get a handle on
a legal concept or legal doctrine. It is important to notice how
complicated and many-limbed Black's "definition" of stare decisis
really is. The entry continues as follows:
Policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled
point. Doctrine that, when court has once laid down a principle of
law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and
property are the same. Under doctrine a deliberate or solemn
decision of court made after argument on question of law fairly
arising in the case, and necessary to its determination, is an
authority, or binding precedent in the same court, or in other courts
of equal or lower rank in subsequent cases where the very point is
again in controversy. Doctrine is one of policy, grounded on theory
that security and certainty require that accepted and established
legal principle, under which rights may accrue, be recognized and
followed, though later found to be not legally sound, but whether
previous holding of court shall be adhered to, modified, or
overruled is within court's discretion under circumstances of case
before it.... The doctrine is limited to actual determinations in
respect to litigated and necessarily
decided questions, and is not
53
applicable to dicta or obiter dicta.
An enormous amount lies hidden in this lengthy definition, if that is
what it really is. The bottom line is that, if a court decides a point of
law, after the adversarial parties have raised it and argued it and after
the court has thought about it carefully, then it is binding on some
range of courts (possibly including the court that decided the point) if
it was a matter of some importance in the decided case. A good deal
still lies hidden. To use the words of the definition itself, what are the
criteria for when the court has made a "deliberate or solemn
decision"? When does one know that a court has made such a
decision? Is it really the decision which constitutes stare decisis, or is

52. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). According to Bryan Garner, the
phrase "stare decisis" is literally translated "to stand by things decided." BRYAN A. GARNER, A
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 515 (1987).
53. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 52, at 1406 (citations omitted); see also DAVID
M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW, 1174-76 (1980).
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it the principle that generates the decision? 4 This last question has
generated conundrums in jurisprudence for years. Obviously, any
decision can be generated by a large number of principles, so that if
legal principle is what constitutes stare decisis, then one is always
asking what the true justificatory principle of a case really is.
This generates all sorts of practical problems. One standard
gambit in advocacy is to narrow a precedent. This can be done in lots
of ways. One can point out that other jurisdictions do not follow it.
One can show that it is not used in analogous cases. Or one can
demonstrate that the language used to state the rule is broader than
was warranted by the facts of the lodestar case or cases. When is such
advocacy legitimate? And how can one know?
Moreover, at its core, the doctrine of stare decisis implies-quite
generally-that even if a legally-authoritative rule is wrong at
inception, or becomes wrong over time, it should still be followed
years later by "lower" courts, if it is not very, very, very wrong.
Because the thesis is quite general, authoritative rules that are
morally wrong should be followed by lower courts years after the
decision, even if they are proved morally wrong. But, the doctrine of
stare decisis is itself thought to be a moral rule. This will be brought
into focus presently when a relationship between the doctrine of stare
decisis and the ideal of the Rule of Law is discussed. Thus, broader,
system-related considerations-such as fairness-dictate that single,
isolated rules that are morally wrong be applied in individual
instances. Besides, the argument goes, if appellate judges know this,
they are likely to take their original epistemic and decisional duties
more seriously. Still, there is something disturbing about claiming that
a moral rule can require that avoidable, less-than-moral acts be
performed.
These considerations create two sorts of problems: practical and
moral. How can it possibly be morally obligatory that courts should
apply and follow a law which is manifestly unjust? How can it be
moral for a court voluntarily to apply a law which it knows to be
immoral? How can lawyers in good conscience argue for the
application of a law that they know to be unjust and immoral? Is this
kind of commitment really a good idea from a practical point of view?
54. For some historical reflections on this problem, see Gerald J. Postema, Some Roots of
Our Notion of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 9 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987). That essay is
immediately followed by Jim Evans, Change in the Doctrine of Precedent During the Nineteenth
Century, at page 35. Evans demonstrates how the authority of precedent depends upon morefundamental philosophical theories about the nature of law.
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Is not this kind of commitment really impossible if legal argument is a
moral enterprise?
Then again, how often do such crises arise? How often is it
obvious that an established legal rule will not only be immoral but
will appear unequivocally immoral to the populace? Surely, such a
wrenching dissonance will-at least over time-present itself as a
crisis in legitimacy. This almost never happens in commercial law, nor
in most regulatory areas (e.g., environmental law), nor in most areas
of property law. (The law of slavery in the last century is the principal
exception.15 ) Moreover, some rules that are immoral in isolation or in
contemplation are much less so when taken as part of a system or
when they have become conventionally received among all the
players in a given game.
Of course, sometimes common law backs away from a hard-andfast rule but does so without expressly overruling it. This is the stuff
of which legal history is made. A hundred years ago, if a party
breached a contract, the other party was excused from performance.
This doctrine was routinely applied, for example, in insurance cases.
If the insured failed to give timely notice to the insurance company,
the insurance company did not have to perform.5 6 This is no longer
the law in most jurisdictions. Now, if an insured fails to give timely
notice, but the insurer is in no way injured, the insurer still has a duty
to perform. In some states, old cases were overruled; in some states,
they faded away; in Texas, the supreme court said it could not bear to
overrule its own relatively-recent decisions, so it begged the executive
branch to fix the problem, which it promptly did.5 7 The solution
created by what is now called the Texas Department of Insurance was
to create a mandatory endorsement. Interestingly, the mandatory
endorsement does not cover certain important areas of now-existing
insurance policies. The Fifth Circuit, not long ago, predicted that the
Texas Supreme Court would not stick by its now-aging reluctance,
but would, by decision, extend the rule of substantial compliance. 8
55. See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860

(1996); WILLIAM E. WIETHOFF, A PECULIAR HUMANISM: THE JUDICIAL ADVOCACY OF
SLAVERY IN HIGH COURTS OF THE OLD SOUTH, 1820-1850 (1996).
56. See Klein v. Century Lloyds, 275 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1955); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
Hamblen, 190 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1945). For a comprehensive treatment of this entire matter which
is both historical and systematic, see 1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES,
§ 1.04, at 11-19 (3d ed. 1995).
57. See Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cutaia, 476 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1972).
58. See Hanson Prod. Co. v. Americas Ins. Co., 108 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1997); see also
McPherson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 1965).
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B. Precedent,Principle,and Policy
There is a well-known distinction between, on the one hand,
moral entitlements, which are a matter of right (as in A has a right to
x) or a matter of principle (B has a duty to refrain from repeating A's
obtainingx) and, on the other hand, matters of policy (as in It would
be a really good idea for A to do y).59 In this sense of the term
"policy," it is probably not true that the doctrine of stare decisis is a
matter of policy, as the quoted entry in Black's Law Dictionary
indicates. Probably, people who live in common law jurisdictions have
a defeasible (i.e., defeatable or overridable) moral entitlement that
the judiciary shall use meta-doctrines of stare decisis. The traditional
justifications for this moral entitlement are defective, however. Here
is one of the usual, traditional arguments. One of the most important
features of a stable society is the ability to plan for the future on the
basis of the past. If people engage in transactions or spend money to
create authoritative plans (such as trust documents, wills, complex
gifts, and so forth), they have a right to be able to rely upon publiclyavailable and authoritative rules. Think in terms of this analogy: if I
am invited to come upstairs to a second-story room and it is indicated
to me that I should use the stairs, I have a right to rely on the idea
that the stairs will hold me. This analogy does not apply perfectly to
society, however.
Having the right to rely on legal rules is an exquisitely-complex
matter. The right to stare decisis is a very complicated right, if there is
such a right. It is subject to all sorts of qualifications, and those
qualifications correspond to the true nature and the strength of the
meta-principle itself. As a consequence, the moral entitlement one
might have to stare decisis is no simple matter to express. I will not
try here-perhaps later, in another place. There is a more pressing
problem, however. There is not one meta-doctrine of stare decisis.
There are several such doctrines. Which version of stare decisis is
applied in a given case can critically affect the outcome of the case.
Indeed, it is possible to generate different answers in the same case,
depending on which meta-doctrine is used. This more-complex and
more-realistic conception of stare decisis is not consistent with the
reliance argument just developed, if the only entitlement is that stare
decisis be used, i.e., that one of the meta-principles bearing that name

59. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-100 (1977); MARKOVITS,
supra note 21, at 95-97.
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be used.
C. Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law

Some version of stare decisis is probably required by the Rule of
Law-which is, perhaps, at the apex of the hierarchy of meta-6
doctrines

governing

adjudication

and

legal

decision-making.

0

Compliance with the requirements of the Rule of Law is an oftlauded political ideal, which is only occasionally spelled out in any
detail. Antonin Scalia, an Associate Justice on the United States
Supreme Court, has suggested that the Rule of Law requires that the
law consist of rules.61 This claim is probably wrong if there is a
distinction between rules and principles as Ronald Dworkin has so
famously suggested. 6 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia is on the right track.
The fundamental idea underlying the ideal of the Rule of Law is that
arbitrary power be limited through stable general norms. 63 Surely they
play a crucial role in achieving the Rule of Law.
Sketchily put, the Rule of Law consists of ten meta-principles.

First, the government (including courts) should not act or refrain
60. Anthony Kronman has suggested that stare decisis is a necessary component of every
legal system. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1032
(1990). I suspect he is right, because every legal system is trying to regulate a social system over
time, and every social system changes. Some change more slowly than others, but all change.
But see generally Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis, in
PRECEDENT IN LAW, supra note 54, at 73. Wesley-Smith distinguishes stare decisis as conceived
by legal positivism and stare decisis as conceived by the declaratory theory of law. According to
Wesley-Smith, a common law judge should be attracted to the declaratory theory of law,
because it absolves them of personal responsibility for bad decisions, since they are-after allsimply declaring law which is already binding on them. At the same time, the declaratory theory
of law cannot provide an account of stare decisis, which requires that judges follow previous
decisions that are wrong. See id. at 80. "Positivist assumptions ... thus provide intellectual
support for.., stare decisis." Id. at 82.
We are therefore led to the position which prevailed when the declaratory theory of
law was orthodox: stare decisis cannot be law, precedents cannot be absolutely
authoritative. Judges owe their fidelity, not to the pronouncement of predecessors, but
to the law. They might not now identify that as ancient custom, and in practice they
will usually discover it in the law reports, but they are ultimately free to reject a
precedent if they do not believe it represents the law.
Id. at 87 (footnote omitted).
61. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989). Also see Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 733
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A government of laws means a government of rules. Today's
decision on the basic issue of fragmentation of executive power is ungoverned by rule, and
hence ungoverned by law.").
62. See DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 22-28.
63. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev ed. 1969); John M.A.
DiPippa, Lon Fuller, the Model Code, and the Model Rules, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 303 (1996);
Robert S. Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominent Philosophy of
Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1978); Special Issue on Lon Fuller, 13 LAW & PHIL. 253 (1994).
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from acting, and it should not require others to act or to refrain from
acting, except upon the basis of legal norms. Second, the commands,
mandates, demands, and directives of government officials (including
judges) are not legally obligatory unless they are based upon law.
Third, all provisos of law must be at least minimally clear. Fourth, all
legal norms are public. Fifth, all legal norms are general. Sixth, all
systems of administering legal norms must involve regularity: similar
cases must be treated in a similar manner. Seventh, and this may
come to the same thing, legal norms must be applied fairly. Eighth,
the process of applying legal norms must be as peaceable as possible,
orderly, and not subject to extra-legal influences. Ninth, the process
of creating, invoking, and applying legal norms must be reasonably
rational, and the process of presentation must maintain the
appearance (and, therefore, the encouragement) of substantial
rationality. (Of course, rationality in a legislative context may differ
from rationality in judicial or administrative contexts.) Tenth, legal
norms should not require the impossible. As a consequence, for the
most part, legal norms may not retroactively require conduct. 64 The
past cannot be changed. That is impossible.
There is a significant question as to whether (and the extent to
which) the common law can conform to the ideal of the Rule of Law.
The tenth component of that ideal creates most of the problem. When
common law courts create causes of action, they create them
retroactively, for the most part. In other words, when P begins a
lawsuit against D in jurisdiction J, seeking a remedy on the basis of a
cause of action which exists in J2 but not J, or which exists nowhere at
all, the court of original jurisdiction will (probably) dismiss the
lawsuit for failure to state a claim (i.e., for failure to articulate a cause
of action). Chances are good that the intermediate-level court of
appeals will affirm the trial court. Sometimes the supreme court of J,
will reverse. If it does, it will find that the relevant cause of action
does exist in J,, and it will apply the new cause of action in the very
lawsuit before it. One must either say that (some) common law rules
64. For a survey of various conceptions of the Rule of Law, see THE RULE OF LAW (Ian
Shapiro ed., 1994). In their contribution to this volume, William N. Eskridge, Jr., and John
Ferejohn suggest that the Rule of Law is met if the commands of the legal system "are general,
knowable, and performable." William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation,
and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra, at 265, 265; see also Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989). Professor Radin's paper contains a
list of components of the Rule of Law very similar to my own. She says they boil "down to two
principles: first, there must be rules; second, those rules must be capable of being followed." Id.
at 785.
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exist before they are declared to exist or that-to some degree-the
common law fails to conform to the tenth principle. It is tempting to
say that the rule existed all along and that most informed observers
would have guessed that it existed. That is what the counsel of
lawyers is for-to explain these risks. But hindsight is much better
than prediction, and whether a given jurisdiction is going to adopt a
new cause of action is almost always a highly-contingent, speculative
matter until adoption actually happens. 6 For these reasons, it is
difficult to see how common law adjudication can completely
conform to the ideal of the Rule of Law, when courts create causes of
action retroactively. If we say that the law exists before the courts
apply it, then not all legal norms are public, and the fourth principle is
violated, as well as-perhaps-the tenth. If we say that courts create
new legal norms after the fact, then the tenth and perhaps the third
principles are endangered. Fortunately, this phenomenon does not
happen very often. 66 Moreover, when new causes of action are
created, there are frequently harbingers of their creation. It has
certainly happened in the middle of the twentieth century, when
courts all over the country adopted strict liability in tort. Harbingers
included previous court decisions, the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
and many scholarly writings. 61 Perhaps it is a breach of the Rule of
Law we can live with if the common law and the Rule of Law
otherwise fit together pretty well. Law students see courts create
more causes of action in their case books than any practicing lawyer
sees created in a lifetime. As a consequence, many law students come
out of law school believing that the common law is much more
generative and creative over short periods of time than it actually is.
The meta-doctrine of stare decisis fits reasonably well with the

65.

See generally MAX BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (4th

ed. 1997); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in
Legal Scholarship:A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging and Hindsight,65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1998).
66. When it does happen, the violation of the Rule of Law is often cushioned. Frequently,
the defendants against whom causes of action are retroactively enunciated are repeat and
sophisticated players in the litigation system, which have reserved funds against such
contingencies as the creation of new causes of action. Such players include large businesses and
insurance companies. Often, liability insurance is in the background of decisions in which new
causes of action are created. Of course, this is not always true. Nevertheless, the presence of
repeat, sophisticated players reduces the discord between the creation of new causes of action
and the tenth principle of the ideal of the Rule of Law.
67. For an account of the rise of strict liability, see Michael Sean Quinn & Nicole Chaput,
Tort Liability and Reinsurance Contracts, 8 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 1967 (1995) (many historical
sources and histories discussed). See generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING (1949).
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ideal of the Rule of Law.68 Here I am discussing actuality and not just
possibility. Stare decisis is designed to give a rough-and-ready
decision-procedure for determining what rules constitute a valid
common law norm. Now, does this meta-doctrine comply with the
Rule of Law? Apparently, it complies with the first meta-principle: it
provides a method for restricting governmental mandates to legal
norms. Second, it helps distinguish legitimate government commands
(those based on law) from illegitimate ones. Third, it helps guarantee
that all legal norms are at least minimally clear. If a norm were not
minimally clear, it could not be selected by stare decisis. Fourth, stare
decisis applies only to public rules; the meta-doctrine helps preserve
the requirement that legal norms be public. Fifth, stare decisis is
designed to pick out general norms. Sixth and Seventh, stare decisis is
designed to pick out general rules, which will help judges treat like
cases alike. These rules are supposed to be, and to sound like, good
reasons for making decisions. Eighth, stare decisis cannot guarantee
fairness, but it can guarantee that general rules are what get applied.
Ninth, stare decisis resists disorder and extra-legal influences. Tenth,
the application of stare decisis (on most theories of its nature) is a
69
rational process.
Of course, no actual legal system ever conforms (or could ever
conform) to the criterial marks of the Rule of Law perfectly. In these
matters, everything is a matter of degree. On the other hand, it is
obvious that some legal systems finish way ahead of others. It does
not take deep, scholarly knowledge to know this, although, perhaps,
only scholars can work out the details of these matters. Moreover, it
may also be that the legal system is thought to be poor from the point
of view of the Rule of Law and that opinion turns out to be mistaken.
Such opinions can be held broadly in various cultures for ideological
reasons, and those widely-held opinions can be wrong. 70 In any case,
law provides decision-makers with a bank of good reasons for their
decisions.
68. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 50, at 56 ("many consider precedent ... to exemplify all
that is truly magnificent in the notion of 'the rule of law').
69. Keep this in mind, however, when we discuss the Subjective Critical Theory. It is not
clear, however, that the meta-doctrine of stare decisis does not, from time to time, assist courts
in requiring the impossible.
70. Courts from time to time adopt the Good Reasons Approach quite expressly. For
example, the New York Court of Appeals laid down a new rule: "There is no controlling
decision in this jurisdiction on the question here involved. In various opinions there may be
found statements which indicate conflicting views. We are at liberty, therefore, to adopt the
view which seems to us to be supported by the best reasons." Davis v. Modern Indus. Bank, 18
N.E.2d 639, 641 (N.Y. 1939) (emphasis added).
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III. THESES
Obviously, I have been sketching with bold strokes. This pattern
will continue. I have two inter-related theses to argue in this paper.
One of them is a practical thesis focusing on effective advocacy. The
other one is a normative thesis, and it focuses on how legal reasoning
ought to be done as a matter of sound jurisprudence.
A. PracticalThesis
My first thesis is a practical one, and it is this. There are different
theories regarding the nature of stare decisis within its usual-"blackletter" - canonical formulations. Some formulations of stare decisis
are much stronger than others. Effective advocacy sometimes
requires selecting and relying upon that theory of stare decisis most
conducive to the argument presented. Learning how to do this is not
difficult. Experienced appellate lawyers already know that what I am
saying is true. Sophisticated lawyers already do what I am
recommending, although they may not think about it systematically.
Advocacy to judges involves not only highlighting the right facts and
selecting the right legal principles and arguments, but also involves
deploying the right meta-doctrines and meta-principles. Taking legal
argument seriously involves using the right meta-doctrine. It is like
what the pianist does with his left hand. At the same time, this kind of
unauthorized shifting around is not to be encouraged in philosophical
jurisprudence (and political theory). Its responsibility is to formulate
the doctrine (or group of doctrines) correctly. How stare decisis
works in actual, honorable advocacy is a necessary prolegomenon to a
correct jurisprudential formulation. But that is all it is.
B. Normative Thesis
These reflections lead to my second thesis, which is normative. I
will suggest that there is an irreducible pluralism within the doctrine
of stare decisis itself. Courts conceal-or, at least, do not emphasizethe irreducibility of this pluralism, because that might affect the
public's perception of the legitimacy of the common law.
Nevertheless, this irreducible pluralism exists, because it is found in
sound and honorable legal practice. An irreducible pluralism means
that there are different principles of stare decisis that cannot be
eliminated or translated into each other and that lead to inconsistent
results. Does this means that it is possible to take legal argument
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seriously and yet to confess that serious legal argument will not
always converge upon one internally-right answer? (If there is an
irreducible pluralism of competing meta-doctrines of stare decisis,
then there is an inevitable pluralism of internally-acceptable answers
to legal problems. There will still remain internally-wrong answers,
however.)
I say that the pluralism among meta-principles of stare decisis is
irreducible because there are no (meta)-meta-principles for deciding
when to use which rule of stare decisis. The problematic character of
this situation can be overstated. Decades ago, Karl Llewellyn
suggested that there was such a thing as a "situation-sensibility," by
which he meant that experienced lawyers-because of their training
and experience -had an understanding of situations that other people
do not have. It is a way of being able to classify the world so that lifesituations in flux can be seen as members of a type.7 There is a
situation-sensibility at work when applying various meta-principles of
stare decisis. It is surprising how quickly knowledgeable,
sophisticated, and reflective lawyers grasp which common law rules
from the past should apply and how they should be formulated.
Almost anybody who observes the legal scene for very long knows
that this is true, although the only evidence for it is anecdotal. Still,
there is a significant irreducible pluralism, albeit for a fairly-narrow
range of cases.
I certainly do not mean to suggest that each meta-principle
formulating a variant of stare decisis is overall as good as the others,
although every one of them has some virtues and some vices. A
thorough, moral, jurisprudential, and political evaluation of these
competing principles will have to await another day, however. There
is space here to sketch only a few different approaches, show that
each of them is independently rooted in the law, discuss their use in
advocacy a bit, and explore a few vices and virtues briefly and more
or less dogmatically. Fortunately, advocacy is structured and limited
by moral considerations.7 2 In the end, I will be arguing for the rather
odd and paradoxical proposal that, although there is considerable
relativity regarding which meta-doctrine of stare decisis counsel may
71. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 60-61 & passim (1960). For
a recent discussion of Llewellyn's situation-sensibility, see Chris Williams, The Search for Bases
of Decision in Commercial Law: Llewellyn Redux, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1495 (1984) (reviewing
LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW (1983)).

One does not have to have practiced law amongst excellent practitioners for very long to see
this kind of practical intelligence work quickly and very well.
72. See MARKOVITS, supra note 21, at 61-74.
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appropriately use, there is very much less relativity about how cases
should be decided. On every issue as to what the law is and how it
should be applied to a stipulated, agreed, undisputed, or somehowfixed set of facts, an array of answers are wrong and demonstrably so.
For a great many such questions, there is only one correct answer,
and it can be proved by means of serious legal argument (although
not generally to the lawyer who loses the case). Finally, in the small
set of cases where, in the end, there remain competing answers
among which no sound choice can be made, this fact implies that
there is a narrow range of cases where no right answer can be found,
when it is needed. There may be right answers out there to be
discovered in many of those cases. It is just that we do not have the
information, the time, the money, the discernment, or the wisdom to
find them. For all of these situations, of course, there are wrong
answers that can be found and which should be rejected. What I have
said still does not imply that there exists a right answer to every
question. There might be some questions that are simply
indeterminate, even when all the law and all the facts are known.
Perhaps the legality of taking sperm from the body of a dead man for
the purpose of inseminating his widow is a question like that for the
late 1990s.73
C. The Common Law and Stare Decisis Meta-Doctrines
There are at least six distinct versions (or theories) of stare
decisis and its component concepts.7 4 I call these meta-theories the
Imperial Theory, the Holdings Theory, the Holdings-Plus Theory, the
Flexible Theory, the Subjective Creative Theory, and the Objective
Creative Theory. These categories are part of the multiplicity
discussed earlier; they are "ideal types," of course.75 In actual,
concrete, historically-significant opinions, these Theories may be
asserted or used concurrently. Often, courts explicitly commit
themselves to more than one Theory at the same time. Their implicit
usages and commitments are more complex. In fact, judicial opinions
do not come anywhere near embracing any version of the Creative
Theories. Sometimes, judicial opinions may exemplify one of those

73. See Lori B. Andrews, The Sperminator,N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 28, 1999, at 62.
74. For a different way of categorizing different doctrines of precedent, see
WASSERSTROM, supra note 50, at 53-54.
75. See NICHOLAS ABERCROMBIE ET AL., THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 205
(3d ed. 1994).
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Theories, but judges can be counted on not to espouse either of those
Theories. The reasons for all this are discussed later. This is part of
the generative and stabilizing murkiness discussed earlier. Lawyeradvocates are very wise, most times, not to spell out specifically the
meta-theory upon which they are relying, even if they themselves
should know. It is best simply to speak in terms of precedent, without
reference to any theories. In the practical world of litigation, "under
theorization" is a very good idea, indeed.7 6 For their part, legal
scholars distinguish the various meta-doctrines of stare decisis in
different ways.77 Actually, although I pluralize only the Creative
Theories, each of these Theories is really a family of theories; for each
Theory there are subspecies. All the Theories, however, will be
sketched here, but no more. Only a few of the subspecies can be even
mentioned. A full taxonomy will have to await another day.
In illustrating these Theories, it is important to focus on one
body of law. Skipping around from one state to another is a priori not
a good idea. I contend that each Theory (or traces of them) will be
found in every jurisdiction. Besides, most states focus on their own
law most of the time. This is true even when the high court says that
courts of a given jurisdiction should pay attention to what is going on
in other states.78 Many discussions of stare decisis by American
lawyers focus on the role of the doctrine in constitutional law. 79 1 have
deliberately focused elsewhere because most law arises elsewhere.
Undoubtedly, the concept of the common law has tremendous
prestige all over the United States and is at the heart of our legal
regime.80 For no reason except the accident of residence, a large
population, considerable public wealth, media attention to its legal
affairs, and antecedent familiarity, I use Texas law to develop the
doctrine. Texas law seems typical, though I have no guarantee of

76. See generally ANTHONY D'AMATO, HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE LAW (1989),
77. See generally RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (4th ed. 1991). For some
other ways to think about precedent, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
LAW § 20.1 (5th ed. 1990). See also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent:A
Theoreticaland EmpiricalAnalysis, 19 J.L. & Econ. 249 (1976). Posner argues that precedent is
analogous to stock of capital goods, i.e., goods which are used in the production of other goods.
See also EISENBERG, supra note 39, at 47.
78. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 522 (Tex.
1995) ("Courts usually strive for uniformity in construing insurance provisions, especially where,
as here, the contract provisions at issue are identical across the jurisdictions").
79. See Note, ConstitutionalStare Decisis, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1344 (1990); see also John
M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for "Unnecessary" Constitutional Rulings in Civil
Rights Damage Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (1999).
80. See generally A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW (1995).
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this. 8' Moreover, I have drawn much of my material from insurance
cases. This is a harmless-enough bias: insurance cases involve themes
of contract, tort, and public policy, so they reflect many of the themes
to be found in the common law generally.
The Texas Supreme Court has written several prose poems in
honor of stare decisis on a number of occasions.82 These paeans
contain all the usual elements of venerating history, worshiping
custom, embracing successive adaptations, glorying in flexibility and
growth, celebrating continuity and predictability, while all the time
keeping precedent in mind. Courts and great judges frequently write
this way.83 There is a theory of epistemology called the Verstehen
Doctrine, according to which knowledge of human affairs consists of
fundamental and unanalyzable cognitive intuitions-fundamental
graspings of the understanding. 84 Thoughtful judges and their courts
appear to adopt this view when they talk about how lawyers know
which aspect of the common law to accent. They seem to think that
there is a sufficiently rich and uncontroversial Verstehen Doctrine to
account for how we know when a legal argument has come to the
right conclusion. This is obviously not very satisfying. Nevertheless,
systematic, rigorous discussions of stare decisis are not to be found in
judicial opinions. Odes to stare decisis tend to be more inspirational
than they are rigorous. Alas, even the inspirational component is thin.
Let's try a somewhat different approach. Roughly put, the metaprinciple of law known as stare decisis is the proposition that
something about previous decisions of supreme courts (at least)
provides a very, very, very good reason for deciding subsequent
similar cases in the same way.8 This could be called the Good
81. There are at least two ways in which Texas is atypical. First, it has two courts of last
resort. The Texas Supreme Court hears only civil cases, while the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals hears only criminal cases. Occasionally, the two courts interact. For example, in the
recent controversies over scientific expert witnesses, the two courts have moved, more or less, in
tandem. See Michael Sean Quinn, Memory, Repression and Expertise: Civilly Actionable Sexual
Misconduct in Texas and Individual Rights, 3 TEX. F. CIv. RTS. & CIv. LIBERTIES 1 (1997).
Second, Texas has many intermediate-level courts of appeals. Many states do not have this
geographic regionalization. It is entirely unclear that a holding from one court constitutes
precedent for another.
82. See Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603,608 (Tex. 1975).
83. See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1921).
84. For a systematic exposition of the ideal of Verstehen, see H.P. RICKMAN, WILHELM
DILTtEY: PIONEER OF THE HUMAN STUDIES, 74-87 (1979).
85. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 571 (1987) ("The bare
skeleton of an appeal to precedent is easily stated: The previous treatment of occurrence X in
matter Y constitutes, solely because of its historicalpedigree, a reason for treating X in manner Y
if and when X again occurs"). The phrase "a reason" does not really capture the force of
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Reasons Approach to precedent. 86 At this point it does not involve
any account of why the reasons are good. Moreover, it does not
involve any account of whether judicial decisions need to be
persuasive (for political reasons) or how judges can make them
persuasive. The Good Reasons Approach is not a theory of
persuasion. What counts as a good reason is determined by the
normative-conceptual structure of the context in which a reason may
be a good one or a bad one, not by whether it actually persuades
anybody of anything. 87 The word "good" is ambiguous in rhetorical
contexts. A good argument may be a persuasive argument, or it may
be one that has true premises and is formally valid. The Good
Reasons Approach suffers from the same ambiguity.
It starts with a phenomenology of reasoning in legal contexts.
The strength of the reason which precedent supplies is really prima
facie dispositive. In other words, an applicable precedent is, in and of
itself, a crushingly-good reason for deciding a case in a given way,
barring overriding opposing reasons. Perhaps the best way to put this
is to say that precedent is binding. A reason is binding in an
institutional context if the decision-maker is wrong to decide a case
contrary to what that reason prescribes. Unfortunately, all of this
phraseology does not really illuminate much of anything. All I am
coming up with here are different multi-syllabic ways of saying pretty
much the same thing. Then again, this negative point is true of most
accounts of precedent.
Thus, not only does the doctrine of stare decisis help maintain
"systemic consistency" and "doctrinal stability," 8 it also contributes
to our sense of the objective-external object-like-reality of the
common law. Stare decisis suggests that there is objectivity inherent
in the law. Moreover, the use of precedent creates a sense of
evenhandedness and a notion that decisions are replicable. In
precedent.
86. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 50, at 83 (viewing precedents as reasons); Frederick
Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995). Courts from time to time adopt the
Good Reasons Approach quite expressly. See, e.g., supra note 70.
87. For a helpful and authentically-personal discussion of persuasiveness in judicial
opinions, see Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). For an
extremely interesting discussion of rhetoric in the context of legal reasoning and persuasion, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 498-530 (1995). Analogously, morality is sometimes
conceptualized as a bank of good (indeed, presumptively overriding) reasons for practical
reasoning and decision-making. Perhaps the leading exponent of this view is KURT BALER, THE
MORAL POINT OF VIEW: A RATIONAL BASIS OF ETHICS 296 (1958).

88. EISENBERG, supra note 39, at 50.
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addition, it serves the ends of due process, broadly conceived,
because the application of stare decisis involves notice and, hence,
facilitates the values both of justified reliance and of the avoidance of
unfair surprise. 89 In other words, stare decisis seems fair. None of the
grounds of the doctrine of precedent explains its meaning, however.
None of the grounds of the doctrine of precedent shows how stare
decisis can be reconciled to the need for moral rectitude in
authoritative legal decision-making.
The true meaning of stare decisis-the proposition that the rule
of a precedent provides a very, very, very good reason for deciding
similar cases in the same way-depends upon the meaning of the
phrase "very, very, very good reason." Essentially, this phrase is the
matter under discussion here. Each of the Theories named above and
discussed below gives a different account of this phrase's scope and
meaning. Nevertheless, whatever the correct understanding of the
doctrine of stare decisis, its conceptual components and contrasts are
always the same: precedent, holdings, dicta, judicial dicta, and obiter
dicta. How these concepts relate is the key to understanding different
theories of stare decisis.
IV. THE IMPERIAL THEORY OF STARE DECISIS

According to the Imperial Theory, when a principle of law has
been deliberated upon (i.e., thought about), expressly formulated,
and posited as law by an appellate court, it must be followed in similar
cases. This rule is especially powerful where the precedent was set by
the supreme court of the appropriate jurisdiction. 9° This rule applies
to any principle of law that has been decided by the highest court. It is
particularly inflexible where trial or intermediate-level appellate
courts are concerned. In other words, authoritative expressions of the
law, deliberately stated, constitute precedent when stated by the
supreme court and other appellate courts.
A. ImperialInflexibility
Four components of the Imperial Theory are significant. First,
stare decisis applies to all principles of law that have been decided.
89. Eisenberg discusses these values at some length. See id. at 47-49, 50-76. He thinks that
stare decisis also contributes to social congruence and the enrichment of the law by the courts.
90. See, e.g., Jones v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local Union No. 936, 601 S.W.2d
454, 461 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Duval County Ranch Co. v. Foster, 318 S.W.2d
25, 28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Second, it appears to apply with full force to legal decisions of
supreme courts but with lesser force to legal decisions of intermediate
appellate courts. Third, stare decisis applies to some components of
some decisions of intermediate-level appellate courts. Fourth, the
force of the idea of a "very, very, very good reason" is quite high. It is
virtually indefeasible when it involves a decision of the supreme
court. The age of a case does not matter. The fact that the case was
decided five-to-four, or its equivalent, does not matter. Thus, if an
appellate court reflectively and deliberately lays down a rule, then
that rule is virtually decisive in any relevant case in any lower court.
This meta-principle is to be inflexibly applied.
B. Authoritative Expression/DeliberateStatement
The Imperial Theory tries to capture the idea of a principle of
law having been decided and, therefore, having become inflexibly to
be applied. Some courts have said that this characterization applies to
any principle of law which is an "authoritative expression" of the high
court or which is a "deliberate statement" of a principle of law by the
high court.91 The mature Antonin Scalia appears to subscribe to the
Imperial Theory 2
So far as I know, no court has ever specified criteria for what
constitutes an "authoritative expression" or a "deliberate statement"
of the law. Is everything the supreme court says deliberately about
the law binding upon the courts of appeals? What are the criteria for
determining whether a statement is deliberate? What are the criteria
for determining the authoritativeness of an expression? Obviously, if
these are questions without definitive answers, then what constitutes
an "authoritative expression" or a "deliberate statement" is
essentially contestable. Significantly, there is nothing about the
phrases "authoritative expression" or "deliberate statement" which
suggests that stare decisis is limited to the factual situation (abstractly
conceived) in the authoritative case. On the Imperial Theory, the
reach of stare decisis is very broad. As a theory of precedent, these
phrases are generative, open-ended, and protean. The concept of
what-has-been-decided is not a self-defining concept, and it is not

91. See, e.g., Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. App.
1988, writ denied); Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 697 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.
1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987).
92. See Scalia, supra note 61, at 1185 ("I believe that the establishment of broadly
applicable general principles is an essential component of the judicial process").
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necessarily restricted to the actual facts of a given case. After all, a
reason for a decision is necessarily more general than the decision,
and giving a reason necessarily commits the giver of the reason to the
general application of that reason.93
Do these phrases suggest that everything the supreme court
says-not otherwise described, say, as dicta-be binding upon lower
courts? After all, we are all aware that supreme courts take an

enormous amount of care with their decisions. They are argued,
researched by counsel, researched again by the court personnel and

by the judges themselves (perhaps), written slowly, reviewed a
number of times, discussed by justices and their minions, and so forth.
Probably, the best way to determine what is precedent on the

Imperial Theory is to look to the actual law-language of the court.
One should attend to only that language that constitutes a deliberate
statement of the law, and attend to only that language that constitutes
an authoritative expression. How these matters are determined will
vary from case to case. Expressly-designated tentative musings, legal
history, and targets of reputation are treated differently. On the
Imperial Theory, however, text is crucial.
Sometimes, advocates use this general idea of what constitutes a

more-authoritative expression, although it is not usually said. In the
(second) alternative, an "authoritative expression" may be anything
the court says on a general topic of the case establishing that the
matter has been briefed and argued and carefully considered. This

can be determined from the content, length, and form of the court's
prose, as well as the tone of the language used. In the (third)
alternative, perhaps there are other ways to limit the phrase

"authoritative expression." One of the hallmarks of the Imperial
Theory is the smashingly-decisive strength precedent is supposed to
have. 94
93. See Schauer, supra note 86, at 638, 656.
94. Occasionally, this point is made in perverse ways. Some intermediate courts have held
that the doctrine of stare decisis is not only a rule of precedent but also a rule of preclusion. See,
e.g., City of San Antonio v. Aguilar, 696 S.W.2d 648, 653 (Tex. App. 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e. and
dism'd). Most courts, to be sure, refer to stare decisis as a rule of precedent and say nothing
about preclusion. There is a striking contrast between stare decisis and res judicata: "The
doctrine of stare decisis ... is based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the
judgment which results therefrom. In this particular stare decisis differs from res judicata, which
is based upon the judgment." Horne v. Moody, 146 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940, writ
dism'd judgm't. cor.). Under the Imperial Theory, the reach of a binding supreme-court
precedent can be quite broad. For example, under the Imperial Theory, if the supreme court
construes two similar statutes with nearly-identical wording, then its construction of one statute
is binding precedent with respect to the construction of the other. See Neie v. Stevenson, 663
S.w.2d 917, 919 (Tex. App. 1983, no writ). The temptation to conflate the two must be very
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C. Range of Application
Under all theories of stare decisis, but especially under the

Imperial Theory, precedent is extraordinarily powerful in the areas of
statutory construction, 9 property rights, 96 and regulating the practice
of law.97 The reasons are different in each case. Regulation of the bar
is said to be a matter especially within the power of the courts. Notice

and reliance are particularly strong values in the area of property
rights. And judicial constructions of statutes, not subsequently
changed by the legislature, are often taken to have become part of the
statute itself. The idea is that if the legislature does not overrule the

judicial construction, it has adopted it. (Have you ever heard a more
na've account of legislative process?)
Stare decisis does not apply to findings of fact. It applies only to
rules of law. Even the Imperial Theory agrees on this point. As a
result, stare decisis is less strong in areas which are pervasively factintensive. One good example is the construction of a will. 98 However,

Texas courts occasionally have departed from the principle that stare
decisis applies to the law only and not to findings of fact. This
departure has arisen mainly in boundary disputes. There are several
cases in which appellate holdings regarding boundaries have been
deemed to govern subsequent litigation regarding the same
boundaries, even though the new litigants were not parties to the old
case. 99 This is a misapplication of the doctrine of stare decisis. It
powerful. Justice Steakley, a very influential member of the Texas Supreme Court for a number
of years, wrote at length to distinguish between res judicata and stare decisis. See Zollie
Steakley & Weldon U. Howell, Jr., Ruminations on Res Judicata,28 Sw. L.J. 355, 356-57 (1974).
95. See James v. Vernon Calhoun Packing Co., 498 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1973); Marmon v.
Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 193 & n.1 (Tex. 1968); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
McDaniel, 327 S.W.2d 358, 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959, no writ); see also Sonnier v. ChisholmRyder Co., 909 S.W.2d 475, 489 (Tex. 1995) (on behalf of a four-person minority, Justice Owen
accuses a five-person majority of ignoring the idea that the doctrine of stare decisis has some of
its greatest force in the area of statutory interpretation).
96. See Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tex. 1975). There are limits, of course. For
example, cases about slaves decided before the Civil War are no longer binding precedent when
it comes to property rights and human beings. The property concepts in such cases, however,
may very well work quite well for other cases involving property rights. Nevertheless, it is
regarded as poor taste to cite these cases, if one can find anything else at all to cite. Because
quite a lot of time has passed, there are always other cases to cite.
97. See Daves v. State Bar of Texas, 691 S.W.2d 784, 789 (Tex. App. 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Banales v. Jackson, 601 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Tex. App. 1980), motion denied, 610 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.
1980).
98. See, e.g., Alviar v. Gonzalez, 725 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see also Young v. State, 488 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (applying this
principle in a criminal setting).
99. See, e.g., Porter v. State, 15 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929, no writ); Note, 8
TEx. L. REv. 387 (1930); see also Eppenauer v. Ohio Oil Co., 98 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1938);
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probably represents a triumph of reliance over justified reliance in the
area of property ownership. Nevertheless, the late and authoritative
commentator of Texas law, Gus Hodges, calls it a "radical extension

of or departure from" the doctrine of stare decisis and, therefore, to
be rejected. 1°° Perhaps the court confused the construction of deeds, a
purely-legal matter where stare decisis is relevant, with boundary

disputes, which frequently involve issues of fact.
Under

the

Imperial

Theory,

the

innovative

powers

of

intermediate courts are quite circumscribed. Obviously, courts of
appeals have a duty to follow clear rules which are laid down by the

supreme court.0 1 Additionally, courts of appeals must exercise selfrestraint in creating exceptions to well-settled rules or in elaborating
new doctrines; 10 2 they may not change rules by adopting new legal
theories; 103 and they may not discard legal theories which have the

imprimatur of the supreme court, even if those theories are
manifestly outmoded and very likely to be rejected by the supreme

court at its next opportunity. 1°4 Under the Imperial Theory, the
function of intermediate appellate courts is to review trial courts,
apply rules laid down by the supreme court, deal with conflicts among

them, trace out their implications, and fill in gaps. They do not create.
(To the extent that the Imperial Theory diminishes the role of

intermediate-level appellate courts in articulating, elaborating, and
developing new themes in the common law, the Imperial Theory
also-implicitly and silently- assumes that principles of the common

law, as articulated by the court of last resort, form a-relativelyseamless web, part of which is explicit and part of which is inferential.

Thus, the Imperial Theory, without ever saying so, subscribes to the
view that the common law of any mature jurisdiction is virtually
complete.)
Note, 17 TEX. L. REV. 49 (1939).
100. See Gus M. Hodges, Stare Decisis in Boundary Disputes: Let There Be Light, 21 TEX. L.
REv. 241, 241 (1942-1943). For many, many years Professor Hodges taught in the Law School of
the University of Texas-Austin. He is a venerated figure among all well-educated Texas trial
and appellate lawyers.
101. See Slocum v. Galveston County, 410 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) ("This Court finds itself in the same position of the trial court in that it is our
constitutional duty to follow the law as announced by the Supreme Court where the identical
question has been decided").
102. See Molder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App. 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
103. See Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287, 294 (Tex. App. 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
104. See Lynch v. Port of Houston Auth., 671 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. App. 1984, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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In summary, the Imperial Theory construes, as broadly as
possible, the obligation of lower courts to follow reflected-upon

statements of law of the supreme court. From time to time, courts
formulate the Imperial Theory succinctly. They accomplish this end,
in Texas, through the use of felicitous but obscure phrases, such as
"authoritative expression" and "deliberate statement" of the law.
One trial court once wrote this, in a case which became highly
influential: "This court is, of course, bound by all pronouncements of

''
the present or former high tribunal of [the relevant state.] 105

Unquestionably, however, text is crucial. The obligation to follow

rules laid down by the supreme court is construed as very strong,
inflexible, and broad. According to the Imperial Theory, once a
higher court has laid down a principle of law, a lower court has a very,

very, very good reason for following it, and almost nothing can
overcome the force of that reason. Courts of appeals are not only
required to follow the express dictates of an authoritative expression

of the law, but they are barred from any express creativity outside
that limit. Furthermore, according to the Imperial Theory, principles
formulated by the courts of appeals themselves have precedential

significance. Finally, this Theory views virtually any discussion of the
law contained in an opinion of the supreme court not only as binding
precedent for intermediate courts of appeals but also as (strongly)
presumptive precedent for later decisions facing the supreme court
itself.
The meta-doctrine of stare decisis is no relic. It is a living,

animating, very strong component of the law. The Supreme Court of
Texas of the present is quite clear that it is, to a considerable degree,
bound by its own previous decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis is,

after all, "inflexible," even when it comes to the very court which laid
down the rule. 10 6 It would be inefficient, unfair, and delegitimating for
105. Wolf v. Home Ins. Co., 241 A.2d 28, 35 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968) (emphasis
added).
106. In Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995), the court was called upon to
reconsider its decision and opinion in Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983), which held
that a portion of the Texas Medical Liability Act was unconstitutional as applied to malpractice
claims owned by minors. The decision rested upon the "Open Courts Provision" of the Texas
Constitution. See Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 664. The decision in Sax was unanimous, and it explicitly
considered and rejected the argument that a child's parent could bring a malpractice action on
behalf of the child and that such a legal capacity was a reasonable substitute for a child bringing
such an action. See id. at 667. In Weiner, the majority pointed out that "Sax has been frequently
cited as authority by this Court, the courts of appeals, and even by high courts of other states."
Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 319. Moreover, the Sax case has been the "cornerstone" of many
decisions made by the supreme court since the Sax case was decided. See id. On this basis, the
supreme court declined to overrule Sax:
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a high court to overrule very many of its precedents. High-court
precedent creates expectations. Over the years, these become settled,
1°7
and litigants should be able to rely upon such precedents.

Legitimacy, i.e., the perceived authority of a legal regime, requires
stability and the sense on the part of the public that the law is based

upon principles and not upon individual proclivities. Without such an
outlook, the legal system will be regarded as lacking integrity. 1°8
D. The Name
I call this theory the "Imperial Theory" because an imperial
power is a strong, domineering, expansionist power. The Imperial
Theory of precedent is an expansive-indeed, expansionist-theory:

virtually everything the supreme court says is binding precedent upon
lower courts. The Imperial Theory of precedent is also a theory of

domination. The past dominates the present. Higher courts dominate
lower courts. Any feedback from lower courts to higher courts is
accomplished informally. Lower courts have little discretion. Also,
imperial powers rule through the imperium. This necessarily carries
with it the notion of dignitas. There is a certain majestic quality about
[The appellant] Weiner presents no arguments that were not considered in Sax, nor
does he demonstrate that Sax was wrongly decided. Of course, we have, on occasion
and for compelling reasons, overruled our earlier decisions, but undeniably, Sax has
become firmly ensconced in Texas jurisprudence. Generally, we adhere to our
precedents for reasons of efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy. First, if we did not follow
our own decisions, no issue could ever be considered resolved. The potential volume of
speculative relitigation under such circumstances alone ought to persuade us that stare
decisis is a sound policy. Secondly, we should give due consideration to the settled
expectations of litigants like [the plaintiff here], who have justifiably relied on the
principles articulated in Sax.... Finally, under our form of government, the legitimacy
of the judiciary rests in large part upon a stable and predictable decisionmaking
process that differs dramatically from that properly employed by the political branches
of government.
Id. at 319-20 (citations omitted). Even Justice Priscilla Owen, writing a dissent for herself and
two other justices, agreed with the abstract proposition set forth by Justice Cornyn in the
majority opinion. She wrote this:
A fundamental tenet in our jurisprudence is the recognition of the need for consistency
and predictability in the decisions of our courts. This Court should be loath to overrule
its prior decisions, particularly where an opinion has been cited and relied upon as
frequently and as recently as has Sax. Our Court should not succumb to a temptation
to continually revisit prior decisions as new fact situations arise or the concerns of the
public shift. The Court similarly stresses the importance of stare decisis, but
misapprehends the application of that doctrine to the case before us.
Id. at 332 (Owen, J., dissenting).
107. Justice John Cornyn, who is now the Attorney General of Texas, cited Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), and specifically drew attention to some language in Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion: "[Rieliance on a square, unabandoned holding of the Supreme
Court is always justifiable reliance ....
" Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 320 (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at
321 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
108. See Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 320 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986)).
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the language of the supreme court. It is always to be treated
respectfully, perhaps even reverently. Thus, under the Imperial

Theory, the supreme court stands to other courts as Mother England
stood to, say, India. 109 On the other hand, there is nothing really
necessary about this name. It could also, easily, have been called the
Deliberate Statement Theory or the Authoritative Expression

Theory.
One sees the Imperial Theory used all the time. Even so eminent
a jurist as Justice Scalia adheres to it. Whenever an advocate makes

express reference to the "deliberate statements" or the "authoritative
expressions" of a higher court, she is invoking the Imperial Theory.
Whenever an advocate invokes the language of the supreme court as
authority, without reference to the role that language played in the

decision in which it is to be found, she is implicitly relying upon the
Imperial Theory. Often, when an advocate uses quoted language

from the high court to suggest that a lower court is bound by a
previous decision, she is invoking the Imperial Theory.110 Thus, the
Imperial Theory can play an important role in appellate advocacy,
even if no one could bring herself explicitly to espouse the Theory.
Advocacy relies upon a theory when its gambits make no sense but
for the theory. Theory does not have to be stated to be presupposed.

Moreover, a theory can be semi-stated in the context of advocacy
without being explicitly stated. One does this by citing cases which
embody the theory and selecting appropriate language from those
109. For a discussion of the virtues of imperialism, see ANTHONY QUINTON, The British
Empire and the Theory of Imperialism, in FROM WODEHOUSE TO WrrfGENSTEIN 175 (1998).
Or, from an opposite point of view, consider a remark of Richard Rorty: "National pride is to
countries what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for self-improvement. Too
much national pride can produce bellicosity and imperialism, just as excessive self-respect can
produce arrogance." RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY 3 (1998). It would be easy
to imagine Rorty's remarks adapted to a legal system.
110. It is currently out of fashion to say to lower courts that they are bound by previous
decisions of higher courts. The current wisdom is that telling your judge that she is bound is like
telling her that she wears a strait-jacket. It is like telling her she is dominated. It is like telling
her that she is under the authority of the Master. Judges have power as well as authority, so
many appellate advocates regard such rhetoric as a very bad idea. Perhaps they are right. One
wonders if the current fashion may be, to some extent, the result of the currency of feminist
jurisprudence, which emphasizes the soft touch in an argument. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). This is the fountainhead of feminist jurisprudence. It makes it quite
clear that feminism predisposes a different form of reasoning from the more difficult, masculine
paradigm. Then again, maybe it is simply good sense. Kinder, gentler argument creates less
distance and, hence, less alienation. There is little point in emphasizing to "inferior" courts what
they already know but they may not much like. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal
Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990); Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 10 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
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cases for use in argument.
There are really two themes in the Imperial Theory. One of them
is that the pressure precedent exerts on later judges is strong and
domineering. The other theme is that what constitutes precedent is to
be construed expansively. In theory, these two themes can be split
apart. They often go together, however, in the minds of judges and
lawyers, and for that reason I have treated them as a single Theory.
Each of these themes carries with it certain problems. With respect to
the first theme, there is no method for gauging the "pressure"
precedent exercises on subsequent courts. Nor is there a metric for
gauging the strength of precedent on lower courts as opposed to on
the same court. It would be nice to have one. Nevertheless, you can
be fairly confident that the Imperial Theory is not being employed.
Consider this language: "While not an insurmountable bar, the
doctrine of stare decisis preponderates against reexamining ...issues
[already decided]."111 The significant words here are "not ...

insurmountable" and "preponderates." These terms suggest that the
pressure precedent exerts is not smashing."t 2 The second theme (i.e.,
the theme of expansive interpretation) has limits. Obviously, not
every justification of an authoritative expression of the law is itself an
authoritative expression of the law. Not every reason given for a legal
proposition is itself a legal reason. Obviously, if the justifications for
authoritative expressions of law are legal propositions, then,
according to the Imperial Theory, they should be construed as having
maximum force. When they are not legal propositions, however, it is
unclear what force they should have. It is not always easy to tell the
difference between a proposition of law given as a reason for an
authoritative expression and a proposition external to the law given
as a reason. One of the temptations of the Imperial Theory is to
convert justifications of authoritative expressions of law into legal
rules. There is no mechanical procedure for drawing this distinction.
Most lawyers make the divide with some facility. Indeed, being able
to do this is one of the marks of excellence in lawyering. Nevertheless,
it remains an intractable difference.
It is important to observe that the Imperial Theory depends very
111. Anheuser-Busch Co. v. Summit Coffee Co., 934 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. App. 1996, no
writ).
112. Oddly, this court cites cases in which stare decisis is said to create "a strong
presumption," id. (quoting Guterriez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. 1979)), and language
that stare decisis "requires" that subsequent courts follow precedent, id. (quoting Carpet Servs.,
Inc. v. George A. Fuller Co., 802 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. App. 1990) (en banc) (Baker, J.,
dissenting), aff'd, 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1992)).
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much upon the intentions of the opinion-writing court. Surely, if a
proposition of law is intended to be an authoritative expression or a
deliberate statement of the law, then it is. At the same time, it seems
unlikely that a proposition of law would be a deliberate statement of
the law if the court did not intend it to be binding. Thus, the Imperial
Theory is beset by all the genuine problems which have ever been
raised with respect to determining authorial intent. The Imperial
Theory is not quite a mechanical theory, even though it is text-based.
It requires identifying deliberate statements or authoritative
expressions of the law. Sometimes, this is easy. Sometimes, it is just a
matter of quotation. Sometimes, it is just a matter of describing an
opinion and the result. Nevertheless, there is no mechanical decisionprocedure for determining what constitutes an authoritativestatement
of the law or a deliberate expression of the law. Still, experienced
readers of cases seldom disagree about this sort of thing, except when
they are adversaries." 3
From a rhetorical point of view, it is probably a bad idea to
suggest to a court that the Imperial Theory is the way to understand
stare decisis. If this Theory is articulated to a court explicitly, the
court will probably reject it. Courts use it all the time, and many
lawyers and judges embrace it in some context, while they hardly ever
assert it. If an advocate is going to use the Imperial Theory as a mode
of presenting legal argument, it is best simply to lay out the key
language of the court, document the numerous times language of a
similar sort has been used (if at all possible), quote key passages, and
leave it at that.
E. A Note on "Formalism"
In certain ways, the Imperial Theory is similar to what others
have called "Mechanical Jurisprudence""' 4 and what is popularly

113. Arguably, this is the wrong way to look at the Imperial Theory. Suppose there are
actually two versions of the Imperial Theory. One of them could be named the Intentionalist
Imperial Theory. It is the one described in the text above. On that Theory, what counts as a
deliberate statement or what counts as an authoritative expression depends upon the intentions
of the writer, those judges who join him, and the institution. The other version would be called
the Textual Imperial Theory: on this Theory, precedent would not be determined from the
intentions of the court but from the language it used. The rules of interpretation would have to
be developed. In fact, most lawyers who are experienced readers of opinions can do this on the
basis of "feel" without any rules.
114. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1908). Bernard
Schwartz has called Professor Pound the "Schoolmaster of the Bar." BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 466 (1993).
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known as Formalism."' These two theories are more or less the same,
and they both involve three important propositions. First, rules of law
are mechanically extracted from judicial decisions. The idea of a
mechanical extraction suggests objectivity. It suggests that anyone
who is knowledgeable can do it. It suggests that the methodology of
the common law is scientific, or at least objective. It suggests that the
methodology of the common law is anything but literary
interpretation, creative hypothesizing, or guess-work. I have already
shown that, because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between
the authoritative expression of legal propositions and the
justifications of those authoritative expressions which rest on nonlegal
premises, mechanical extraction is not always possible even on the
Imperial Theory. Second, both Theories suggest that once rules are
formulated, they are rigid and not subject to the endless generation of
ad hoc exceptions. On a Formalist Theory, the existence of rules
means something. Judicial decisions are to be based on legal rules as
they exist. They are not to be based on the direct application of the
justifications that vindicate the rules. Nor are exceptions to be created
as things go along. Thus, the scope of rules can, fairly generally, be
determined from their general terms. Third, legal reasoning looks
very much like deduction. 116 There is a universalistic major premise
which is a legal rule. There is a minor premise which is the description
of some facts. There is a conclusion generated by applying the major
premise to the minor premise.
The Imperial Theory does share some characteristics with
Formalism and the Mechanical Theory. According to the Imperial
Theory, it is fairly easy to extract decided, authoritative propositions
of law from judicial texts. Copying out quotations is one such
mechanical procedure. In addition, the Imperial Theory does see
legal rules as inflexibly to be applied. Judges should not make up
exceptions as they go along, on the Imperial Theory. Nevertheless, if
exceptions need to be created, those with authority should be able to
115. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 n.1 (1988); see also LYONS,
supra note 6, at 42-44. "Formalism" is principally a term of abuse. The impulse underlying
Formalism, the "yearning for consistency, for certainty, for uniformity of plan and structure...,
the constant striving of the mind for a larger and more inclusive unity, in which differences will
be reconciled, and abnormalities will vanish" is helpful, honorable, and generative. CARDOZO,
supra note 83, at 50 (describing "the method of philosophy"); see DUXBURY, supra note 3, at 912; LLEWELLYN, supra note 71, at 38-39; SCHWARTZ, supra note 114, at 473-82.
116. See NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 52 (1978). Quite
frequently, the application of legal rules to facts is deductive. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 50,
at 138; Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes
and the Constitution,37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179,181-82 (1986).
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do so at appropriate intervals and for the right reasons. The Imperial
Theory is not necessarily reactionary or brittle in its approach.
Further, the Imperial Theory need not commit itself to a deductive
approach to legal reasoning. It could acknowledge that all legal rules
are prima facie-authoritative only, so long as there was a verticallyauthoritative procedure for deciding what to do after the prima faciebinding rule had been defeated. It is consistent with the Imperial
Theory that this procedure would be: Let a high court figure out what
to do. The Mechanical Theory and Formalism would be very
uncomfortable with this decision procedure.'17
V. HOLDINGS AND DICTA
The Imperial Theory has an enticing elegance about it. Its
simplicity is problematic, however. Most significantly, the Imperial
Theory does not honor, if it even pays lip service to, the distinction
between "holdings" and "dicta." Most believe that this distinction is,
in fact, crucial to a correct understanding of stare decisis; courts
certainly talk this way, much of the time. To the extent that the
distinction is significant, the Imperial Theory is troubled. Counsel
espousing arguments based upon readings of cases predicated upon
the Imperial Theory are often greeted with critiques -whether from
opposing counsel or from the court-based upon the distinction
between holdings and dicta.
The meaning of the concept of holdings is not rigorously spelled
out in Texas cases. My impression is that this situation is not
uncommon. The concept of dicta is somewhat better explained,
although there is substantial confusion about the different kinds.
Once the idea of dicta is partially understood, however, the concept
of holdings can be elucidated. The two concepts are, after all,
intended to be reciprocal and complementary: if something is a
holding, it cannot be a dictum, while if something is a dictum, it
cannot be a holding. This is a universally-understood equation in
common law. Texas law is not unusual.

117. For a deeper conception of Formalism, see Joseph Raz, Formalism and the Rule of
Law, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS, supra note 5, at 309; and Ernest J.
Weinreb, Why Legal Formalism, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS, supra
note 5, at 341. See also the recent multi-author Symposium: Formalism Revisted, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 527 (1999) (will be a starting point for all future informed discussions).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:655

A. Dicta
The best Texas exposition of the concept of dicta is found in
Grigsby v. Reib.11 8 According to that case:
"Dictum" is defined to be: "An opinion expressed by a court, but
which, not being necessarily involved in the case, lacks the force of
an adjudication; an opinion expressed by a judge on a point not
necessarily arising in a case; an opinion of a judge which does not
embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made
without argument, or full consideration of the point;
not the
11 9
professed deliberate determination of the judge himself.
There are a number of separate ideas in this passage. First, dicta
could be anything not necessary to the resolution of the case. Second,
dicta could be anything stated with insufficient force to constitute an
adjudicative remark. Third, they could be any remarks by a judge
irrelevant to the issues before the court. Fourth, dicta could be
anything presented by the judge without full argument in the text of
the opinion. Fifth, dicta could be anything said by a judge and not
fully argued by the parties. Sixth, dicta could be anything other than
deliberate statements by the judge writing the opinion.120 In this
plethora of ideas, there are really two themes in Grigsby. One theme
is that all remarks of a court about the law (or expressing the law) not
necessary for vindicating the decision constitute dicta. The other
theme is that only those remarks not well thought out or not
responsive to an argument presented constitute dicta. Thus, we get
the "Deliberate Statement" doctrine used again. Obviously, these two
ideas are not the same. Obviously, a case could be decided based
upon a principle that was not well thought out. An ill-considered
principle could be necessary to the resolution of a case. On the other
hand, an opinion could discuss a legal norm elaborately and in a wellthought-out manner that was not necessary to the actual resolution of
the case. Which is the correct view? Before anything more can be said
about this question, something must be said about holdings.

118. 153 S.W. 1124 (Tex. 1913).
119. Id. at 1126.
120. Portions of the definition set forth in Grigsby have been cited repeatedly. See, e.g.,
State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853, 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), affd and adopted, 355
S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1962); see also Winn v. Warner, 193 S.W.2d 867, 881 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on
other grounds, 197 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1946); P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND
SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING,
LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 124-25 (1987) (distinguishing English and

American approaches to stare decisis).
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B. Holdings
The language in the Grigsby opinion begins to characterize the
nature of holdings. Grigsby implies a number of propositions:
holdings are propositions of law necessarily involved in the resolution
of a case; holdings are legal norms integral to an adjudication; the
holdings of a case are legal norms that necessarily arise in that case;
holdings are those legal norms which are necessarily involved in a
resolution or determination of a case; and holdings are legal norms
the enunciation of which is preceded by fully-considered legal
argument.
Unfortunately, the phrases drawn from Grigsby are rather vague,
and at least the last one is not similar to the others. Fortunately, other
cases also elucidate the nature of holdings. For example, in Wiener v.
Zwieb, 21 the court stated as follows: "Ordinarily a decision on the
question in a case, not necessarily presented, will not be treated as
binding authority, but merely as persuasive. 1 22 Still other cases make
clear that one of two things must be true in order for a proposition of
law to be a holding. First, the holding of a case is frequently said to be
that rule of law the direct application of which is necessary to resolve
the dispute between the litigants.12 3 These might be called "Level-1
Holdings." Second, a proposition is also a holding if it is necessary to
12 4
vindicate or justify another proposition of law that is also a holding.
These can be called "Level-2 Holdings." If a proposition of law
2
justifies another Level-2 Holding, then it, too, is a Level-2 Holding.1'
121. 141 S.W. 771 (Tex. 1911).
122. Id. at 774.
123. See Carpet Servs., Inc. v. George A. Fuller Co., 802 S.W.2d 343, 346 n.3 (Tex. App.
1990) (en banc), affd, 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1992); see also Maxwell Lumber Co. v. Merle Greer
Co., 501 S.W.2d 454, 456-57 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973, no writ).
124. See Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 193 n.1 (Tex. 1968). The
choice-of-law doctrine set forth in Marmon has been rejected. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583
S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979). The meta-discussion of stare decisis, however, is still sound.
Technically, Gutierrez does not overrule Marmon: Gutierrez involved a nonfatal injury, so that
only the common law was involved. In contrast, Marmon involved a death, so that the wrongfuldeath statute was involved. The Marmon majority refused to reject the ancient rule of lex locus
delicti for wrongful-death cases on the grounds of principles of statutory construction. The
Texas Supreme Court never overruled Marmon; it was overruled by statute. See Total Oilfield
Servs., Inc. v. Garcia, 711 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. 1986) (citing Hearings on H.B. 974 Before the
Senate Comm. on Jurisprudence,64th Leg. (Tex. 1975) (statement by committee chairman)).
125. A very nice example of Level-1 and Level-2 Holdings is found in the Texas Supreme
Court's decision of Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993). It laid down the Level-1
Holding that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress could be brought in a
divorce proceeding, and predicated that holding upon the Level-2 Holding that the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress existed in Texas. Of course, this Level-2 Holding is
not sufficient, but it is necessary, for if there were no such cause of action, it could not be
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Obviously, Level-1 Holdings are more general than the facts of a
case; Level-2 Holdings that justify Level-1 Holdings are more general
than the Level-1 Holdings; Level-2 Holdings that justify other Level-2
Holdings are more general than the Level-2 Holdings they justify, and
so on.
Traditionally, the nature of a holding was stated as follows: a
proposition of law is the holding of a case if it is necessary to decide
the case, or, as the English say, it is the ratio decidendi, i.e., the
126
conclusion of a line of argument necessary to vindicate the decision.
There is some confusion about the relationship between holding and
the ratio decidendi of a case. Sometimes, people say that the ratio
decidendi of a case is the reasoning which leads to the holding. Far
from it. The ratio decidendi and the holding are exactly the same. Of
course, holdings must be vindicated by reasoning. Holdings must be
justified. Indeed, many times, they are the result of a deductive
argument from the set of legal and factual premises. 127 Often, the
justifications for holdings are not deductive, but deductive-looking,
and sometimes the structure of the argument is quite lose.
Of course, there may not actually be very many Level-2 Holdings
whose only function is to justify other Level-2 Holdings. Seldom is
one abstract legal proposition necessary to justify another. Almost
every legal proposition can be vindicated in a variety of ways. (Still,
room must be left for the possibility that one abstract legal
proposition may be necessary to vindicate another.) Notice that a
proposition of law can be an upper-level holding only if it is necessary
to justify a Level-1 Holding. The fact that an upper-level holding is
sufficient for a lower-level holding does not make it a new type of
1 28
holding.
C. Dicta Again
It would be easy to say that holdings constitute binding
precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis, and that dicta never do.
litigated in a divorce case.
126. Black's Law Dictionary somewhat-misleadingly defines this phrase as: "The ground or
reason of decision. The point in a case which determines the judgment." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 52, at 1262. The Texas Supreme Court sharply distinguishes between
the holding of a case and the reasoning which yields the holding. See, e.g., Boyles v. Kerr, 885
S.W.2d 593, 595 (Tex. 1993); ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 120, at 124-25.
127. See MACCORMICK, supra note 116, at 52.
128. See Christian Zapf & Eben Moglen, Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law: On
the Perils of Misunderstanding Wittgenstein, 84 GEO. L.J. 485 (1996) (considering various
arguments for indeterminacy and the implications of the idea).
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Such a formulation would have a simple elegance. Alas, matters are
slightly more complicated, for the realm of dicta falls into two parts.
There are obiter dicta and judicial dicta.
1. Obiter Dicta
Obiter dicta are sometimes called mere dicta or pure dicta, and
they include "a mere remark made in passing, [which is] quite
unnecessary to the issue upon which the Supreme Court of Texas" is
writing. 129 Obviously, obiter dicta, in this sense, are never binding
precedent. Indeed, their value even as persuasive authority is
limited. 130 One wonders why obiter dicta are even present.
Sometimes, they are included for reasons of contrast. Sometimes,
judges appear to be writing short essays on the law. Perhaps the judge
wants the opinion included in a case book. Perhaps he is bucking for
another job. Perhaps the judge writes well and is looking for a mode
of self-expression. Perhaps he does not write the opinions at all but
leaves them to law clerks who do not know any better, or who think
they still are writing term papers. Perhaps all of these reasons apply,
and perhaps there are others as well.
2. Judicial Dicta
The supreme court characterized a judicial dictum as a
formulation of the law "deliberately made for the purpose of being
followed by the trial court. It is not simply 'obiter dictum.' It is at least
persuasive and should be followed unless found to be erroneous."''
Palestine Contractors cites Thomas v. Meyer, and the definition
formulated there includes this language: "[The court's statements
were] deliberately made for the guidance of the bench and bar upon a
point of statutory construction not theretofore considered by the
Supreme Court. It therefore seems that these holdings must at least
be considered as judicial dicta rather than mere obiter.'13 2 Thus,
judicial dicta are those statements of the court which, while not part
of the holding, are nevertheless set forth with the deliberate intent of
not merely exploring the legal issue but instructing the bench and bar.
Thus, a court's reasoned consideration and elaboration upon a legal
129. Ex parteHarrison, 741 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. App. 1987, no writ); see Thomas v. Meyer,
168 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943, no writ) (obiter dictum is language "lightly used").
130. See Calvary Temple v. Taylor, 288 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956, no writ).
131. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 773 (Tex. 1964).
132. Thomas, 168 S.W.2d at 685.
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norm constitute judicial dictum, if not part of the holding.
Do judicial dicta constitute fully-binding precedent? Or is it
defeasibly-prima facie-binding precedent? Must a lower court
follow judicial dicta in a different case? The language of "binding
precedent" versus "persuasive precedent" is no help at all. The whole
idea of "persuasive precedent" is a very obscure idea. It boils down to
the notion that a court once (or more than once) made some
favorable statements about something. The thrust of the idea of
"persuasive precedent" is that the fact that a court has said anything
favorable about something should stimulate the bench and the bar to
take those remarks very seriously. After all, there is a convention that
high courts do not talk about things either favorably or unfavorably
simply for the hell of it. The existence of that convention suggests that
if a high court writes about something, then it means to guide other
courts and lawyers by what it has said. The good-reasons approach to
thinking about precedent provides a methodology for ranking the
force of judicial dicta.
Of course, according to the Imperial Theory, whether a position
of law is a holding or any kind of dictum is irrelevant in determining
whether it constitutes precedent. The proposition of law is precedent
if it is an authoritative expression or a deliberate statement of the law
by an appropriate court. Dicta may be very elaborately spelled out
and, therefore, be both authoritative and deliberate. In order to
distinguish judicial dicta from binding precedent as conceived by the
Imperial Theory, perhaps judicial dicta should not constitute "very,
very, very good reasons" but would be only "very, very good
reasons"? Or are they merely "very good reasons"? Perhaps obiter
dicta are simply very good reasons, rather good reasons, or simply
good reasons. But how can these distinctions be drawn? Obviously,
"very good reasons" must at least be clear, and "very, very, very good
reasons" must also be compelling. But where is the middle level?
Perhaps they must be cogent. These distinctions are intuitively
appealing, but no one has ever set out the criteria for their
application. Perhaps it cannot be done.
In the face of these doubts, one suspects that variations upon the
Imperial Theory would say that judicial dicta from the supreme court
are fully binding-DO IT!-on lower courts and that they are
presumptively binding on the supreme court. Some variations of the
Imperial Theory might say that the use of the phrase "obiter dicta"
signals the reader that whatever is thereby classified cannot possibly
constitute an authoritative expression or a deliberate statement of the
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law. Indeed, they only leave some conventions to that effect. Of
course, this view combines judicial dicta with holdings in terms of
their precedential significance. That conflation is consistent with the
logic and rhetoric of the Imperial Theory. Underneath its surface, the
Imperial Theory might silently loosen the conditions under which the
supreme court could reasonably reject its own judicial dicta. These
remarks are speculative, of course. It is well to remember that courts
are institutions, and they persist over time. It may be just as difficult
for a court in Year Twenty to determine what a court in Year Two
meant (i.e., intended by a text) as it is for anybody else; even if some
133
members of the Year Two court are still there, memories fade.
4 provides an example of
Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael1
judicial dicta as conceived by the Imperial Theory. Several years ago,
the Supreme Court of the United States laid down principles and
rules for dealing with scientific evidence in federal courts under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 135 The question in Kumho Tire was how to
treat engineering testimony. The expert testimony at issue in Kumho
Tire was that of an expert in tire-failure analysis. The majority of the
Court, led by Justice Stephen Briar, however, formulated the
question before it in a much broader fashion.
This case requires us to decide how Daubert applies to the
testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists....
... The initial question before us is whether this basic
gatekeeping obligation applies only to "scientific" testimony or to
all expert testimony....
Engineering testimony rests upon scientific foundations, the
reliability of which will be at issue in some cases.... In other cases,
the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal
different kinds of
knowledge or experience.... [T]here are many
13 6
experts, and many different kinds of expertise.
Obviously, the rule enunciated in Kumho Tire far exceeds the
factual issues before the court. Presumably, the court wanted to put
an end to any further expert-testimony cases before it, so it-quite
sensibly-embraced a broad, black-letter rule mandating a
"Gatekeeper Function" for federal judges in all cases involving expert
133.
134.
135.
136.

Of course, on the Textual Imperial Theory, this problem goes away.
119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999).
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1171-75.
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testimony. The most plausible account of what the United States
Supreme Court did here is to be found in the Imperial Theory.
Another plausible account might be found in the Holdings-Plus
Theory, to be discussed later. In any case, everything puzzling about
this decision issues from how we think about judicial dicta.
D. Obiter Dicta Again
Do the categories of judicial dicta and obiter dicta exhaust all of
the dicta there might be? Obviously, the answer to that question
depends upon how the categories are defined. If judicial dicta are
defined as expressions of law made for the deliberate purpose of
guiding future litigation, and if obiter dicta are defined as off-hand
remarks about the law, then many dicta do not fit in either category.
Given these definitions, there are various grades of "considered"
dicta that are neither judicial nor obiter. If, on the other hand, obiter
dicta are defined as all judicial expressions and discussions of the law,
other than those that are necessary for deciding or vindicating the
decision, and other than those that are made for the deliberate
purpose of guiding future litigation, then judicial dicta and obiter
dicta exhaust the field of dicta. Conceptual elegance and theoretical
economy argue in favor of this definition of obiter dicta that makes
judicial dicta and obiter dicta the only categories. However,
experiential familiarity with appellate rhetoric sets up an absolute
impediment to this simple division and requires a more spectrumoriented account of dicta.
Nevertheless, the broad definition of obiter dicta does appear in
some cases. In Thompson v. McAllen Federated Woman's Building
Corp.,137 the court held that it was not necessary for a subscription
agreement involving a charity to be in writing in order to be
enforceable. 3 8 On a motion for rehearing, the appellant suggested
that the decision conflicted with Wasson v. Clarendon College.13 9 In
Wasson, A had promised to give B a sum on money, if B could raise a
specified sum. The issue was whether C's agreement to make a
contribution counted toward the specified sum; if it did, then the
condition upon A's subscription was met; otherwise, it was not. There
was language in the Wasson decision to the effect that it was relevant

137. 273 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954, no writ).
138. See id. at 107.
139. 131 S.W. 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, no writ).
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to determine whether B might recover from C.140 The Thompson
court held that this discussion was not binding precedent but merely
obiter dicta, basing its conclusion on the ground that the legal rights
of B as against C were not at issue in the Wasson case.1 41 This
characterization is, in effect, the broad definition of obiter dicta.
It should be kept in mind that the term obiter dicta is to some
degree a term of abuse. Thus, its use by courts is not always purely
descriptive. In advocacy, when one wishes to sneer at something that
someone else wants to call precedent or precedent-like, one refers to
it as "mere obiter dictum." There is little logic to this. It is mostly
rhetoric. Obviously, it is unwise to use that rhetoric on something that
is unquestionably a holding or a very-obviously-lovable judicial
dictum.
E. JudicialDicta:A Paradox
Notice that in setting forth judicial dicta, the supreme court is
functioning as a quasi-legislature. It is laying down rules in the
abstract for the guidance of litigation. If the case is reversed and sent
back, some of the directions will be for the lower courts in completing
the litigation before them. Most of the directions, however, will be for
future courts. The idea that a common law court might function as a
legislature is bothersome to many legal thinkers. The notion of
judicial dicta as semi-binding rules is contrary to the theory of stare
decisis as classically conceived. Nevertheless, it is reality. For
example, when a court describes a purely-prospective ruling as a
holding, it cannot possibly be right. It is a necessary truth that a
holding must be used to resolve an issue in the case in which it is a
holding. Prospective-only rules are necessarily legislative in nature.
Sometimes, they are adopted "'as a matter of sound
administration." ' 14 This is a very legislative-sounding consideration.
Where then is the line between judicial dicta and merelyadvisory opinions? We all think we know the difference, but actually
drawing the reason-based line is no simple matter. 143 Frederick
140. See id.
141. See Thompson, 273 S.W.2d at 109.
142. Minyard Food Stores, Inc., v. Newman, 612 S.W.2d 198, 198 (Tex. 1980) (quoting
Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex. 1978)). The court of appeals classified the
"prospective only" rule which the Texas Supreme Court had formulated in Whittlesey as dictum
and bad law. The supreme court was not amused.
143. See General Land Office v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1990);
Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 337 (Tex. 1968); see also United Servs. Life Ins. Co.
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Schauer has suggested that the aversion of the common law to
advisory opinions stands in tension with its commitment that
appellate judges should give reasons for their decisions. According to
Schauer, reasons are always more general than the propositions which
they are supposed to vindicate, and the giving of a reason is a kind of
act that involves a commitment to deciding similar cases in a similar
manner. 144
F. A Covey of Problems
Many problems beset the division of judicial assertions into
holdings, judicial dicta, and obiter dicta. The problems that come up
in distinguishing these three concepts constitute real impediments to
both the Holdings Theory and the Holdings-Plus Theory.
First, courts often set forth alternative holdings. How can there
be such a thing as alternative holdings, given the definition of the term
"holding"? Nevertheless, Texas courts, like most other courts, say
that alternative holdings really are holdings and, therefore, are
entitled to full dignity. 14 This dogmatism renders incoherent the
orthodox account of the nature of holdings. It would be far better to
treat the most important alternative holding as a genuine holding and
the other one as a judicial dictum. 146 But how is this matter to be
judged? By what criteria do we determine the order of importance?
No one has ever developed rational principles to solve these
problems, or, at least, no set of such principles has ever acquired
wide-spread public agreement.
Second, plurality opinions cannot be treated as containing any
holdings at all, even though that word is often used. 147 Plurality
opinions of the Texas Supreme Court are not binding precedent upon
either the supreme court itself1 48 or upon lower courts.1 49 Nevertheless,
over time, plurality opinions acquire some force. One wonders what
to do with a plurality opinion when there is a concurring opinion.
v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855, 863 (Tex. 1965); Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Tex. 1933).
144. See Schauer, supra note 86, at 655.
145. See Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Edgar, 98 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936),
overruled on other grounds, 107 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
146. This is obviously true when one of the alternative holdings is that the court does not
have the legal power to do whatever it is that is asked. Consider, for example, Griggs v. Capitol
Machine Works, Inc., 690 S.w.2d 287, 294 (Tex. App., writ ref'd n.r.e.).
147. See University of Tex. Med. Branch v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 176-77 (Tex. 1994).
148. See Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1996).
149. See York, 871 S.w.2d at 177; Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme
Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756 (1980).
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Obviously, the two opinions will have to come to the same decision.
They will not necessarily involve the same holding, although they
might, and they will almost certainly not involve the same reasoning.
As a practical matter, in the "Four Plus One" situation, lawyers often
treat the decision as if it had considerable precedential force. Thus,
lawyers' practice is, to some degree, at variance with legal doctrine.
Third, if a plurality opinion is not binding precedent at all, is a
five-to-four opinion just-barely-binding precedent, and, therefore,
weaker than (say) a unanimous opinion? Of course, if the
composition of a court has changed, there is marginally more of a
chance that a five-to-four decision will be overruled, if the new judge
has been on the court long enough to have a sense of independence.
On the other hand, many judges are unwilling to overrule previous
decisions, even when they were vigorously contested and voting was
close. 150 Many advocates believe that five-to-four opinions constitute
weak, pale, or somehow-faded authority. This is seldom true in lower
courts, and it is often not true in the very court that decided the case.
Of course, occasionally courts overrule fairly-recently-decided cases.
This is quite rare, however. At least in theory, a five-to-four decision
is just as strong as a six-to-three decision, or one that is decided
seven-to-two, eight-to-one, or nine-to-nothing. This fact is a testament
to the strength of a subtext of the doctrine of stare decisis, to wit: let
things that have actually been decided stay put. The general intuition
is that the strength of authority is too complex a matter for either the
legal public or the lay public to grasp. One wonders if this sensibility
is always correct.
Fourth, sometimes a court adopts a new cause of action and
argues that the cause of action is necessary because of various social
considerations. In Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance
Co., 5 , for example, the Texas Supreme Court created a common law

tort cause of action for insurer breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing.52 Any insured might bring such a claim. The court
posited the existence of a duty, characterized the duty, stated the
social foundations of the duty, and articulated the elements of the

150. See State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d 444, 455 (Tex. 1997) ("I am not in favor
of abolishing the tort of bad faith, although I would not have been in favor of creating it").
151. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987). Arnold is especially interesting, because the supreme court
had just a few years earlier refused to imply the duty of good faith and fair dealing in contracts
outside the Uniform Commercial Code. See English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
152. See Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167.
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cause of action.'5 3 What did the court hold? What constitutes judicial
dicta? What constitutes obiter dicta? It is very difficult to tell. The
language that the court said was its holding was formulated in quitegeneral terms, but the justification for the holding had to do with the
economic power that insurance companies often have vis-A-vis their
insureds. 5 4 The rationale for the decision would suggest that the
holding should be narrow rather than universal. Moreover, it became
clear later that the decision in Arnold applies only to first-party
insurers. 155 Moreover, subsequently the supreme court became
dissatisfied with the rule and replaced it with another one. 15 6 Cases
like Arnold, which adopt new causes of action, indicate that there
may be some problems with the categories of holdings, dicta, judicial
dicta, and obiter dicta.
Fifth, consider the realm of definitions, jury questions, and jury
instructions. From time to time, the supreme court approves one of
these. 57 Almost certainly, the approval of an entire charge, a whole
slate of questions, or even a definition, will go beyond that which is
necessary for deciding the case before the court. If so, then such
approvals are not entirely holdings, and, of necessity, involve some
dicta. Are they judicial dicta? The Imperial Theory, of course, tries to
blur these distinctions, so that what constitutes a holding is construed
as broadly as possible. Courts seem to be aware of the problems
involved in approving jury instructions. In fact, recently, the Texas
Supreme Court precisely classified such an action as dictum. 15 8 This is
an awfully hard view to swallow, although it can get a court out of
rhetorical trouble. If a supreme court approves a jury instruction, it is
very difficult to argue to another district court that it should decline
to submit that instruction because the statements made by the
supreme court were really only dicta. This is especially true when the

153. See id. These elements were modified recently in Universe Life Insurance Co. v. Giles,
950 S.W.2d 48, 69-71 (Tex. 1997). There is a deep philosophical and jurisprudential problem
surrounding Arnold and all of the bad-faith cases like it. Those cases appear to tend toward
communitarian ideals, as opposed to strictly atomistic and individualistic notions of the proper
relationship between businesses and customers. See DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND
ITS CRITICS (1993).
154. See The Sophisticated Insured, supra note 27, at 89.
155. See Maryland Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27, 28-29
(Tex. 1996).
156. See Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 64; Michael Sean Quinn, Insurer Bad Faith, Expertise, and
Appellate Review, 20 INS. LITIG. REP. 774, 776 (1998).
157. See Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guin, 723 S.w.2d 656, 660 (Tex. 1987) (jury
instruction and definition).
158. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625,628 (Tex. 1998).
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supreme court has supervisory authority over courts and promulgates
approved jury instructions.
Sixth, the holdings-dicta classification scheme may not always be
adequate. In Total Oilfield Services, Inc. v. Garcia,"' a Texas resident
was killed in an industrial accident in Oklahoma. 16° His survivors
161
sought worker's compensation benefits under Oklahoma law.
Subsequently, they sued for exemplary damages for wrongful death
under Texas law.1 62 The trial court dismissed the action on the ground
that worker's-compensation benefits were exclusive under Oklahoma
law. 63 The court of appeals reversed and remanded on the ground
that the Texas Wrongful Death Act had extra-territorial effect. 16 The
Texas Supreme Court refused application for writ of error, with a
notation: "no reversible error."' 65 Nevertheless, it went on to voice its
disapproval of certain language in the court of appeals' opinion, to
the effect that the case presented no choice-of-law question. 66 The
court of appeals said that the "most significant relationship" rule
already adopted by the Texas Supreme Court did not apply. 167 The

supreme court remarked that the "most significant relationship" test
was most assuredly applicable, but it also noted that the court of
6
appeals actually applied the "most significant relationship" test.' 1
What is the holding here? What is judicial dictum here? What is mere
dictum here? These questions do not have straightforward answers.
Many cases make these distinctions. Two examples should
suffice. In the highly-regarded case of Sparks v. Saint Paul Insurance
Co.,169 the court was called upon to determine whether a claims-made
insurance contract was to be enforced in accordance with its terms. 170
The court held that the particular claims-made contract before it was
invalid because it did not have any retroactive coverage. 7 ' This was
the holding of the case. At the same time, the court said, "[W]e would
not hesitate to enforce [the insurance] policy in this case if it
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

711 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. 1986).
See id. at 238.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex. 1979).
See Garcia, 711 S.W.2d at 239.
495 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1985).
See id. at 407.
See id. at 416.
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comported with the generally accepted expectations of 'claims made'
insurance."'7 2 Obviously, this second remark is dictum. Nevertheless,
it is extremely-powerful dictum in New Jersey and throughout the
insurance world. The same sort of problem arises when a complex
case comes before a high court, and many issues need to be resolved.
In Carter v. Carter,173 the issue was whether a wife who killed her
husband could recover his insurance policy. 174 The holding of the case
was that murderers could not recover under insurance policies. 175 At
the same time, the court held that the guilt of the beneficiary had to
be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence, but that a
withdrawn plea of guilty could not be admitted to prove the
beneficiary's guilt. 76 The court assumed that all of these were
holdings. It then went on to discuss a situation which had not yet
arisen, namely, who should take if the beneficiary were disqualified as
the result of having murdered the insured. 177 This second question
could not possibly have involved a genuine holding. At the same time,
the court treated it as comprehensive and clear instruction on how the
case was to be handled below. 78
Seventh, the law of closing arguments in Texas, spelled out in
Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Reese,'17 illustrates another problem
with the categories. In that case, Justice Pope restated the law of
18°
appellate review of closing arguments in seven numbered principles.
Many of these were not at issue in Reese. As a result, most of the
principles are dicta. Apparently, Justice Pope was trying to resist what
he thought might have been weakening judicial resolve with respect
to the harmless-error rule. His principles have succeeded
magnificently: Reese is, at least for the present, the beginning of all
wisdom on reviewing error in argument. Mirabile dicta!
So, what we have in Reese is extraordinarily influential dictaprinciples that are, by agreement, the prevailing restatement of the
law. Such a restatement of the law is not merely obiter dictum. Then
again, it is not quite judicial dictum, either. Perhaps the passage of
time can transform something from one sort of dictum into another or
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

ld. at 410.
88 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1956).
See id. at 155.
See id. at 158.
See id.
See id. at 159-60.
See id. at 161.
584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979).
See id. at 839-40.
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from dictum into holding. Has history made holdings out of Reese
dicta? Is tradition transformative? Justice Pope himself must have
intended his remarks to be judicial dicta, since he sets them out as
precise elements. Nevertheless, once they are carefully studied, the
inevitable conclusion is that they are problematic. Does this fact have
any effect on their status as judicial dicta? If a directive that was
intended to be judicial dictum turns out-upon reflection-to be
problematic, does it become obiter dictum? Can reason make obiter
out of judicial dictum? Of course, supposing that history can
transform dicta into holdings or holdings into dicta is contrary to the
usual characterizations of these ideas. Fundamentally, the ideas of
holdings and dicta should be determined by a role of the norm in an
argument. That is a matter to be derived from text, logic, and intent,
not from public perception. (Of course, the distinction between
arguments-in-themselves -logic- and
arguments-as-perceived-bythe-public-rhetoric-is a particularly difficult distinction to make in
our time, since much of Post-Modernist thought conflates audience
perception -rhetoric -with reason - arguments-in-themselves. 81)
If history, agreement, consensus, or convention can convert
holdings into dicta or dicta into holdings, can anything else establish
the status of a judicial remark as a holding? In particular, if a court
says that a given proposition is a holding, does that make it a holding?
Unquestionably, law students first identify holdings in cases by
circling the word "holding" and then underlining the "that" clause
which follows. Law clerks, brief-writers, lazy partners, and appellate
judges, I suspect, do much the same thing. And it is frequently a good
idea. Consider again, for example, the case of Twyman v. Twyman.182
In that case, Justice Cornyn wrote: "[W]e expressly.., hold that such
a claim [i.e., a claim for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress] can be brought in a divorce proceeding. ' 183 Circle the word
"holding" here and underline what comes after it; you have one of the
key holdings of the Twyman case. Nevertheless, it is questionable
whether the fact that a court states that a proposition of law is a
holding makes it a holding. More will be said about this presently. A
proposition of law becomes a holding only if it plays a certain
function in the decision. Indeed, arguably, whenever a court
characterizes something as a holding, that characterization is dictum.
181. See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 15, 17 (1998).
182. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
183. Id. at 620 (emphasis added).
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(Obviously, this is a subtle point, more to be loved by the logician
than by the advocate. Nevertheless, the point is true.)
Here is an eighth problem with these categories. Frequently,
courts characterize something they say as a holding. They
characterize the contents of a current opinion less often as dictum,
but they even do that from time to time. What force should such a
characterization have? Someone might claim that when a court says
that a proposition constitutes a holding, it is not characterizing. Such
a person would be claiming that the court is not asserting a
proposition that is true or false. Someone might claim that the court is
engaging in a performative utterance-what is sometimes called a
speech act.184 One speech act, of course, is assertion. It is precisely
that speech act that is not being performed on this view. Another
speech act is promising. When one promises, one does not assert
anything, one acts: one commits oneself by the very act of speaking
the promise. Such speech constitutes an act. The speech act under
discussion here, which only some courts can perform, does not have a
name, but it would amount to something like transformative
endowment. This act would be committed whenever a court said that
a proposition of law was a holding. When a court said this, it would
transform the legal proposition into a holding and endow it with the
characteristics of a holding. This transformation would occur whether
or not the proposition functioned as a holding in any legal argument.
The trouble with this speech-act account is that courts have not
generally recognized the existence of such a performative speech-act,
and its nonrecognition suggests its nonexistence. Moreover, if
holdings must be about questions that are specifically presented to a
court, then a court need not be always correct when it characterizes a
legal norm it sets forth as a holding. Moreover, if holdings are only
those legal norms that are necessary for the decision or for a
necessary premise itself necessary for the decision, then a court could
err in characterizing something as a holding. At the same time, an
advocate should, at least as a methodological starting point, treat
everything that a court marks as a holding as, indeed, a holding.
A paradox now arises. If, on the one hand, that which a court
characterizes as a holding is not in fact a holding, but, on the other
hand, an advocate should, under many circumstances, urge it as a
184. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 6-7 (1962); Laurence Goldstein,
Four Alleged Paradoxes in Legal Reasoning, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 373, 374 (1979); see also E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS 31
(1998); FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, "SPEECH ACTS" AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10-20 (1993).
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holding, then advocates under many circumstances lie to courts. A lie
is the assertion by someone of a false proposition he knows (or, at
least, believes) to be false with the intent of deceiving. 85 The advocate
knows that something is not a holding but believes he can convince
the court it is a holding, precisely because a previous court
characterized it as a holding. If so, then because of the ethics of
advocacy, which prescribe zealous representation, the advocate must
lie-in fact he must lie to a court.
A ninth problem, which is somewhat theoretical, arises out of
those contexts in which a supreme court creates-or, adopts-a new
cause of action. Obviously, when, as in Twyman, a court creates a new
cause of action, it goes well beyond what is necessary to decide the
case. All a court would need to do to decide a case is to create a cause
of action restricted to the facts as presented in that case. But that is
not what happens when a court adopts a new cause of action. Thus,
when the supreme court creates a new cause of action, its action
transcends any possible holding. It follows that at least part of what
the court does is judicial dictum. And yet, that division seems wrong
when it comes to the creation of new causes of action. One wants to
say that if the court creates a new cause of action, that creation is -or
is equivalent to-a holding. At the same time, one must represent
that the articulation of a new cause of action is, to some degree, a
legislative act.
A tenth set of problems with this system of categories is
federalism. All theories of stare decisis agree, however, that holdings
of federal courts on state law do not bind state courts. Moreover,
holdings of federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, on federal
law do not bind state courts. Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court on matters of federal law do bind Texas courts. 186 Holdings of
the Fifth Circuit in diversity matters are not stare decisis for Texas
courts.187 Thus, the holdings of Fifth Circuit cases are not holdings in
185. See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978);
DAVID NYBERG, THE VARNISHED TRUTH: TRUTH TELLING AND DECEIVING IN ORDINARY
LIFE (1993).
186. See Virginia Indonesia Co. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 910 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Tex.
1995); Ex parte Twedell, 309 S.W.2d 834, 844 (Tex. 1958).
187. The doctrine of stare decisis requires that all courts adhere, as a general rule, to the
principles and rules laid down on a question of law by any court to which obedience is
owed in the matter. Consequently, the doctrine binds all Texas state courts to the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas on a particular question of law arising in a
civil case and to the decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in "criminal law
matters." But the various Courts of Appeals are free to differ among themselves on a
question of law that remains undecided by the two courts to which they owe
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Texas state courts, although they play an important role in serious
legal argument. Obviously, whether a proposition of law is a holding
or not is jurisdiction-relative. This point is true from state to state and
true from federal courts to state courts. In contrast, holdings of the
Texas Supreme Court are binding through Erie18 8 for federal courts
deciding Texas law matters. Still, they are not stare decisis. In
contrast, when choice-of-law principles result in a Texas court
applying the law of another state, then Texas courts are bound by the
opinions of the highest court of that other state. 189 In the absence of
an applicable supreme-court decision from another state, Texas

courts will look to intermediate-level courts, although they do not
appear to feel as bound by those decisions.t 9° On the other hand,

when Texas courts apply the law of a foreign country, no account of
the law of that country given by any American court constitutes
binding precedent.?91

It might almost go without saying that when Texas courts are
faced with cases of first impression, and they are trying to determine
what Texas law should be, they may look to "[d]ecisions of courts of

other jurisdictions, [but those decisions] are no more than persuasive,
and they are persuasive only to the extent that their reasoning is
regarded as logical."' 9 No such cases can be anything more than
obedience. "Obedience, rather than rank, is the key."
On questions of federal law-such as the proper interpretation of a federal
statute-all courts in every state owe obedience to the Supreme Court of the United
States.... And when no decision by the Supreme Court appears to be directly in point,
Texas courts look to analogous decisions by that Court in arriving at the meaning
proper to be assigned the federal statute ....
... [However,] the decisions of one federal Court of Appeals on a question of law
do not bind any other federal Court of Appeals under the doctrine of stare decisis. Nor
do they bind any Texas court, even on federal questions, although they are of course
received with respectful consideration ....
Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495, 501 n.2 (Tex. App. 1987, writ denied) (citations omitted); see
also Omniphone, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 742 S.w.2d 523, 526 n.3 (Tex. App. 1987,
no writ).
188. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
189. See Bergstrom Air Force Base Fed. Credit Union v. Mellon Mortgage, Inc., 674 S.W.2d
845, 849 (Tex. App. 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
190. See Francis v. Herrin Transp. Co., 432 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1968). In this case, the issue
was whether a Louisiana statute specified what we would call a statute of limitations or a statute
of repose. The Louisiana language is "prescription" verses "preemption." See id. at 714. The
Texas Supreme Court noted that there were no decisions by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
See id. at 715. However, the Texas court said the wording of the Louisiana statute appears to
resolve the matter, and there are a number of intermediate-level Louisiana appellate decisions
and Fifth Circuit decisions. See id. at 716-17. The supreme court's conjunctive argument
illustrates the difficulty of figuring out whether something is judicial dictum or a holding.
191. See In re Contests of the City of Laredo, 675 S.w.2d 257, 270 (Tex. App. 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
192. Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Bd., 471 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex. 1971); see also
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persuasive. No one thinks that Texas courts have a legal duty to look

to the courts of other jurisdictions, although they quite often do. 193
Another aspect of federalism which creates puzzles for stare decisis is

the institution of certification. 194 This is too complex a matter to be
discussed here. However, some cases which come to the Texas

Supreme Court on certification receive detailed consideration. 95
Eleventh, sometimes, when a court is silent in a timely way and
in the right context, silence is pregnant with meaning. Sometimes,
silence can be significant dictum. There has been a controversy for

several years over whether insurance defense counsel is also counsel
for the insurance company. After all, he provides the insurance
company with legal advice, and the insurance company frequently

acts on that advice. Most often, that advice comes in the form of legal
evaluations of the case together with estimates of settlement value.
At the same time, defense counsel provided by an insurer is

unquestionably counsel for the insured/defendant, and-as suchthat lawyer may not assist the insurance company in ways that would
be injurious to the defendant/insured/client. It has been the law, for
example, for many years, that the insurance-defense counsel may not
act as coverage counsel for the insurer. He most assuredly may not
deliberately collect for the insurer evidence that would defeat
19 6
coverage.

A controversy has been raging for the last several years around
these matters. It has focused on the work of the American Law
Institute in trying to formulate the Restatement (Third) of the Law

Hollins v. Rapid Transit Lines, Inc., 440 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. 1969).
193. Having responsibility is like having a moral duty. However, it is not a rights-generating
duty. No litigant has a right that the Texas Supreme Court, for example, should consider, and
discuss in its opinions, cases from other jurisdictions. The Texas Supreme Court has said that
insurance decisions should be in conformity with those of other jurisdictions. The supreme court
frequently does discuss decisions from other jurisdictions at length in supreme-court cases and
does try to conform to well-established majority rules. See Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Texas v.
Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153, 159 (Tex. 1999) ("we believe this conclusion to be consistent with the
majority of decisions in other jurisdictions in similar cases"). This was a six-to-three decision.
Justice Craig Enoch, who wrote for the dissenters, observed that the court "unnecessarily
embarks on an exhaustive search through other states' jurisprudence to glean support for its
conclusion that there is coverage here when we have already decided the issue. There is no
principled distinction between this case and [the case Justice Enoch thought was controlling]."
Id. at 165.
194. See TEXAS CONST. art. V, § 3.
195. See Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co., 972 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Tex. 1998). In contrast, some
cases receive minimal consideration. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Stephens, 130 F.3d
123, 128-30 (5th Cir. 1997) (Reavley, J., dissenting), withdrawn, 140 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. 1998).
196. See Employers Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552, 558 (Tex. 1973).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:655

Governing Lawyers.1 97 How insurance-defense counsel were to be

conceptualized in that work has been widely discussed. Some argue
that insurance-defense counsel may never (from the point of view of
legal ethics) represent the insurance company in the same matter.
Some argue that it must happen to some degree. And some argue that
it is a matter of contract to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
The Texas Supreme Court is well aware of this controversy and of the
various positions.
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court went out of its way to avoid
commenting on this problem. 198 It did this by stating that insurancedefense counsel was an independent contractor with respect to the
insurer and, hence, that an insurer was not vicariously liable for an
attorney's malpractice. Part of the reason the court gives for its
holding is that insurance-defense counsel owes a duty of loyalty to his
client, the insured, and for this reason is legally barred from taking,
from an insurer, instructions that would be to the detriment of his
client, the insured. In addition, the court observes that a liabilityinsurer does not have the right to control the details of insurancedefense counsel's work, from which it follows that defense counsel is
not an agent of the insurer.
At the same time, the court does not discuss whether insurancedefense counsel may ever simultaneously have a client-attorney
relationship with the liability-insurer that is funding (and perhaps
controlling) the defense. This is a pregnant silence. Many attorneys
will draw the inference that insurance-defense counsel should not
become an attorney for the insurer, according to the Texas Supreme
Court. This case will not bear that analysis from a strictly-logical point
of view. Nevertheless, its silence is suggestive, and insurance-defense
counsel must proceed with caution. Silences are pregnant, and a court
could easily have indicated that it was not citing something. From
time to time, indeed, courts explicitly indicate that they are leaving an
issue for another day. Silences are always ambiguous, even when they
are suggestive. 99 Nevertheless, they can be influential.

197. See Charles Silver & Michael Sean Quinn, Are Liability Carriers Second-Class Clients?
No, But They May Be Soon-A Call to Arms Against the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers, COVERAGE, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 21; Charles Silver & Michael Sean Quinn,
Wrong Turns on the Three-Way Street: Dispelling Nonsense About Insurance Defense Lawyers,
COVERAGE, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 1.
198. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.w.2d 625, 629 (Tex. 1998).
199. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 39.
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G. Dicta and Advice
Obviously, dicta-whether obiter dicta or judicial dicta-should
by no means always be regarded as chaff. Frequently, dicta are
designed to give advice to someone.2 00 Sometimes, that someone is the
lower court that will think about this very case. Sometimes, it is
judges sitting on courts of appeals where similar problems are likely
to come up. Sometimes, it is a section of the bar. And sometimes, it is
the legislature. Other times, it is industry groups or politically-active
sections of the public. One typical group to which advice is frequently
given is the insurance industry. Thus, courts complain from time to
time that insurance contract language is badly drafted, even though
20 1
they decide in favor of the insurance company.
Any sort of equation between dicta and advice runs into an
immediate problem. The distinction between judicial dicta and obiter
dicta has to be handled. Surely we would not wish to say that the
former constituted good advice while the latter did not. Nor would we
wish to say that the former constituted considered advice, while the
latter did not. Obviously, advice can be given in different tones.
Sometimes, courts can give advice by saying that they think the
legislature really should do such-and-such, or that some state agency
should promulgate some regulations. Sometimes, advising can sound
like begging.
If advice is dictum, it can provide smooth transitions from the
past to the future. It has been argued that unless courts are
encouraged to give this kind of advice openly, they will do so behind
the scenes, as many judges have done at various times in American
history.20 Similarly, the great Lord Mansfield is said to have engaged
in ex parte advice-giving. It is said that he met with many London
merchants from time to time in order to exchange views. He was
certainly trying to find out what their customs were. He might also
have been trying to formulate general principles.
H. Summary
In summary, the doctrine of stare decisis has four crucial
conceptual components: precedent, holdings, judicial dicta, and obiter
dicta. Precedent is logically independent of the other three, which are
200. See Neil Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1710 (1998).
201. See Stanley v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 361 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Ala. 1978).
202. See Katyal, supra note 200, at 1816-21.
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conceptually interdependent. Precedent is that which is binding on
subsequent courts. Holdings are expressions of the law necessary to
resolve the litigation in which they are formulated or legal
propositions necessary to justify that proposition of law which is
necessary to resolve that litigation, or which are reasonably
characterized as such by a deciding court. Judicial dicta are reflectedupon remarks of a court, which are intended to guide subsequent
litigation, even though they are not necessary to the present litigation.
(Generally speaking, a piece of judicial dictum will not be
characterized as a holding.) Finally, obiter dicta are any other
discussions of the law which occur in an opinion. They might be
historical; they might be simply scholarly; they might be critical of
other cases; they might be suggestions about what a court might do in
the future; and so forth. (The only trouble with these categorizations
is that they sharply divide all dicta into judicial and obiter. Truly,
there is spectrum of considered dicta, ranging from the most
considered to the least. Thus, black-and-white divisions into two
categories are probably wrong.)
In any case, when the concepts of holdings and dicta are used,
gradations of binding-ness are created. Holdings of a supreme court
are fully binding on appropriate lower courts. Prior holdings of a
supreme court are also presumptively binding on that court.
Probably, judicial dicta are defeasibly binding on both the supreme
court and lower courts, while obiter dicta are not binding at all.
Perhaps the supreme court does not need as good a reason to depart
from judicial dicta as it needs to reject previous holdings. One
problem with the Imperial Theory is that it does not encompass these
commonly-used distinctions.
VI. THE HOLDINGS THEORY OF STARE DECIsIS
One popular theory of the doctrine of stare decisis is that all
holdings-but only holdings-of high courts bind lower courts and all
holdings-but only holdings-of intermediate-level courts bind trial
courts. In general, the Holdings Theory provides that courts are
bound by their own holdings, although with somewhat less force than
lower courts are bound. Grigsby exemplifies this view, and it is a
recurrent theme in many cases. In some ways, the Holdings Theory is
the opposite of the Imperial Theory. While the Imperial Theory has a
broad and expansionist approach to precedent, the Holdings Theory
has quite a narrow and restrictive one. This narrowness is entailed by
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the nature of "holding" itself. Moreover, the Imperial Theory looks at
what a court actually says to determine what is binding, whereas the

Holdings Theory analyzes the subtext of an opinion to determine
what is really necessary to generate the decision. However, in another
respect, the Holdings Theory may resemble the Imperial Theory. In

general, the rhetoric of this Theory is that holdings constitute very,
very, very good reasons for applying those holdings to similar cases in
the future. Part of the reason for distinguishing between holdings and
everything else is to give holdings tremendous force. In this sense, the
Holdings Theory resembles the Imperial Theory because it is a theory

of domination. Both of the Theories are inflexible when it comes to
the application of whatever it is that constitutes precedent.
One of the things that recommend the Holdings Theory is the
rhetoric of courts. Courts frequently designate what they take to be

their holdings. Whether they are always right about this, whether
their designations play a crucial role in analyzing opinions for
precedent, or whether the identity of a holding is always subject to
analysis, courts surely think they are doing something by demarcating
holdings, and distinguishing them from dicta of various gradations.
Holdings are important. Everyone thinks so. It is easy to slide from

there to holdings-and-only-holdings' constituting precedent.
The Holdings Theory is well-loved by academics, advocates, and

judges alike. Academics love it (in part) because it provides potential
for ingenious analysis and clever refutation. Advocates love it
because it gives them lots of arguing room. Judges like it because they
have more space in which to make decisions. Justice Scalia has said

that he subscribed to it in his youth.203 Amazingly, few decisions of the
Texas Supreme Court actually subscribe to it, and the court often uses
different

language

to describe

stare decisis. An authoritative

203. See Scalia, supra note 61, at 1178.
Of course, in a system in which prior decisions are authoritative, no opinion can
leave total discretion to later judges. It is all a matter of degree. At least the very facts
of the particular case are covered for the future. But sticking close to those facts, not
relying upon overarching generalizations, and thereby leaving considerable room for
future judges is thought to be the genius of the common-law system. The law grows
and develops, the theory goes, not through pronouncement of general principles, but
case-by-case, deliberately, incrementally, one-step-at-a-time. Today we decide that
these nine facts sustain recovery. Whether only eight of them will do so-or whether
the addition of a tenth will change the outcome -are questions for another day.
When I was in law school, I was a great enthusiast for this approach-an advocate
of both writing and reading the "holding" of a decision narrowly, thereby leaving
greater discretion to future courts. Over the years, however-and not merely the years
since I have been a judge-I have found myself drawn more and more to the opposite
view.
Id. at 1177-78.
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expression of the law or a deliberate statement of the law can easily
be broader than the holding. It is hard to see how it might be
narrower.
The Imperial Theory can be made to converge upon the
Holdings Theory by limiting the definitions of authoritative
expressions and deliberate statements to holdings only. This is seldom
done, and it is doubtful that most courts would want to strait-jacket
themselves like that. Then again, there could be conventions by
means of which courts signal what is and what is not authoritative and
deliberate. However, if there are such signals, the legal public would
have to know about them in order for the signals to override actual
language of authoritative-looking expressions and deliberate-looking
statements. I cannot think of any such signals. "This is dictum you
idiots. We're just fooling around. Don't pay much attention to it"
would do the trick. Then again, there are strong conventions against
saying things like this in judicial opinions, and that claim is true for
more reasons than one. One of the reasons is that courts want lawyers
and other courts to pay attention to dicta. Sometimes, they even want
dicta treated as holdings, or something close.
The Holdings Theory is deeply troubled, however. First, it is
unempirical. Both courts and lawyers treat much more than holdings
as significant and, indeed, as binding precedent. Second, the Holdings
Theory presupposes that the holding of the case can be found, at least
most of the time. The fact of the matter is that both judges and
advocates experience enduring disagreement as to what the holding
of the case really is. They may agree as to what a court said, but they
simply do not agree as to what the holding was. Such are the
vicissitudes of analysis. This is not a result of ignorance,
incompetence, bull-headedness, or deficiencies of analytical
intelligence. Law professors and legal intellectuals have the same
problem. Third, many legal rules are treated as precedential even
though they are not really necessary to decide the case at hand. This
last fact alone bankrupts the Holdings Theory.
An instance of this came up not long ago in the Texas Supreme
Court. In State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Morua,204 the issue
was whether a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure required that
supplementary interrogatory answers be verified. In its short opinion,
the court held that they do indeed have to be verified.20 5 However,
204. 979 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. 1998).
205. See id. at 617.
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because the opposing party waited over a year before objecting to this
defect and objected only at trial, the court also held that the objection
had been waived.20 6 It seems perfectly clear that the waiver resolution
is the holding in the case, and the resolution of the question regarding
the verification of supplementary answers is dictum. However, Justice
20 7
Greg Abbott, who wrote the opinion, called them both holdings,
and there are probably only a few lawyers in the state who will not
treat the requirement that supplementary interrogatory answers be
sworn as binding precedent. The resolution of Morua and the instant
consensus that developed around it with respect to its holdings are
significant, and they completely refute the Holdings Theory.
The Holdings Theory can provide an extremely-powerful
rhetorical tool, whether in the hands of an advocate or in the hands of
a judge. The Holdings Theory is a marvelous way to reduce the power
of language in other cases. This Theory permits advocates and judges
to narrow the rule a case stands for by analytical means. If an
advocate can convince a court that a case stands for a very narrow
proposition, .then the advocate can classify everything else as dicta
and, hence, not binding. This is a standard ploy for both judges and
advocates alike.
From a more-philosophical point of view, if the rhetorical uses of
the Holdings Theory reflected the actual state of the law, then the
common law would be much less developed than people usually think
it is. It would be much gappier. It would resemble a pond with a few
lily-pads, rather than the grassy marsh that it is usually thought to be.
One doubts that the public really wants the legal system to be
conceived along the lines suggested by the Holdings Theory. It leaves
too many gaps. It creates too large a sense of uncertainty. It is a
standard joke among the business public that lawyers are forever
saying "It depends." Those who interact with the legal system
frequently want rules, at least under many circumstances.2 8
VII. THE HOLDINGS-PLUS THEORY OF STARE DECISIS
If holdings alone do not constitute binding precedent, if more
206. See id. at 619.
207. See id. at 621.
208. Still, there is much to be said for judicial minimalism. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) (arguing that courts

should decide most constitutional issues upon grounds that are both narrow and shallow). While
Sunstein's minimalism is not the same as the Holdings Theory, they overlap to a considerable
degree.
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than holdings constitute binding precedent, what might that "more"
be? One natural candidate is judicial dictum. Another is the
reasoning which justified or sought to justify the rule of law that was
or that generated the holding. 209 Thus, many discussions of precedent
posit that binding precedent consists of holdings plus judicial dicta.
This kind of precedent is created whenever a court adopts a rule
when it does not have to. Supreme courts sometimes do this because
they believe a rule is necessary for the administration of a particular
kind of lawsuit that is relatively common. For example, most autoinsurance policies cover "permitted users." In other words, if the
insured gives someone else permission to use his car, then that person
is covered by the liability sections of the policy while he is using the
car. As a matter of standard jargon, this portion of an auto-insurance
policy is called the "omnibus clause," and permitted users are called
"omnibus insureds." The ordinary discourse of ordinary life is quite
fluid, gappy, fragmented, and generally incomplete. Thus, the
contours of permission are not always clear. So, how do you judge
whether a particular use is a permitted use? In Coronado v.
Employer's National Insurance Co.,210 the Texas Supreme Court
considered exactly this issue. 211 The facts of the case involved a
foreman who had the permission of his company to use one of its
trucks to take his crew home.212 There was an eight-hour drinking
incident followed by an accident. 213 The court observes that "[t]here
are three different approaches to the problem of deviation [from a
permission] in the United States. '214 The court describes these three
approaches, each of which is a rule. 2 5 The court then adopts one of
the rules and applies it to the facts. 216 The rule the court adopts is not
necessitated by the facts. One of the other rules would have led to the
same result. In other words, when the court adopted a rule, it went
well beyond the facts, but it was perfectly clear that the court's intent
was that this rule should be followed in all subsequent Texas
217
decisions.
209. On the importance of justifications in the context of precedent, see Neil MacCormick,
Why Cases Have Rationes and What These Are, in PRECEDENT IN LAW, supra note 54, at 155.
210. 596 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1979).
211. See id. at 503.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 504.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 505.
217. See id. at 505-06.
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The Holdings-Plus Theory is quite a sensible one. In dealing with
auto insurance and the "permitted user," there needs to be a rule. If
the legislature will not give us one, the courts must, and it is better for
the courts to lay down the rule than it is for the legislature to do so.
Moreover, the Holdings-Plus Theory also solves the problem just
discussed in Morua. Obviously, the court's discussion of whether
supplementary interrogatories need to be sworn was a carefullyconsidered matter and, therefore, judicial dictum. The Holdings-Plus
Theory might very well explain part of the Imperial Theory. Holdings
plus judicial dicta might be what courts have in mind when they use
language like "authoritative expression" and "deliberate statement."
On this account, the Imperial Theory would simply be the HoldingsPlus Theory "with an attitude." The "attitude" would be the attitude
of domination, distrust of uncertainty, and a whole-hearted
veneration of the past.
One problem with the Holdings-Plus Theory is that it is not
always easy (or even possible) to tell what constitutes judicial dicta.
There are many mechanically-discoverable features which suggest
that a discussion comprises judicial, as opposed to mere, dicta: the
length of the discussion, the consideration of arguments, the presence
of citations, the discussion of other cases, and so forth. Nevertheless,
distinguishing types of dicta is by no means purely mechanical, and
there may be areas of controversy as to whether some kinds of
dicta-even "considered" dicta-constitute judicial dicta. Indeed, it
may be that what constitutes judicial dicta, as opposed to other kinds,
hinges in part on the course of history. It may be that one
generation's judicial dicta are another generation's obiter dicta. If so,
then the kind of objectivity that one wants to see built into a theory of
precedent will not be present.
As with the Imperial Theory, there may be two versions of the
Holdings-Plus Theory. One would be the Intentional Holdings-Plus
Theory. On this view, whether something constituted judicial dictum
would depend upon the intentions of the relevant judges. The other
theory would be the Textual Holdings-Plus Theory. On this Theory,
what constituted judicial dictum would depend upon the face of the
text, and no reference to the intentions of the judges would be
permitted. Obviously, specialized rules of interpretation would have
to be developed. At the same time, most lawyers can distinguish
judicial from other kinds of dicta without too much difficulty, and
there is frequently a consensus as to which is which.
As with the other Theories, there is a triangular tension between
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text, authorial intent, and audience consensus deriving from history.
It would be nice and clean to say that every significant judicial
opinion in one way or another has a particular holding, involves
certain judicial dicta, and so forth. The collective memory of the legal
profession, however, or, at any rate, the collective memory of the
attentive, specialized legal public, has a great deal to do with what a
case stands for. Often, these memories are shaped by what people are
taught in law school, so that enunciated conceptions of law professors
are frequently quite important in shaping the collective memory. This
is less true with cases, which are constantly subject to review and
critique. It is less true with so-called landmark cases, which have
218
stood the test of time. Thus, the meaning of Raffles v. Wichelhaus
(for example) is very dependent upon a fairly-stable collective
memory created by the professoriate, whereas the meaning of Roe v.
Wade219 is much more a matter of the text plus political context and
cross-currents. These observations ought to be disquieting to anyone
who would like to believe that, in theory, there are stable precedents
and they are largely a function of text.
VIII. THE FLEXIBLE THEORY OF STARE DECISIS
The Flexible Theory of precedent does not have a mechanical or
a quasi-mechanical notion as to how to pick out what is binding about
a case. First, according to the Flexible Theory, it is good enough to
say that a proposition of law in a case constitutes precedent if it is an
important proposition of law in that case. Obviously, importance is a
very flexible idea. The idea of importance is probably enough to
distinguish the Flexible Theory from all others. However, two other
propositions tend to go with this first one. Second, the Flexible
Theory tends to subscribe to the view that a proposition of law is an
important one only if it was squarely decided. Third, most versions of
the Flexible Theory emphasize the continuous evolutionary change of
the law. This idea, too, flows from constraints generated by what it is
to be an important proposition of law. The Flexible Theory is not
enamored of sharp, revolutionary changes in the law. There may be
many subspecies of the Flexible Theory, depending upon what
dimension of precedent is being regarded flexibly. There are a
number of such dimensions. First, how much force should precedent
have? I have suggested that if a proposition is precedent, then it is a
218. 2 Hurl. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
219. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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very, very, very good reason for deciding a subsequent appropriate
case. I also conceded that this notion is far from clear. The Flexible
Theory would, as befits its name, have a flexible approach to what
constituted a good reason, a very good reason, and so on. The
Flexible Theory would say that it depended on the circumstances, on
the amount of time that elapsed, on the type of case that was
involved, on the judge who wrote the opinion, on the number of
dissenters, on their identity, on the nature of the controversy, on the
identity of the parties, and on many other factors. Another dimension
of precedent with respect to which the Flexible Theory may be
flexible is the role of text. Each of the Theories outlined up to now
emphasizes the role of the text of a court's opinion in determining
what constitutes precedent. Some variants of the Flexible Theory
might say that, while text is important, history, attitudes of the bar,
and social consensus are at least as important as the language of the
case. This is certainly true in some instances. Precedent applies only
to similar cases. This is true by definition. What constitutes a relevant
similarity? This is a problem over which legal scholars have struggled
for years. Whatever the ultimately-correct answer is, similarity among
social states of affairs is partly determined by social rules and rules of
language. 220 Those rules can evolve, so that what once was precedent
no longer is.
The expressions of the Flexible Theory (or subspecies of the
Flexible Theory) in cases often may not be distinguishable from the
expressions of the Imperial Theory, the Holdings Theory, or the
Holdings-Plus Theory. The wording may be identical. What
distinguishes the Flexible Theory (and its subspecies) is accented by
attitude, not formulation. The way the Flexible Theory looks at good
reasons, however, will be different from the way every other Theory
does. It will always see the goodness of a reason in terms of its
context. It will always see the strength of precedent as less than the
previously-discussed Theories see it. At the same time, however, the
Flexible Theory will move with the times. It will conceptualize itself
and everything else in pragmatic terms. 221 Pragmatism implies not
220. See Schauer, supra note 85, at 591-92.
221. There has been a revival of pragmatism in recent years. The intellectual leadership is
provided by Richard Rorty. The cornerstone of his work is PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF
NATURE (1979). Rorty's leadership is complemented by HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN
OPEN QUESTION (1995) and by the earlier WILFRID SELLARS, SCIENCE, PERCEPTION, AND
REALITY (1963). For a recent discussion of pragmatism, politics, and the law, see THE REVIVAL
OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE (Morris Dickstein
ed., 1998). Pragmatism as a philosophical doctrine, pragmatism as a world-outlook, and
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only practicality, however, it implies an accommodation to the social
world as currently understood. The Flexible Theory may be reformist

in its orientation (or not), but it will never be confrontationally
critical. In this sense, the Flexible Theory fits well with some
moderate versions of Legal Realism 222 and with many versions of the
Legal Process Theory of legal institutions. 223 Both empiricism and
224
reasoned elaboration are important.
pragmatism as a conception of the law may or may not be related to each other. In Freestanding
Legal Pragmatism, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM, supra, at 254, Thomas C. Grey suggests
that pragmatist jurisprudence may be nothing more than "a theoretical middle way between
grand theorizing and anti-intellectual business as usual." Id. at 266. In What's PragmaticAbout
Legal Pragmatism?,in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM, supra, at 275, David Luban implies that
legal pragmatism is often nothing more than "eclectic, result-oriented, historically minded
antiformalism." Id. at 280. According to Luban, whatever legal pragmatism is, Formalism-a
theory of law which cabins "legal analysis to logical and analogical manipulation of pre-existing
doctrine"-is its sworn enemy. See id. at 276. The linkage between pragmatism-whether
conceived as a philosophical theory or as a loose outlook on life-and the law has been around
for a long time. Judge Cardozo recognized this fact in his great and influential THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 83, at 102:
Not the origin, but the goal, is the main thing. There can be no wisdom in the choice of
a path unless we know where it will lead. The teleological conception of his function
must be ever in the judge's mind. This means, of course, that the juristic philosophy of
the common law is at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism.
222. The Flexible Theory probably fits best with moderate Legal Realism, such as that of
Karl Llewellyn. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 71, at 5; K.N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the
Beautiful, In Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224, 224 (1941-1942); see also K.N. Llewellyn, The Rule of
Law in Our Case-Law of Contracts, 47 YALE L.J. 1243, 1246 (1938). The Flexible Theory does
not fit quite so well with more radical Legal Realisms such as those of Jerome Frank. See
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). Nor does it fit well with the cynical
Legal Realism characteristic of the Critical Legal Studies school. For the classical systematic
statements of the Critical Legal Studies school, see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986). See also ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITCAL LEGAL
STUDIES (1987). For a recent statement of Critical Legal Studies, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997). For a contemporary variation on the theme, see PAUL F.
CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW 38-44 (1998). See also ARTHUR
AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: OUTSIDERS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER LEGAL
EDUCATION (1998); PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW (1996). Radical Legal Realists
tend to believe that language is completely malleable and absolutely subject to all sorts of
manipulation, so much so that virtually all judicial decisions were nothing but discretionary.
Obviously, on a radical Legal Realist jurisprudence, stare decisis is nothing but window
dressing. One of the (fictional) lawyers Laurence Joseph interviewed says this:
Cynical? Of course I am. How can you be a lawyer and not be cynical? But a cynic? I
am not a cynic. Cynics are the second-, the third-raters. For the cynics I have nothing
but contempt. There are rules, basic rules-they may change, they may or may not be
to your liking-but there are rules. The cynics don't give a damn about the rules.
LAURENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND 35 (1997). The Critical Legal Studies school seems to be
populated by cynics.
223. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Phillip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process,
107 HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994). For an account of the Legal Process School which places it in
historical and political context, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM (1996).
224. For more on reasoned elaboration, see Schauer, supra note 86, at 633 n.1. For more on
empiricism, see JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
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If the Imperial Theory is to be characterized by its "having an
attitude," the Flexible Theory is to be characterized by its having the
opposite attitude. It is not particularly attached to fixed rules. It does

not worship custom. It is not particularly attached to the status quo. It
does not view rules in an expansionist way. And it does not
necessarily view the relationship between sovereign and subject as an
imperial one of dominance. The Flexible Theory would characterize

itself in pragmatic, evolutionary terms. There is a distinction,
however, between the Flexible Theory (which is pragmatic) and
something people are now calling the Pragmatic Theory of Law: at

least in principle, one could advocate a pragmatic theory of
225
adjudication and not take stare decisis seriously.
Indeed, whenever a supreme court emphasizes the importance of
change, as opposed to fixity or stability, in the common law, one can
be assured it will not be articulating the Imperial Theory of stare
decisis.226 If there is an emphasis on pragmatic and evolutionary
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995).

225. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM,
supra note 221, at 235, 238: a pragmatist judge sees precedent as merely "sources of
information" and as "limited constraints on his freedom of decision"; in truly novel cases, the
judge instead looks for "sources that bear directly on the wisdom of the rule that he is being
asked to adopt or modify." Notice that Judge Posner, if he in fact does not take stare decisis
seriously, is just a hair's width over the line with this passage. He comes off differently in other
passages: "[T]he positivist [judge] starts with and gives more weight to the authorities, while the
pragmatist starts with and gives more weight to the facts." Id. at 240. "[C]ommon law judges
reserve the right to 'rewrite' the common law as they go along." Id. at 245.
226. As demonstrated by the actions of the majority of states, the common law is not
frozen or stagnant, but evolving, and it is the duty of this court to recognize the
evolution. Indeed, it is well established that the adoption of the common law of
England was intended "to make effective the provisions of the common law, so far as
they are not inconsistent with the conditions and circumstances of our people." Our
courts have consistently made changes in the common law of torts as the need arose in
a changing society.
El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 310-11 (Tex. 1987) (citations omitted) (quoting
Grigsby v. Reib, 153 S.W. 1124, 1125 (Tex. 1913)). Perhaps the best explication of the theory is
to be found in the oft-cited case of Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964)
(emphasis added):
As originally conceived and as generally applied, the doctrine of stare decisis governs
only the determination of questions of law and its observance does not depend upon
identity of parties. After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely
decided by the Supreme Court, or the highest court of the State having jurisdiction of
the particular case, the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or
other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit
between different parties. As a general rule the determination of a disputed issue of
fact is not conclusive, under the doctrine of stare decisis, when the same issue later
arises in another case between persons who are strangers to the record in the first suit.
Thus, according to Swilley, stare decisis applies only to questions of law; it applies only to
decisions of the supreme court; the propositions of law must have been "squarely decided"; the
new case must involve the very same question; the precedent binds all lower courts; it also binds
the supreme court.
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change, if there is an emphasis on balancing a variety of factors, and if
there is an emphasis on the law's not getting too far ahead of the
public, then the Flexible Theory is likely under discussion. Notice that
the same features are not necessarily characteristics of the Holdings
Theory, although they are consistent with it.
The Flexible Theory subordinates the meta-doctrine of stare
decisis to the necessity of historical change and, hence, the desirability
of legal change. It is less rigid, therefore, and less inflexible than the
Imperial Theory, although-as an institutional matter-intermediatelevel courts may have to follow the supreme court in a manner that is
less than fully-flexible. (Obviously, the Flexible Theory permits the
supreme court to overrule its own decisions, as is unquestionably the
law in Texas.227) The Flexible Theory uses the distinction between
holdings and dicta and the distinction between judicial dicta and
obiter dicta, as well as the distinction between binding precedent and
persuasive precedent. Indeed, one of the problems with the Flexible
Theory is that it (all-too-flexibly) slip-slides among these various
categories.
One difficulty for the Flexible Theory is to state when legal
change should take place, i.e., to state when stare decisis should give
way to other considerations. And what should those other
considerations be? In the succinct phrasing of Benjamin Cardozo,
"The final cause of law is the welfare of society. '228 He also wrote this:
"[I]n every department of the law ...the social value of a rule has
become a test of growing power and importance. '229 He describes the
230
examination of rules in this manner as "the functional attitude.
The power of stare decisis is thus limited by public policy. It is limited
by the analysis of public institutions, societal needs, and the direction
of history in moral terms. Unfortunately, bare references to public
policy and moral considerationswill not do. These forms of analysis
and critique must be worked out in convincing detail. Of course, all
such analyses will become political in a democratic order.
Consequently, the Flexible Theory shades off into high-class but
pretty-much-recognizable political analysis. There is a continuum
here.
227. See Federal Royalty Co. v. State, 98 S.W.2d 993 (Tex. 1936). In contrast, according to
FederalRoyalty, even the supreme court does not have the power to set aside its own previous
judgments. See id. at 995.
228. CARDOZO, supra note 83, at 66.
229. Id. at 73.
230. Id.
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Another difficulty with the Flexible Theory is that it relies upon
the splendidly-attractive phrase "squarely decided." It is important to
notice that the phrase "squarely decided" is much narrower than the
phrases "authoritative expression" or "deliberate statement."
Nevertheless, unclarities shroud that phrase like fog. For example,
does it apply only to holdings or does it extend also to judicial dicta?
A quite-modern case, in line with the Flexible Theory, is
Gutierrez v. Collins.31 Gutierrez adopted the "most significant
relationship" test for conflicts of law in the area of tort. 32 In criticizing
the rule of lex loci delicti, the court acknowledged that the "law of the
place of the tort" rule was mandated by stare decisis. However, said
the court,
the doctrine of stare decisis does not stand as an insurmountable
bar to overruling precedent. Stare decisis prevents change for the
sake of change; it does not prevent any change at all. It creates a
strong presumption in favor of the established law; it does not
render that law immutable. Indeed, the genius of the common law
rests in its ability to change, to recognize when a timeworn rule no
longer serves
the needs of society, and to modify the rule
233
accordingly.
Much is unclear in this language. Most importantly, there is a great
distance between change for the sake of change, at one end of a
spectrum, and change compelled by social need, at the other. In
between, there are many gradations of the need for change. Still, one
thing is obvious in this passage from Gutierrez: the supreme court is
talking only about itself when it talks about explicitly overthrowing
timeworn rules. Nevertheless, it is making clear that even the mostapplicable precedent should not bind a subsequent supreme court,
unless the rule "makes sense or follows logical reasoning. ' 234
It is impossible to distinguish the Flexible Theory from the other
Theories in terms of the language in which the Theories are
formulated. Unlike the Holdings and Holdings-Plus Theories, the
Flexible Theory does not use a criterial mark for what counts as
precedent. The difference between the Flexible Theory and the
Imperial Theory is really a matter of emphasis. 235 The Flexible Theory
231. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
232. See id. at 319.
233. Id. at 317.
234. Collier v. Poe, 732 S.W.2d 332, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc), affd, 484 U.S.
805 (1987).
235. Consider the following language:
What is stare decisis? It is "A deliberate or solemn decision of a court or judge made
after argument on a question of law, fairly arising in a case, and necessary to its
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is much more amenable to change than the Imperial Theory. It simply
takes less to obtain change on the Flexible Theory than it does on the

Imperial Theory. In the formulations of the two Theories, change
plays a larger role in the way the doctrine of stare decisis is discussed
when it is the Flexible Theory that is being discussed. There may be

very deep political and ideological differences between those who
hold the Imperial Theory and those who hold the Flexible Theory. I
would expect those who adhere to the former Theory to be

traditionalistically conservative, more in tune to the idea of very slow,
organic growth, more fearful of change, and so forth. One would
expect those who adhere to the Flexible Theory to be somewhat more
enthusiastic about the possibility of change, less devoted to the past,
and so forth.
One of the most significant arguments in favor of the Flexible
Theory in recent years is given by Frederick Schauer in his book
Playing by the Rules.2 36 Schauer sketches what he calls "the pure
common law model." 237 On this model, the common law decision-

making system is barely rule-based. First, common law rules do not
have canonical formulations, because there are no authoritative
formulations of the rules. Many great judges see the rules as

"opportunity for change [rather] than as constraint against

''

it. 238

According to Schauer, rule-based decision-making focuses on the
determination." Stare decisis does not arise when there is "an opinion expressed by a
judge on a point not necessarily arising in a case; an opinion of a judge which does not
embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument, or a
full consideration of the point." The strength of the common law and its stare decisis
rules lies in that thoroughness with which a case is tried after investigation and
argument of issues fairly arising. To the extent that a court overflows the issues and
seeks to declare rules of law into being by avulsion instead of accretion, it destroys the
system. Courts are not legislatures; courts decide cases. Until the case arises, there is
no precedent; there is no stare decisis. Comments on sterile abstract situations lack the
vitality of actuality. The solemnity and seriousness with which a court investigates and
writes upon an irrelevant point, may entitle it to respect, but it is the respect due any
learning and not the respect of a rule of law by which inferior courts are bound. Chief
Justice Marshall once wrote concerning general expressions, "If they go beyond the
case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit
when the very point is presented for decision."
State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853, 878-79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (citations omitted)
(quoting Grigsby v. Reib, 153 S.W. 1124, 1125 (Tex. 1913) (alteration in original)), affd and
adapted, 355 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1962). It is important to notice that the supreme court not only
affirmed but adopted this decision. It did this even though it subtly warned other intermediate
courts to tread lightly upon supreme court precedent. Is it not odd that the author of Valmont
Plantations, Justice Pope, who was then on the intermediate-level court of appeals, does not
refer to the distinction between holdings and dicta?
236. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND INLIFE (1991).
237. Id. at 179.
238. Id. at 178.
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rules and not on the justification for the rules. According to him, the
common law frequently looks to the justification and not to the rule.
Thus, common law rules in his "pure common law model" are very
much like weak rules of thumb, rather than like real rules. 239 Inother
words, the common law is focused on "case-specific optimization
'240
rather than rule-based stability.

Seemingly, reliance on precedent is inconsistent with this theory
of the common law. However, according to Schauer, because there

are no canonical formulations of rules, the lawyer or judge reasoning
from precedent must construct a new rule every time; it is this
discretion in constructing rules which permits the common law as
practiced to converge upon the pure model of the common law.241
After all, no two events are ever completely alike, and the later court
has substantial discretion in describing the previous case. There are

hardly any constraints on this process, 242 says Schauer, and so courts
can approach the matter flexibly. Often, the flexibility is to be found

in how they describe the facts of the new case. That will determine
what was important about the old case and, therefore, what it has to
do with the new case.
A. Convention
What counts as a holding and what counts as a dictum, according
to the Flexible Theory is-at least to some degree-a matter of
convention. These conventions are not easily articulated, and most

lawyers could not state them with any clarity, but most good lawyers
know that what is being said here is true, and they have a "feel" for

when different conventions apply. The conventions vary, for example,
from field of law to field of law. Thus, it is conventional for a supreme
239. What is central to the common law is the way in which what had previously been
thought to be the rule is a rule only in a very peculiar sense, for it will be applied to
new cases if and only if that application is consistent with the full array of policies and
principles that, in a more complex rule system, occupy the same place that
justifications occupied in many of our earlier and simpler examples. The common law
appears consequently to be decision according to justification rather than decision
according to rule. It abounds with rules of thumb, but avoids the use of rules in a
strong and constraining sense.
Id. Judge Posner holds a view somewhat like this. He believes that a pragmatistic account of the
nature of law will be neutral with respect to whether the law consists of, or should be dominated
by, rules. The pragmatist jurist will be interested in approaching this matter pragmatically. See
Posner, supra note 225, at 247.
240. SCHAUER, supra note 236, at 181.
241. See id. at 183.
242. See id. at 184.
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court all at once to overthrow the old rules governing, for example,
choice of law. In the area of tort law, for example, it is not done tort
by tort. The replacement of lex locus delicti with some sort of
substantial relationship or similar test2 43 was accomplished in one
decision. Other decisions may have refined the rule a little, but the
overthrow of the old rule was accomplished swiftly and boldly, not
piece by piece.
Supreme courts have had no hesitation about doing this, and the
bar was not outraged by the bold and sweeping character of the
decisions, even if some members of the bar lamented the passing of
the old rule. Technically, the holdings in these conflicts-of-law cases
would be much narrower if they were conceived in orthodox terms, or
if they were conceived along the lines of the Holdings Theory. Thus, a
change in the choice-of-law rules for negligence law does not
necessitate a change in the choice-of-law rules for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Indeed, a choice-of-law holding
involving roadway accidents does not necessarily apply to a case
alleging negligence in warning consumers about manufactured
products, to negligence in the provision of legal services, or to other
exotic forms of negligence.
Often, a high court will indicate what it wants the scope of the
holding to be. The Flexible Theory generally honors the intentions of
a precedent-setting court, although the Theory is not committed to
anything so drastic as either the Imperial Theory or the Holdings
Theory. I doubt that the Flexible Theory is dedicated to the idea that
precedential propositions should always be understood quite
narrowly. The Flexible Theory is just that: flexible. Hence, what
constitutes precedent in a given case may vary with the intentions of
the court. Courts do not usually discuss this feature of the Flexible
Theory.
What is problematic about the Flexible Theory is that no one has
ever articulated a comprehensive set of criteria, or even guideposts,
for determining when this or that convention applies. Even though
sophisticated lawyers seem to be able to figure out what the
conventions are, the laity has great difficulty with this; many users of
the legal system-including sophisticated businessmen-believe that
all talk about conventions is mumbo-jumbo, and that the courts
243. A particularly-interesting case of this is to be found in California law, which differs
strikingly from most of the rest of the country with respect to choice-of-law rules and
methodology. See Michael Sean Quinn, California Choice of Law, Insurance Contracts, and
Environmental Litigation, 8 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 29 (1995-96).
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simply do as they please. Obviously, when such an attitude is
widespread, the legitimacy of the law is diminished.
There is another problem with my formulation of the Flexible
Theory. I characterize that Theory as stating that precedent is any
proposition of law that is important in a case. But what is it to be "in a
case"? Does this hinge on the intention of the judges deciding the
case? If a judge says, "Listen up, you all! What I'm about to say is
really important in this case," is that sufficient to make the
proposition he is about to utter binding precedent? What is the
relationship between the logic of the justification for the holding and
the proposition's being important, according to the Flexible Theory?
The closer this relationship, the more the Flexible Theory begins to
resemble the Holdings Theory. Or does importance hinge on what
2
the legal community takes to be important about a case? "4
B. Accent and Emphasis
What really characterizes the Flexible Theory is partly a matter
of emphasis. What is emphasized is the inevitability of social change
and, hence, the mutability of judicially-ordained rules. Another thing
that contributes to the Flexible Theory is a narrower approach to
what constitutes precedent. The Imperial Theory ultimately does not
rest upon distinctions between holdings, judicial dicta, and obiter
dicta. The Flexible Theory fully encompasses these distinctions and
thrives on them. It is not always clear what the Flexible Theory is
doing with them, however.
The Flexible Theory is neither text-based nor based on authorial
intent. Those two features of any opinion are not excluded from the
Flexible Theory, but they are not decisive. What is decisive? Who
knows? As is characteristic of balancing theories, one does not know
in advance what will be decisive. One must look at the totality of
relevant factors, and it is usually not possible to know in advance
what those factors are.
C. Actions and Arguments
In addition to its use of the distinction between holdings, judicial
244. It is well-known that some precedent is more important than other precedent. Some
cases have enormous influence. Usually, such cases are well-written specimens by important
judges in politically-significant areas of the law. Most significantly, perhaps, they exemplify the
frame of mind or a mode of reasoning which is important. For a general theory of this matter,
see Richard Bronaugh, PersuasivePrecedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW, supra note 54, at 217.
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dicta, and obiter dicta, its use of convention, and its use of audienceoriented tools, the Flexible Theory departs from the Imperial Theory
in another way as well. According to the Imperial Theory, lower
courts are bound by any authoritative expression of the law to be
found in a supreme-court opinion. Thus, according to the Imperial

Theory, what constitutes binding precedent may be determined from
the face of an opinion. If the supreme court said something, if what it

said had to do with the case then at hand (and is not simply a
technical essay), and if what the court said is an expression of law,

then the court's statement is binding precedent. For the Imperial
Theory, it is possible to tell from the words and opinion alone what
constitutes binding precedent.

Many say that, under the Flexible Theory, what constitutes
binding precedent in a case is determined more by what the court did,

than by what it said.2 45 Some people try to say that, on the Flexible
Theory, it is the decision itself that is precedent and not any particular
principle of law. Some people use this as a foundation for saying that
legal reasoning is substantially different from other types of
reasoning. They say that legal reasoning is essentially reasoning by
analogy from one decision to another situation. 246 This idea of
reasoning is nonsense. Reasoning is always propositional: what is
binding is not a decision but a principle. A decision cannot be
binding. Only a principle or a rule can be binding. Nevertheless, one

245. The bindingness of a series of holdings of a court of last resort under the rule of
stare decisis is determined by the "decision" rather than the opinion or rationale
advanced for the decision. The controlling principle of a case is generally determined
by the judgment rendered therein in the light of the facts which the deciding authority
deems important.
Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 193 n.1 (Tex. 1968) (citation omitted).
246. See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning:Semantics, Pragmatics,and the Rational Force
of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996). For a critique of analogical
reasoning, see Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57 (1996). For an
elaborate defense of analogical reasoning in the law, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 62-100.
For an equally elaborate defense of analogical reasoning, see Emily Sherwin, A Defense of
Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (1999). A remarkable amount of
analogical reasoning goes on whenever the law encounters an ostensibly-new problem and tries
to cope with it. Dealing with the problem of communicating with clients in the new
"cyberworld" is such a situation. Lawyers are terribly concerned about whether e-mail
communications are sufficiently protected to count as confidential, or whether lawyers might
inadvertently violate the rules demanding that lawyers never-or, hardly ever-betray the
confidences of their clients. In this area, most of the thought begins by thinking through
analogies between e-mail systems on the Internet and telephones, cordless phones, radio
transmissions, letters, FedEx deliveries, and the like. The law of e-mail communications is now
beginning to develop in a stable direction, and much of it is based upon analogies. See David
Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting Client Confidences by Internet E-Mail, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459 (1998).
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determines which principles are important in a case by determining,
at least in the first instance, what the court did.
This mode of determining which principles have precedential
authority is strikingly different from the Imperial Theory. According
to the Flexible Theory, a court might express a proposition of law
authoritatively and, ostensibly, use it in resolving the case, when in
fact it relied on a different legal principle or on a much narrower one.
Courts do not infallibly know which legal principles they are using in
resolving cases, according to the Flexible Theory. It is even more true
that courts do not ineluctably know which legal principles they need
to rely on or which legal principles-as a matter of logic-are
necessary to their argument. This is a striking contrast with the
Imperial Theory, assuming that authorities generally know what they
intend. The idea that precedent is to be found in what courts do
rather than in what they say is a clever one, but as an account of
precedent, it is wrong-headed. Even if doings constituted some sort of
precedent, it would be the descriptions of the doings, or the principles
embodied in the doings, that actually constituted helpful prescriptions
for future actions. The simple performance of actions-even the
deciding of cases-cannot by itself be normatively interesting. There
must be principles behind that performance, and those principles
must instruct the articulation of yet other principles.
D. More Differences
The Flexible Theory differs from the Imperial Theory in other
important respects as well. First, one version of the Flexible Theory
fully recognizes that some binding precedent arises out of holdings; it
acknowledges that quasi-binding precedent also arises out of judicial
dicta; yet at the same time it is committed to the view that precedent
can arise from convention and consensus about a case, as well as from
the language of the decision and from the intent of the judges.
Obviously, in this sense, the Flexible Theory also differs from the
Holdings Theory and from the Holdings-Plus Theory. The Flexible
Theory also differs from the Holdings Theory in the way it
determines what constitutes a holding. Both proceed, to some degree,
by analysis. On the Holdings Theory, however, the analyst is
restricted to the logic of the decision in determining what constitutes
a holding. On the Flexible Theory, the analyst may use the logic of
the decision-indeed, she must-but she may also look to values and
to other things. The goal of the Flexible Theory is to determine not
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what is logically necessary to a decision but what is important about a
case. The Imperial Theory has a much broader view of what
constitutes real binding precedent than any of these.2 47 Second, the

Flexible Theory embraces the view that the question of what
constitutes a precedent must be approached through analysis and
cannot be determined mechanically. Third, the Flexible Theory
accents the changing nature of the common law, whereas the Imperial
Theory tends to emphasize the stability of the common law. The
Holdings Theory is ambiguous on this point. If holdings are construed

narrowly, then there is lots of room for new decisions. This outlook
can be consistent with the idea that the common law is evolving, and
the judges need lots of room to make decisions. The Holdings-Plus
Theory tends to fill in the canvas quite a lot, so there is not so much
room for new judicial decisions. Fourth, the Flexible Theory (like the
Holdings Theory and the Holdings-Plus Theory) is much more likely
than the Imperial Theory to focus upon the relationship between
stare decisis and holdings in the supreme court as opposed to in other
courts. The Imperial Theory, in contrast, is likely to blur the

distinction between the supreme court and relevant courts of appeals,
insofar as trial courts are concerned. This difference is harmless
enough where trial courts are concerned, because, whichever Theory
is true, trial courts tend to feel a strong pull toward decisions made in

the courts of appeals that govern them. Some cases even say
specifically that decisions of courts of appeals are stare decisis for trial
courts. 248 It is not at all clear that the common law doctrine of stare
2 49
decisis was intended to apply to intermediate courts of appeals.

Matters become more interesting when one considers the extent
to which decisions of one intermediate court of appeals constitute
247. The only potential exception to this will be when history, convention, and collective
memory, as it were, impose a holding on a landmark case. That "holding" may be quite broad.
248. See City of San Antonio v. Gonzales, 737 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex. App. 1987, no writ).
249. Whatever is true about the ancient law, decisions of intermediate courts of appeals
are-as a matter of practice-recognized as some sort of authority. How does one footnote the
experience of every litigator? Perhaps indirectly. Rule 90(i) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure provides that "[u]npublished opinions shall not be cited as authority by counsel or by
a court." This language is perfectly general with respect to which unpublished opinions one is
forbidden to cite. Nevertheless, it clearly includes opinions of courts of appeals. See Berry v.
Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1983); see also Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498,
501 (Tex. App. 1991, writ requested); Bullock v. Sage Energy Co., 728 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Tex.
App. 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McCollum, 666
S.W.2d 604, 610 (Tex. App. 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985). In
McCollum, the court toys with the issue of which unpublished opinions cannot be cited, and it
also ponders what sanction there should be for citation of unpublished cases. The court gives no
clear answers, however. See McCollum, 666 S.W.2d at 610.
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precedent for another. At least one court of appeals has said that it
felt bound by the decision of another court of appeals.2 Interestingly,
the West Reporter headnote for this case summarizes the rule as
follows: "A Court of Civil Appeals is bound by a decision of another
Court of Civil Appeals, and especially by its own decision. '' 52 1 The
headnote is a blatant error. In fact, once the decision is analyzed, it
does not actually say that the court is bound by the holdings of
another court of appeals. What it says is that when a court of appeals
decides a point of law having bearing on the meaning of an insurance
contract, and when that form is not subsequently modified, then the
decision of the court of appeals is read into the contract as an implied
term.25 2 This type of reasoning is a familiar principle of statutory
construction, and the court of appeals is applying it to form insurance
contracts, apparently because they are statute-like. The reasoning
may be wretched, but it is not poor reasoning regarding the authority
of other courts of appeals. A number of other intermediate appellate
courts deny that they are bound by other courts of appeals. One case
explicitly states that the doctrine of stare decisis in no event applies to
253
any decision of a court of appeals.
IX. THE CREATIVE THEORIES OF PRECEDENT
The Creative Theories constitute an extension of the Flexible
Theory-sort of. The Imperial Theory construed precedent broadly.
The Holdings Theory, the Holdings-Plus Theory, and the Flexible
Theory differ considerably on what counts as precedent. In
determining what constitutes precedent, however, the Flexible
Theory is just that, flexible, when it comes to having any
methodology. According to the Holdings Theory and the HoldingsPlus Theory, precedent is somehow extracted, teased out, or
elucidated by analysis. According to the Flexible Theory, many things
may assist in finding the law that is truly important to a case. The
same approach applies to the Creative Theories. At the same time,
the Creative Theories emphasize imagination, invention, and
250. See Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Jackson, 264 S.W. 289, 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924, no
writ).
251. Id. at 290.
252. See id. at 292.
253. See Calvary Temple v. Taylor, 288 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956, no writ); see
also General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Rios, 154 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), rev'd on
other grounds, 164 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942); Malone v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 9 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928, no writ); Thompson v. First State Bank of
Amarillo, 198 S.W. 116, 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916, no writ).
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construction. While the Flexible Theory emphasizes the evolutionary
nature of the common law, the Creative Theories celebrate its
essentially-inventive and -improvisational nature.
A. The Subjective Versus the Objective Creative Theory
The Creative Theories are not one big, happy family. They
comprise a number of families, but there are two opposing clans. One
of them is the Subjective Creative Theory, and one of them is the
Objective Creative Theory. Both Theories emphasize imagination
25 4
and inventiveness in what should be counted as precedent.
1. Subjective Creative Theory
The Subjective Creative Theory asserts that there is no context
of justification.25 In some contexts, people discover things. In others,
they justify their claims about their discoveries. In the law, the
process of pre-trial discovery is a little like the context of discovery in
science, while summary judgment and trial are sort of like the context
of justification in science. The argument of Frederick Schauer in his
book Playing by the Rules illustrates this point.26 He thinks that no
stable, fixed, or dispositive rules are to be found in older cases. This is
true because there are always factual differences to be found between
any two cases. Schauer's "pure" model of the common law is
undoubtedly wrong. The common law involves both particularistic
and generalistic tendencies. It involves both narrowness and
rulishness. Nevertheless, if one takes Schauer's particularism
seriously, it affords lots of room for inventing rules by distinguishing
past cases with wild abandon. Different judges with different outlooks
can come up with different rules for new cases and claim they are
somehow connected to the old cases when adapted for more modern
times. If there are no ways to check this assertion, we have the
Subjective Creative Theory in all its glory.
A second version of the Subjective Creative Theory posits that
254. Not every theory of adjudication that emphasizes judicial creativity is a Creative
Theory, because as I am using the term, a Creative Theory is a theory of stare decisis. There are
theories of creative adjudication that are not theories of stare decisis and that, indeed, do not
take stare decisis seriously as an animating legal doctrine. See Posner, supra note 225, at 245.
255. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 50, at 26-27. It is sometimes said that the context of
justification has a "logic," while the context of discovery is much more free-wheeling-filled
with imagination, fantasy, analogy, or what have you. The locus classicus for the distinction
between these two contexts is HANS REICHENBACH, EXPERIENCE AND PREDICTION 4-5 (1938).
It has become a standard distinction in epistemology.
256. See SCHAUER, supra note 236.
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creativity certifies itself and that-at best-the superiority of
creatively-produced theories should be recognized through Verstehen,
if at all. The trouble with all Verstehen doctrine is that there is no way
to distinguish a mere assertion of understanding from genuine,
fundamental intuition. The mere presentational feel of the intuition is
not enough. One can believe that one has grasped a social structure
and be wrong. Similarly, one can believe that one has grasped the
spirit of the law and be quite wrong. This is, after all, a highly-political
situation, at least broadly speaking.
A third version of the Subjective Creative Theory contends that,
in construing previous cases, judges are really fobbing off their
political preferences under the guise of rationalizing the law. One of
the premier exponents of this view is Pierre Schlag. According to him,
"the reason of law not only underwrites the rule of law but provides a
sense of comfort and control to jurists and citizens alike. ' ' 217 Schlag
believes that reason is "an essential aspect of the rule of law, ' 25 8 but
he also believes that the rule of reason, as conceived by American
law, is phoney. In particular, Schlag is critical of the balancing that is
central to most versions of the Flexible Theory. He calls it a "Noble
Scam." 29 The general idea is that if prestigious elites claim that
something is authoritative, then it becomes authoritative by a kind of
social magic. The general idea is that prestige has its privileges.
On Schlag's version of the Subjective Creative Theory, legal
reasoning, especially balancing, essentially masks political vision. In
this sense, legal reasoning is ideological. This third version of the
Subjective Creative Theory might be called nonpolitical romanticism.
On this view, diverse legal imaginations create as many rules of law as
possible, and they provide diverse approaches to dissolution of legal
problems. The motto of this approach is "Let a Hundred Flowers
Blossom." It is not clear that this approach, however, will lead to a
flourishing legal system. Indeed, it may very well fail to be compatible
with the Rule of Law. Uniformity in law is a virtue, even if it is not an
art.
2. Objective Creative Theory
In contrast to the Subjective Creative Theory, the Objective
Creative Theory holds that even ingeniously-invented explanations
257. SCHLAG, supra note 181, at 15.
258. Id. at 20.
259. Id. at 33.
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for cases-even brilliantly-derived principles of law-must be
justified as precedent somehow. Probably the best-known exemplar
of the Objective Creative Theory is the approach of Ronald Dworkin
in his justly-celebrated treatise Law's Empire.26° In that volume,
Dworkin develops a synthesis of interpretive hermeneutics,
narratology, and legal reasoning. He argues that, in finding precedent,
the thoughtful judge, whom he names "Hercules," should carefully
analyze the potentially-applicable cases, arrange them in order, create
a story of legal development and evolution that matches social
evolution, extract or impose upon the cases the best interpretive
principle possible from the moral point of view, and then treat that
principle as the binding precedent. Obviously, this is a very creative
activity. Equally obviously, it can be a rational activity. And, without
doubt, it is a profoundly-moral activity. Dworkin submits that, for
every such activity, there will be a uniquely-correct answer. The
essence of legal argument-when taken seriously-is the finding of
such answers and their presentation. Dworkin's theory has been
summarized, explicated, reviewed, and criticized so many times and at
such length that hardly anything new can be said about it. Everyone
would agree, however, that Dworkin's account of the nature of legal
reasoning and of the nature of precedent links both reasoning and
precedent to deep moral and political theories. On Dworkin's
account, judges are applied philosophers.
A recent theory of jurisprudence which exemplifies the Objective
Creative Theory is that of Professor Richard Markovits in his new
book, Matters of Principle. Although Markovits does not focus on
judges in the same way Dworkin does, his judges, too, are applied
philosophers. Interestingly, Markovits treats the subject of precedent
systematically and at length. Markovits's view is "an anthropological,
secular version of natural-law jurisprudence. 2 61 The central
contention of his argument is that "our society is morally committed
to making 'arguments of moral principle' the dominant form of legal
argument and that such arguments will yield internally-correct
'262
answers to all legal-rights questions.
Markovits starts from the proposition that American culture is
rights-based, through and through. He takes the concept of moral
obligation to be reciprocally correlated with the idea of a moral right,
260. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
261. MARKOVITS, supra note 21, at 1.
262. Id. (emphasis added).
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whereas the idea that someone ought morally to do something is a
weaker idea and does not imply the existence of a correlative moral
right. Markovits believes that the moral-rights-related practices in
American culture are "sufficiently rich and dense" to determine
"internally-right" answers to virtually all moral-rights questions. By
an "internally-right" answer, Markovits does not mean one that is
objectively correct and filled with truth everywhere and for all time or
even true everywhere at one given point in time. For Markovits, an
"internally-correct" moral determination is one to which a given
society is morally committed. 263 It is fundamental to our culture that it
be embedded with basic moral principles, and their more-concrete
corollaries "are not only automatically part of the law but provide the
basis of the type of legitimate legal argument- arguments of moral
principle--that we are committed to making dominant in our legal
culture. '' 264 Markovits believes that our many, many legal and moral
practices are rich enough to enable legal principles, together with
arguments from basic moral principles and their corollaries, to yield
internally-right answers to all legal-rights questions. Obviously,
societally-internally-right legal answers to legal-rights questions will
be internally correct both from a legal point of view and from the
society's moral point of view. Obviously, Markovits has wholeheartedly embraced the Doctrine of Moral Seepage.
In addition, he subscribes to the view that legal rules and legal
practices are to be evaluated in terms of the basic moral principles of
the society in which the legal system exists. Our society, for example,
subscribes fundamentally to a liberal basic moral principle according
to which everyone at all times is morally obligated to
treat all moral-rights holders as equals in the sense that liberalism
would define that egalitarian notion-namely, treat with equal,
appropriate respect all creatures who have the neurological prerequisites to become and remain individuals of moral integrity and
actualizing
show equal, appropriate concern for all such creatures'
265
their potential to be individuals of moral integrity.
Obviously, this is not a version of utilitarianism. Indeed, it is much
closer to Kant. One wonders, of course, if one can, in all
circumstances, show equal respect and equal concern for all persons.
In the abstract, it is tempting to think that if A has fiduciary duties to
B and none to C then, by virtue of that fiduciary relationship, A owes
263. See id. at 2.
264. Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted).
265. Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
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B duties of concern she does not owe C. At a more concrete level,
sometimes, the showing of concern for one person requires that
showing respect for another person be deferred. This is potentially an
acute problem for the trial lawyer. It is difficult to know what would
count as showing appropriate respect for a lying witness. It is not
clear how opposing counsel should show concern for an opposing
party that has brought a frivolous lawsuit based upon, say, forged
documents. It is difficult to know what would count as proper respect
toward a corporate entity that is engaging in coercive and oppressive
litigation. Indeed, what is appropriate respect toward any artificial
legal entity? Curiously, the ambiguities in these problems and the
proper way to respond to them have not yet been seriously
developed. Kantian duties in a world in which black and white are
present, streaked, and mixed, are not easily discerned, articulated, or
2 66
vindicated.
Nevertheless, Markovits has a significant theory of moral
integrity. According to him,
an individual has moral integrity when he takes his life morally
seriously not only by giving appropriate consideration to his
obligations but also by attempting to establish a reflective
equilibrium
between his personal value-convictions and his life
267
choices.
According to Markovits, in order to be "a person of integrity, an
individual must take her obligations seriously, make a meaningful
personal-ultimate-value choice, and make meaningful other choices
that make her life conform with her value choices. ' 268 Generally
speaking, people of moral integrity live examined lives and live with a
view toward being autonomous (i.e., free and inner-directed).
Legitimate legal argument in a liberal rights-based society will
involve several significant features. First, it will not offend the basic
moral principle of the culture. Second, it will respect those principles
and values that are corollaries of the basic moral principle. Third,
every decision will be examined against the rights-based interests of
all moral-rights holders in the society, and only those decisions that
are morally positive, on balance, will be repeated over time. Fourth,
the state will enforce morally-legitimate private legal rights of
members of the society.
266. For a recent move in that direction, see ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR
ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999).
267. MARKOVITS,supra note 21, at 22.
268. Id. at 39.
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As a consequence of these fundamental principles, argument
from precedent will be a significant component of legal
argumentation. Obviously, they are not the last word: arguments from
the basic moral principle in the culture will be the last word, and they
will trump every other form of legal argument. Nevertheless,
precedent will always be a primary consideration in legal reasoning. If
precedent were not an important form of argument, then the state
would be creating legitimate expectations on the part of its citizens
and then disappointing those expectations.2 69 Such conduct on the
part of the state hardly manifests either respect or concern.2 70 In
addition, according to Markovits, precedent should be interpreted in
such a way that it reflects the moral-obligation- and moral-rightscommitments of our society. In other words, basic moral principles
should seep into the legal system and inform it in all sorts of ways,
including how legal rules are interpreted.
Markovits also spells out a number of ways in which arguments
from precedent should be limited. (1) If people have not relied upon
the precedent, then it is weaker than if it has been relied upon to a
considerable extent.2 71 (2) If precedent has been weakened to the
extent that it has been undermined by subsequent, analogous, legal
developments, it is not as binding. 72 (3) Precedents are weaker when
they are based upon factual considerations that are outmoded. Thus,
a precedent which necessarily hinged upon the use of the mail to
communicate would be weaker in 1999 than it was in 1899. (4) If a
precedent is designed for a factual situation which never obtained,
precedent should be weaker than it would be if the situation for which
it was designed actually existed. (5) Precedent which was never fully
argued to any court should not be given the same kind of weight that
should be given to precedent which was fully argued and, therefore,
presumptively fully considered. (6) Precedent narrowly conceived
should be given more weight than precedent more broadly conceived.
269. See id. at 56.
270. [A]rguments of moral principle reveal that our practice of giving judicial precedent
and practice weight in themselves is an outgrowth of our duty to show respect to all
moral-rights holders by giving them fair notice (by making our conclusions about their
legal rights and obligations consistent with their reasonable expectations). I do not
think that this obligation to give fair notice can be fulfilled only through giving weight
to precedents.
Id. at 70.
271. Interestingly, Cass Sunstein also argues in favor of desuetude as a precedent-weakening
device. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 155.
272. Interestingly, both Markovits and Sunstein count heavily upon analogies. See id. at 62100.
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Broad precedential rules are probably not going to have been fully
argued, and it is the established and well-known practice in American
legal culture to tend to give narrow precedents more weight than
quite-broad ones. This is the point to distinguishing, says Markovits,
between holdings and dicta.273 (7) If a given decision was wrong right
from the start, its weight as precedent should be inversely

proportional to the seriousness of the original error. And finally, (8) if
precedent has proved unworkable in practice, then it should not be
274
counted as very strong precedent.

At the same time, the mere fact that overruling a precedent
would "undermine our belief in the rule of law" 275 should not prevent

it from being overruled. Similarly, the fact that overruling a precedent
276
would "destroy social peace in relation to the issues in question,"
does not require keeping a precedent which should otherwise be
overruled. This is where fundamental moral rights and the action of
legal precedent will clash seriously. These were the kinds of
277
arguments which were given against Brown v. Board of Education.
(Markovits would, without doubt, agree that Brown was correctly
decided. In fact, he would suggest that it was long overdue when it
was decided.)

Quite clearly, Markovits's jurisprudence is a version of the
Objective Creative Theory. In Matters of Principle, Markovits is not

terribly interested in the nature of advocacy or in the nature of
judicial decision-making. Nevertheless, it is clear from his discussions
of the substantive law that both advocates and judges need to

approach legal argument in a creative spirit. At the same time, it is
crystal clear that he provides criteria for distinguishing direct creative
suggestions from all others. Those criteria consist of the liberal basic
moral principle he articulates, its corollary rules, and its corollary

273. Obviously, Markovits has little use for the Imperial Theory and is suspicious of the
Holdings-Plus Theory. Nevertheless, he is not committed to the Holdings Theory either,
because he believes that precedential propositions of law shade into one another. Probably, he
does not think that hard and fast distinctions between holdings and judicial dicta can be reliably
formulated. Markovits would probably be tempted by the Flexible Theory, but in every case he
would want to know whether the "important" proposition that has become precedent was
actually fully argued to some court, whether people have relied upon it, and whether it fits with
the true facts both of the past and of the present world (as opposed to lawyer-, judge-, and law
professor-concocted facts), and he would want to know how it fits in with his Basic Moral
Principle (together with its corollaries).
274. See MARKOVtTS, supra note 21, at 73 (describing all eight judicial-precedent practices).
275. Id. at 74.
276. Id.
277. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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values.
A third version of the Objective Creative Theory may be found
in the recent writings of Professor Cass R. Sunstein. Sunstein argues
that law in the pluralistic-indeed, heterogeneous-society involves a
certain miracle. How can this be decided and decisions be made when
there are significant disagreements about fundamental values and
politics? Sunstein has developed the idea of an "incompletelytheorized agreement," which, he believes, holds the key to
understanding the nature of precedent.2 8 The general idea is that
skilled lawyers and jurors can end up agreeing on how a certain case
should come out without at all agreeing on the proper reasoning or
upon the philosophical foundations of the proper reasoning. Judges
with different political visions can agree, if they focus narrowly and
stay away from controversial areas. They can also come up with
reasoning, if they proceed by using analogies. Established precedent
plays the role of the "fixed point" in analogical reasoning. In general,
judges deciding controversial matters should stay away from general
rules, about which there will be substantial disagreement, and should
pay close attention to the drift of the law. Almost every good lawyer
has a good grasp on what the law is and on the direction in which it is
going to go. An insightful lawyer is very much like a musician, in
some ways. He has a good ear for the melody and rhythm in the law.
Some very intelligent people have a "tin ear" for legal argument.
These matters are frequently subject to a broad consensus.
Sunstein and Markovits are obviously polar opposites in their
approaches to the law. Markovits believes that significant judicial
opinions should be deep, in the sense that they are connected to
important
moral, political, economic, jurisprudential,
and
philosophical truths. Because Sunstein is skeptical about the existence
of much agreement about what is true at a deep level, he believes that
judicial decisions should be shallow and should stay away from the
search for deep truth. Probably, Markovits is more sympathetic to
broad decisions than is Sunstein, although there is nothing about
Markovits's theory that requires that judges always articulate broad
rules. In some circumstances, Markovits would love narrowness as
much as does Sunstein and sometimes for the same reasons. Still, the
fact that it is proper to include Sunstein among Objective Creative
Theorists, tends to show that "objective creativity" is not linked to the
embracing of deep philosophical theories.
278. See Sunstein, supra note 46.
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B. Narrow Scope
According to the Creative Theories, binding precedent is to be
construed narrowly-indeed, some say as narrowly as possible.279 In
this respect, the Creative Theories converge upon the Holdings
Theory. The theme of narrowness is one way to distinguish the
Creative Theories from the Imperial Theory. 280 The Creative Theories

want to give themselves as much room as possible in which to create.
This distinguishes them sharply from the Imperial Theory. Most of
the time, the Creative Theories will be every bit as evolutionary as
the Flexible Theory. The Creative Theories, however, leave room for
revolutionary changes in the law, after the manner that Thomas Kuhn

described revolutionary scientific changes. 281 Of course, in theory,
some versions of the Flexible Theory could de-emphasize the role of

evolution in jurisprudence, but that is unlikely.282

279. See Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F.2d 1271, 1275 (5th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) ("Cases
are to be decided on the narrowest legal grounds available"). Of course, Korioth is not a
statement of Texas law, but of federal law. Indeed, no Texas case appears to go as far as Korioth
does. Nevertheless, strains of Korioth are to be found in Texas cases.
The applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis is ... thus: "to make an opinion a
decision there must have been an application of the judicial mind to the precise
question necessary to be determined ..... .... "A decision is not authority upon a
question not raised and considered in the case, although it may be involved in the
facts."... "Furthermore, the former holding or decision is binding only to the extent of
the precise question passed upon; and is confined to the application of a legal principle
to the same, or substantially the same, state of facts, and is not binding as to facts or
issues not adjudicated or involved in the former decision or ruling."
State v. J.M. Huber Corp., 193 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (citations omitted), affd,
199 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1947). This language is very close to Korioth, because it narrows the focus
of binding precedent as much as possible. Although it does so in terms of the question
presented, rather than the rule applied, the idea that binding precedent must be construed quite
narrowly shines through this passage.
280. Although our duty is to apply the law as decided and declared by the supreme
court, we are not bound by assumptions and implications in its opinions. Justice in the
particular case, as well as rational and orderly development of the law, demands that
the doctrine of stare decisis be limited to questions raised and decided on full
consideration. Otherwise, application of precedents to cases without such full
consideration would inevitably result in anomaly and injustice. Consequently, we
consider ourselves free in this case to construe the Act in question in accordance with
our own determination of the intention of the legislature as expressed in the Act and in
the light of pre-existing law.
American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284, 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
(citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 601 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1980).
281. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
282. In American Transfer, Justice Guittard says that one court is not bound by the
implications of a rule set down in a previous case. One form of implication is surely an
entailment. But if one proposition entails another, then the truth of the entailed proposition is a
necessary condition for the truth of the first. Hence, at least on the Holdings Theory and on the
Holdings-Plus Theory, surely subsequent courts are bound by the entailments inherent in
previous decisions. Thus, doctrines espoused by Justice Guittard are quite different from the
doctrines to be found in some of the other Theories. Four factors impose narrowness:
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Other cases that tend to support the Creative Theories have said
the following sorts of things: courts should interpret the law in order
to avoid inequity and antiquated doctrines; 283 to the extent that courts
should use considerations of substantive justice in statutory
construction and in rethinking the common law, the scope of binding
precedent is reduced;28 rules may not be disassociated from their

facts. 285 Obviously, the more seriously, or stringently, this principle is
understood, the narrower a binding precedent will be.286 Thus, the

Creative Theories and the Imperial Theory are opposites (sort of).
The Creative Theories almost certainly tend to weaken stare decisis.

This goes along with trying to make room in which courts may create.
Usually, formulations of Creative Theories do not actually say this.

They simply emphasize the ability of courts to overturn previous
decisions. 287

One rather indirect source of authority for the Creative Theories
comes from the way in which dissents are characterized by the Texas

Supreme Court. It is odd that a dissenting opinion would be counted
as any form of precedent. After all, dissenting opinions support

positions that have lost. The majority of the court will have rejected
not only the conclusion of the dissenters but important parts of their
reasoning. So how can a dissent count as any form of precedent? In
O'Connor v. First Court of Appeals,2 Justice Oscar Mauzy relied
upon the writings of Charles Evans Hughes, a former Chief Justice of
the United States, to characterize dissenting opinions. 2 9 Chief Justice

Hughes had stated that dissenting opinions are "an appeal to the
brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a
later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting

rationality, the theory of evolution in the common law, the concept of holdings, and substantial
justice. The Court of Civil Appeals' opinion in American Transfer states that there is a moral
dimension to the requirement that precedent be construed narrowly. See American Transfer,
584 S.W.2d at 298. Thus, the area of judicial generativity is enhanced. Sometimes, a formulation
of one or another of the Creative Theories actually commits itself to a logical absurdity in order
to maximize its "wiggle" room.
283. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. 1983).
284. See Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.w.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (holding that
developing public policy regarding employer/employee relationships mandated a narrow
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine); see also Cox v. Thee Evergreen Church, 836
S.W.2d 167, 171 n.6 (Tex. 1992).
285. See W.D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 308 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. 1958).
286. See Pennell v. United Ins. Co., 243 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1951).
287. See Lesage v. Gateley, 287 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956, writ dism'd).
288. 837 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1992).
289. See id. at 96.
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judge believes the court to have been betrayed."2 9° The Texas
Supreme Court also relied upon the writings of Ruth Bader Ginsberg,
now a Justice upon the United States Supreme Court, in
characterizing dissents. She says that the prospect of the dissenting
' 291
opinion "heightens the opinion writer's incentive to 'get it right.'
Chief Justice Phillips, who currently leads the Texas Supreme Court,
has also recently attributed to dissenting opinions the function of
"meaningful[ly] disciplining" the writer of the majority opinion. 292
Perhaps a dissent counts as very weak precedent because it suggests
that certain legal arguments are within the canons of acceptability,
and the larger the number of judges that join the dissent, the more
acceptable the dissenting argument is, other things being equal.
(Other things are not equal when an eminent jurist writes a dissent. In
that case, a one- or two-judge dissent-like "Holmes and Brandeis
Dissenting" - gives an argument a certain pedigree, which is
valuable.)
In addition, the ideas put forward by Chief Justice Hughes,
Justice Mauzy in O'Connor, and Chief Justice Phillips in Dallas
Morning News create a dialogic or dialectical conception of the
relationship between majority opinions and dissenting opinions.
Focused and reasoned conversation about the law is almost always

creative, and the law requires imagination to interpret

it.293

Thus, the

fact that a learned judge, after reflecting upon a matter for a period of
time, has written a dissent in Year One may help an advocate in Year
Six to construct an argument in favor of change. This is particularly
true if not just one judge promulgated such a dissent, but several
others joined him. This is particularly true if the judges who turned
out the dissent are "forward looking," "progressive," and still on the
court.
C. Interpretation,Imagination,and Invention
The Imperial Theory conceptualizes the idea that binding
290. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 68 (1928).

ITS

291. Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 139
(1990).
292. See Dallas Morning News v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 842 S.W.2d 655, 661 (Tex. 1992)
(Phillips, C.J., separate opinion).
293. One of the problems about conversation is that it can become too shrill, too much like a
high-school debate, and too rhetorical. Where does vigorous, productive dialogue end and
meaningless, verbal pushing and shoving begin? As we all know, that in itself is currently a
matter of debate among legal circles in Texas.
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precedent is to be discovered by reading the text of the opinion,

reflecting upon it, and placing it in several large contexts. The
Holdings Theory and the Holdings-Plus Theory hold that binding
precedent is to be discovered by analyzing an opinion. The Flexible
Theory also emphasizes analysis, but it is much more free-wheeling.
The Creative Theories hold that binding precedent is not discovered
but teased out by interpretation, seized by imagination, or perhaps
even invented first by vision, then by lawyerly agreement, and

ultimately by social consensus.
The basic point of the Creative Theories is that what constitutes
the narrowest-or even simply, a quite-narrow-ground for a legal

holding is not something that can be discovered. Thus, the Creative
Theories posit that not even holdings are things that can be
discovered. What constitutes the narrowest ground is a shifting
matter, which will depend upon practicalities, upon individual

purposes, upon the context of the litigation, upon the context of the
original decision, and so forth. In other words, the Creative Theories
are committed to the view that there is no identifiable narrowest legal
rule constituting or justifying a decision. Hence, what constitutes the
binding precedent of a case will depend upon a variety of extrinsic
factors. 94
In some ways, this concept is similar to the interpretation of
literature.2 95 Obviously, not every proposed interpretation of a poem
is satisfactory. However, every good poem is susceptible to more than

one plausible, acceptable, or even correct interpretation. This is true
294. Theoretically, there could be yet another theory. This theory would hold that stare
decisis applies only to (1) those propositions of law in a given case that express the narrowestpossible legal ground upon which judgment could have been entered and (2) the narrowest
propositions of law that justify the holding. If this theory were committed to the view that one
could always find the narrowest holding in the narrowest ratio, then the theory would be
possible. Arthur Goodhart tried to spell out this view some years ago. See Arthur L. Goodhart,
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1931). This view was demolished
by J. Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REv. 597 (1959); see also A.L.
Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REv. 117 (1959); A.W.B. Simpson, The
Ratio Decidendiof a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 413 (1957).
295. The relationship between law and literature is all the rage these days. See RICHARD
WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE (1992); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (rev. ed. 1998); INTERPRETING LAW AND
LITERATURE (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988). There is a particularlyinteresting essay in the Levinson and Mailloux anthology by Richard Weisberg. Although the
verbiage may be alien, what advocate cannot profitably contemplate the following: "Nietzsche
links textual accuracy with the urge to justice. Clearly, for him, living well means reading well or,
at a minimum, reading vitalistic, performative texts with an aspiration toward the dynamic
growth and the necessary constraint of the individual will to power." Richard Weisberg, On the
Use and Abuse of Nietzsche for Modern Constitutional Theory, in INTERPRETING LAW AND
LITERATURE, supra, at 181,185.
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even if the criteria for adequacy in interpretation are to be found in
authorial intent. Authors frequently do not know what they intended;
poets frequently adopt the interpretation of others as consistent with
an enriching of their intent, and so it is with courts. Frequently, in a
given case, the court does not intend just exactly this legal rule, as
opposed to precisely that one, although there are many legal rules
that the court manifestly does not intend: textual nihilism is
completely wrong-headed. The Creative Theories have a freewheeling account of what constitutes interpretation. It is not a matter
of finding out facts. It is not a matter of objective analysis. It is a
matter of preventiveness, and there will be several interpretive
inventions that cannot be falsified for any given text. Lots of people even lawyers-subscribe to these Theories of interpretation. There is
no necessity that interpretive processes must be relativistic in this
way. Even the most basic of human experiences involve the
interpretation of sensory stimuli, yet relativism seems out of place
here.
The difference between the Creative Theories and the other
Theories harks back to the distinction between finding and making
legal rules. To put the matter differently, so long as self-evident
textual readings are not the sole source, the essential difference
between the Creative Theories and the other Theories is whether the
recovery of binding precedent is seen in terms of archaeology or in
terms of literary interpretation. In archaeology, one digs and digs and
then one finds, say, a pot. According to an archaeological theory of
stare decisis, one digs and digs-analyzes and analyzes-and then
finds the binding precedent. One may have to analyze the shards one
finds before determining what one has really found, but the
enterprise is essentially a matter of discovery. In contrast, there is the
interpretive theory of stare decisis, in accordance with which, after
the digging is done, interpretation begins. The interpretation is not, of
course, on the level of saying, "That is a bone," and, "That is a
spoon." The process of interpretation is more nuanced and more
subtle, as well as unfalsifiable, at its core. Moreover, because the
purpose of the interpretation is not merely to find the truth, but also
to solve contemporary practical problems, legal interpretation is to
some extent inventive. As such, it essentially involves relativity. Acts
of creation always involve differing products.
The Creative Theories are the darlings of law professors. There
are several reasons for this. Law professors are frequently the mostcreative legal thinkers around. Creative legal thinkers are frequently
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drawn to the professoriate because it is in precisely such a profession
that people can be most creative in their legal thinking. Besides,
professors can write almost anything and call it work, and if other
professors like it, tenure is likely to follow. Once tenure is achieved,
there is even more freedom to think creatively. There is actually not a
great deal of demand for creative thought in most aspects of legal
practice. In fact, many parts of legal practice discourage most types of
creativity much of the time. The points of error one files in appellate
court should look like the points of error other lawyers file. Briefs
should follow a prescribed formula. Outlandish, exotic ideas seldom
prevail, and both the ethics and economics of advocacy focus on
winning. Of course, creativity-like subtlety-has an appropriate role
to play in advocacy. But it is not a pervasive role in most cases.
Indeed, it is quite limited.
And this is not all. The Creative Theories are an imperative of
pedagogy. The common law does change. At some point, those bound
for the law must be tuned in to the brooding nature of the law.2 96 The
law at any given time contains the seeds of its own change. Law
students must be taught to look for this. The only way to look for,
discern, and "plug into" tendencies toward change is to exercise
creativity followed by the right sort of Verstehen. Law professors see
generation after generation of bright but, usually, quite-orthodox
young people coming into law schools. These professors believe that
these minds have not only to be shaped into legal molds but blasted
into creativity. The latter is much more difficult than the former, and
teaching the Creative Theories of stare decisis is one way to
accomplish this pedagogical goal.
There is another reason why the Creative Theories are more
popular among professors than they are among lawyers. The Creative
Theories are naturals for intellectuals. Yet there is a deep divide
between practitioners of the law and legal intellectuals, who tend to
296. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1916). In his dissenting opinion, Holmes
remarked that "[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate
voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified." Id. at 222 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Holmes seems right in part and wrong in part when he here embraces Legal
Positivism with a vengeance. He is no doubt correct that the common law is the product of some
sovereign or quasi-sovereign. And he is also right that the sovereign can probably be identified.
However, he is wrong when he says that the voice of that sovereign (or quasi-sovereign) is
always articulate. Sometimes, the voice is anything but articulate. And sometimes the sovereign,
speaking through courts, speaks with many voices. Indeed, sometimes there is a virtual
cacophony. To the extent that decisions sensibly conflict with each other, it makes sense to say,
metaphorically, that the common law broods. Of course, it does not do so in the sky, even
metaphorically. Probably it does so in a cave, metaphorically speaking.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:655

be law professors. Intellectuals tend to be individualistic (in a certain
sense). They love to stand out as exponents of exotic ideas. Flashiness
in argument is not a virtue, but flashes of genius are, as are meteoric
displays of creativity. Intellectuals who take on a public role are
outsiders; they are by temperament committed to disturbing the
status quo. Intellectuals pride themselves on manifesting glistening
brilliance, on taking unpredictable positions, on eschewing slogans,
on anathematizing party lines, on devastating-if not humiliatingthe opposition, and on scoffing at fixed dogmas. Few things lie closer
to the soul of the intellectual than embarrassing orthodox dogma.
Few things are more embarrassing to an intellectual than being coopted by an orthodox institution. In general, public intellectuals
regard their raison d'etre as representing "all those people and issues
that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug."2 Much of the
confrontational work of intellectuals depends upon adherence to
universal principles: we should attend to the down-trodden because it
is morally wrong not to. In our time, one of the universal principles
many intellectuals embrace is a skeptical principle that little can be
known, and less can be known with certainty. Obviously, this
skeptical stance is a critique and an embarrassment to those
attempting to vindicate the common law. However, because their
discourse must pierce into everyday public conversation from the
outside, the style of intellectuals tends to be confrontational. How
else could intellectuals get people to pay attention to what they are
saying? Public intellectuals -of which legal intellectuals are a
species-are not performing a function when they are making
"audiences feel good: the whole point is to be embarrassing, contrary,
even unpleasant. ' '298 Public intellectuals -and,
therefore, legal
intellectuals- assume a role that involves "both commitment and
risk, boldness and vulnerability. '299 "They cannot be mistaken for any
anonymous functionary or a careful bureaucrat," 3°° or for a work-aday lawyer.301
297.

EDWARD W. SAID, REPRESENTATIONS OF THE INTELLECTUAL 11 (1994). Much of

what I am saying about intellectuals is supported by this source. Said follows Karl Mannheim in
conceptualizing intellectuals. See KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Louis Wirth & Edward Shils trans.,
Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1946) (1929). Both of them stand in stark opposition to Marx, who
thought that intellectuals were always tools of the ruling class.
298. SAID, supra note 297, at 12.
299. Id. at 13.
300. Id.
301. Consider the following statements: The lawyer is in exile. He tends to be happy with
the idea of unhappiness. Lawyers passionately embrace dissatisfaction and dyspepsia. Lawyers
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Dazzling and meteoric brilliance is an important virtue for
intellectuals.30° Brilliance is also important to the lawyer who engages
in a good deal of legal argument, but it is of a much different kind.

Indeed, it is a self-effacing brilliance. The point in too much legal
argumentation is not to be novel or provocative. The objective of
legal argument is to take novel ideas and make them appear

commonsensical, simple (even obvious), mostly analogous to that
which is settled, and requiring only a baby-step or two forward from
what has already been established. Revolutionary argumentation has
almost no place in legal argument. Revolutions do occur, maybe, once
in a generation or so. Brown v. Board of Education was
revolutionary, but that case hardly sets the standard or gives a model
for legal argumentation. That noble case is politically a shining jewel,

but from the point of view of legal argumentation, it is a sport case.
D. Improvisation
The narrower the scope of each binding precedent, the less
decided is the law as a whole. The fewer binding precedents and the
more judicial decisions are workable improvisations, the more they
become juristic inventions designed to do justice and to move the
naturally tend toward curmudgeonly disagreement so much so that it becomes an entire style of
life. Do these sentences sound like sane lawyers anybody knows? Here is how Said describes the
intellectual: "[Tihe intellectual as exile tends to be happy with the idea of unhappiness, so that
dissatisfaction bordering on dyspepsia, a kind of curmudgeonly disagreeableness, can become
not only a style of thought, but also a new, if temporary, habitation. The intellectual as ranting
Thersites perhaps." Id. at 53. Said's prototype for description is Jonathan Swift. It is hard to
imagine him functioning as a lawyer. Interestingly, lawyers passionately embrace
professionalism. According to Said, professionalism constitutes the great threat to the position
of the intellectual. See id. at 73-74. Said demands that intellectuals eschew specialization, avoid
"the cult of the certified expert," id. at 77, and renounce both "power and authority," id. at 80.
Instead, intellectuals must embrace amateurism and the critique of power. These properties do
not characterize the lawyer very well and certainly not the advocate who is clearly an agent for
the client she represents. Most of the time, advocating lawyers embrace ingratiation and the
Argument by Nudge. In general, lawyers know what intellectuals do not, to-wit: the medicine
goes down easier with honey than with vinegar. (I am using the word "agent" loosely here.
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court said that lawyers were not the legal agents of their clients,
but were, instead, independent contractors. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980
S.W.2d 625 (Tex. 1998).)
302. Many intellectuals, but few lawyers, would care to be described as someone who
"radiated intellectual intensity." James Atlas, The Lose Canon, NEW YORKER, Mar. 29, 1999, at
60, 64. In this article, Judith Butler, Chancellor's Professor in the Department of Rhetoric and
Comparative Literature at the University of California-Berkley, is described as having an
"electrifying lecture style," as someone who transfixes audiences with her charisma, and as
someone who appears flamboyant in her lectures, but is not in real life. Lawyers would like to
be clear, attended to, heard, and so on. Most lawyers also crave respectability. Lots of
intellectuals at least say they do not want this, although they appear to want respect from one
another-hence, the problems of political correctness and ideological purity in the academy.
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culture from one temporal point to another. At this point, the
Creative Theories stand in stark contrast to the Imperial Theory,
which takes as an heuristic (if implicit) first principle that the
common law is somehow complete. The structure of the law is so
abstract that it must be understood by mere mortals in metaphoric
and symbolic terms. Most people would like to understand the
structure of the law in concrete terms (as in, "written in concrete")
rather than in the wispy and ephemeral ideas of consent,
interpretation, and improvisation. The latter make the capacity of the
law to govern too miraculous. In short, the Creative Theories are too
much like a miracle, and we all know that miracles are transitory,
subjective, anything-but-concrete, and perhaps quite unreal.
Nevertheless, according to the Creative Theories, there is nothing
short of a secular miracle at the heart of social orders based upon the
common law. That miracle is a peculiar admixture of quasi-consensus
and creative change.
X. SOME PRELIMINARY EVALUATIONS

Each of the Theories of precedent sketched here has virtues and
vices. The Imperial Theory accords well with the theoretical
characterizations provided by some textbooks and by many judges for
the contours and limits of stare decisis. On the other hand, the
Imperial Theory presents an extremely strong account of what it
takes to overcome a "very, very, very good reason" for deciding a
new issue in an old way. The Imperial Theory tends to be rickety; it
tends to be conservative; it can easily become reactionary. The
Flexible Theory, in contrast, accords well with the pragmatic,
incremental behavior of courts, and it provides a better account of the
common law's openness to change when it comes to picking and
choosing precedent, but the Flexible Theory lacks intellectual
integrity. For their part, the Creative Theories are exciting and
attractive, but they constitute more of a temptation than a solution.
Because the history of common law jurisprudence has concentrated
mainly on the Imperial Theory and on the Flexible Theory, and
because I have already said something about them, I will confine my
remarks to the Creative Theories.
A. Some Positive Thoughts
Courts almost never say that they are embracing either of the
Creative Theories. It would be inconsistent with the political imagery
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surrounding judging to do that. Moreover, while the Flexible Theory,
the Holdings Theory, and the Holdings-Plus Theory all purport to be
universal insofar as their descriptions of what courts do, the Creative
Theories do not purport to describe what courts always do, or even
what they think they do. Indeed, courts frequently lay down broader
rules than they need to, and then subsequent courts interpret those
rules as binding precedent. In this way, over time, dicta can evolve
into holdings. This means that what was obiter dicta in a first case
might become judicial dicta in a second case and holdings in yet a
third case.
Nevertheless, there is much to be said for the Creative Theories.
Appellate courts perform best when they do not lay down broad,
abstract rules, but when they focus on and respond to narrow
problems thoughtfully, openly, flexibly, and creatively. Further, the
idea that binding rules of law are always to be found by discovery or
analyzed into existence is implausible. Complex texts are simply too
indeterminate to bear univocal analysis. (Of course, this truth does
not imply that any interpretation of any text is acceptable. Some
interpretations are flatly wrong.) Finally, there are moral reasonsreasons of justice-for preferring narrow rules. To be sure, like cases
should be treated alike, but cases which appear to be alike, at first
blush, are frequently not alike, and historical changes, sociological
transformations, and changes of context make two cases which were
alike in a previous generation quite unlike in the present.
The Creative Theories draw support from other considerations
as well. Narrowness in conceiving holdings is only one feature of the
Creative Theories. Indeed, it is a subordinate feature. Precedent is
kept narrow in order to encourage creativity and flexibility, according
to the Creative Theories. Occasionally, creativity can become entirely
disconnected from the text of a given opinion. In that case, it is
difficult to guarantee that the holding will be narrow. We are all
familiar with situations in which a general rule of law turn out, upon
scrutiny, not to be found in the particular case with which it is
associated. If nine lawyers out of ten say that Smith v. Jones stands for
such-and-such a rule, then it does-at least under most
circumstances-even if the text does not bear that reading, and even
if the putative rule cannot be teased out of the language, facts, and
context of the opinion. This means that what constitutes binding
precedent is partly a social construction. If everyone, including highcourt judges, accepts the idea that such-and-such a rule is binding
precedent, then it is. Of course, this fact is inconsistent not only with
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the Imperial Theory and the Flexible Theory, but also with one of the
crucial elements of the Creative Theories, to wit: that binding
precedent is always the most narrow rule to be found in the case.
Then again, the Creative Theories have more than one important
element.
B. Some Negative Thoughts
In some ways, it is very difficult to distinguish between the
Flexible Theory and either of the Creative Theories. All three
Theories will be looking for what is important in a case. The Creative
Theories have a different way of going about finding what is
important, or creating importance, and they are more willing to
engage in conceptual leaps, but clearly all three Theories are related.
The Subjective Creative Theory comes at an enormous price.
Some components of that price are technical difficulties. It is one
thing to emphasize invention over discovery. It is a more problematic
thing to suggest that invention replaces justification. This is
particularly true in the law where one wants arguments to convey a
sense of inevitability. This sense of inevitability requires that an
argument for a narrow point must be shown to fit within a family of
arguments and to fit within the broader web of the common law.
There is a far-larger price for the Creative Theories, however,
and that is a social price. Many people in a democratic polis will find
the Theories repugnant. The people will believe that the Theories are
nothing more than rank subjectivity. They will believe that they
destroy the principled basis of law. And they will cry out against the
Theories. Such people will believe that judges who adopt the Creative
Theories are simply saying to the polis, "Trust me," and they will
believe that too much trust is unwise in any political order. Thus,
many will believe that the Creative Theories are elitist, relativistic,
subjective, and politically dangerous.3 03 If the use of the Creative
303. Indeed, the Subjective Creative Theory smacks of pernicious Post-Modernism. One
very seductive account of Post-Modernism is RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND
SOLIDARITY (1989). For another, see ALBERT BORGMANN, CROSSING THE POSTMODERN

DIVIDE (1992). A specifically legal text on Post-Modernism and the law is COSTAS DOUZINAS
ET AL., POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE (1991). It is much less attractive than Rorty's; it is much
too ponderous to be seductive. Pierre Schlag, of course, is an exponent of Post-Modernism. See
also GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS (1995); LAW AND THE POSTMODERN
MIND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE (Peter Goodrich & David Gray

Carlson eds., 1998) (mostly about purported French thought, for example, Pierre Legendre).
For another elaboration of Post-Modernism, see the essays of MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN
LEGAL FEMINISM (1992); for a somewhat more general treatment of Post-Modernism in the
context of social and political theory, there is AGNES HELLER & FERENC FEHItR, THE
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Theories were widely publicized, it might very well delegitimate the
law. The laity and the bar should not-and probably cannot-be that
separated. 304
Notice that this last objection applies both to the Subjective
Creative Theory and to the Objective Creative Theory, although for
different reasons. On the Subjective variant, there is no rational or
conceptual check on judicial decision-making, and the judge is simply
saying, "Trust me." On the Objective variant, there is a check, but it is
essentially controversial and too difficult for many people to
understand. Dworkin named the judge who invents new rules and
finds them in historical cases "Hercules" for a reason: his labors are
Herculean. There will be substantial disagreement about whether the
job has been done right. It is not an easily-solvable disagreement, and
it is not likely to go away when there are social and (broadly
speaking) political reasons for the existence of the controversy.
Without a publicly-professed ideology that judges are not creating but
explicating the law, the public could easily see the members of a
creative judiciary as usurpers.
Any theory of precedent that is facially subjective and relativistic
is unacceptable. It is inconsistent with the Postulates of Adjudication,
and it does not fit with the experience of the advocates and of the
judges alike. However, as was just pointed out, in a democratic order,
no theory of precedent should be too esoteric for the laity to grasp.
Not only must the laity be able to understand it, it must seem
plausible to the legal laity. These requirements create immediate
problems for any theory of precedent. First, there is a strong streak of
relativism in every culture. The public's attraction to relativism is
neither structured nor nuanced. On the other hand, at least in
contemporary American culture, it is rather odd. The people seem to
POSTMODERN POLITICAL CONDITION (1988); and for a general treatise on Post-Modernism,
one may consult DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1989). Those who

want a very simple introduction might try the snippets and cartoon approach to be found in JIM
POWELL, POSTMODERNISM FOR BEGINNERS (1998) (illustrated by Joe Lee), a comic book. For
a marvelously instructive and extraordinarily humorous, parodic put-down of all things PostModern, see Dennis W. Arrow, ',-Article-',-: Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and
Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated,96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997) (with outrageous
footnotes and one illustration: the reader has been warned). For another powerful, though less
Puckish, critique, see ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE:
POSTMODERN INTELLECrUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE (1998).

304. Also, once the Creative Theories are recognized as Post-Modernism, they will become
political anathema to many people. This is particularly true of religious people who regard PostModernism as necessarily atheistic. For a sophisticated discussion of the relationship between
evangelical Christianity and Post-Modernism, see the special issue entitled Postmodernism, 12
MARS HILL REV. 9 (1998).

CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74:655

want to say that morals are relative, but law is not. Indeed, being
subject to relativism is one of the ways that the laity distinguishes law
from morality. Of course, as every lawyer knows, this idea is
troublesome. Law, like any complex theory involving norms, has a
hurdle to climb over. The laity may want the law conceived
nonrelativistically, but once someone starts talking about legal theory,
relativism returns to the popular consciousness with a vengeance.
Perhaps this is a perfectly-general point about systems of norms. It is
difficult to make any complex and complicated theory involving the
articulation and application of norms plausible. The reason is that the
laity has little patience with, and has even less time for, complications,
complexities, and cross-currents. Practicalities tend to require that
legal theories, such as the theory of precedent, be simple enough to
be understood fairly quickly. Alas, no acceptable theory is of this sort.
If the length of this paper proves nothing else, it proves that.
So we are stuck with a paradox. Any rational theory of precedent
is complicated and requires patience. Any acceptable theory of
precedent must be the sort of thing which can be made plausible to
the laity. The laity will not-or will refuse to-grasp and embrace any
theory which takes time and effort to learn. No theory of precedent,
therefore, will be completely acceptable to the lay public.
Consequently, no theory of stare decisis will ever have anything
approaching complete legitimacy.
As if that news were not bad enough, there is more. The bar is
fragmented and stratified in lots of ways. There are rich lawyers and
poor lawyers. There are lawyers who represent people most of the
time, and there are lawyers who represent companies most of the
time. There are lawyers who do deals; there are lawyers who try
lawsuits; and there are lawyers who (mostly) do appeals. There are
also lawyers who are political, economic, or religious ideologues.
Some of them can keep separate their profession and their extraprofessional commitments; some cannot. In addition, there are many
lawyers who are just barely competent; there are many, many lawyers
who are work-a-day competent, but who have no real grasp of the
nature of the law; and then there is the intellectually-elite bar.
Sometimes, the intellectually-elite bar is the same as the social-statuselite bar (i.e., the country-club bar), and sometimes not. The problem
is that the meta-principles of stare decisis and the theories of stare
decisis are not well understood outside the intellectually-elite bar.
This means that no rational theory of precedent will ever have
complete legitimacy in the bar. This sad fact is exacerbated by the
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enormous expansion of the size of the bar over the last several
decades. One cannot count on tradition to teach through seepage in a
rapidly-expanding social system. But most members of the public get
their conception of the law, either directly or indirectly, from
watching, listening to, or hearing about the activities of lawyers. Most
lawyers do not have a firm grasp on the nature of precedent or on
what would count as a rational theory of precedent; how can the
public be expected to have one, and, from a political point of view,
where will one come from?
Therefore, if the Creative Theories are really the best accounts
of common law adjudication, that fact might have to be kept quiet.
The courts certainly do not subscribe to it openly, and few judges sign
on overtly. 35 In other words, it might be best to publicize common
law adjudication as according with one or another of the other
Theories and suppress the fact that the Creative Theories are the best
ones. Alas, this is Plato's "Noble Lie," and that idea is always a
troubling idea in any democratic order. If the Creative Theories have
to be concealed in order to be effective, if the Creative Theories
presuppose that much elitism, then maybe they are not such good
Theories after all.
On the other hand, I have a feeling that most elite lawyers
already know that the Creative Theories are descriptively and
prescriptively a powerful way to describe how appellate advocacyand, therefore, common law adjudication-really works. If so, then
we already have an elite that knows about the Creative Theories, uses
them as concealed subtexts in argument, and discusses the matter
freely, as it were, among itself, but does not discuss it with non-elites.
Is this one reason that so many Americans distrust lawyers? Do not
many judges violently reject the Creative Theories?
C. Implicationsfor Advocacy
What does all this have to do with advocacy? Surely,
approaching the "analysis" of a case in the interpretive spirit-in the
spirit of imagination and invention-is enormously liberating. It is
amazing how often ostensibly-straightforward, but unhelpful, rules
can be reformulated in interesting and helpful ways. Of course,
counsel must conceal the creativity and formulate the creative gloss

305. Maybe Jerome Frank embraced the Subjective Creative Theory from time to time. See
FRANK, supra note 222.
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upon a case or group of cases in a way that effaces their very
creativity. The whole point is to make the interpretation look
inevitable, and the easiest way to do that is to make it look as obvious
as possible.
Here are three rather important consequences of using the
Creative Theories. First, one should not expect intermediate
appellate courts explicitly to limit, create exceptions to, or overtly
criticize propositions of law mandated by supreme-court decisions.
Nevertheless, they may undermine them, distort them, overrule them
silently, and so forth. The Creative Theories give lower courts the
widest possible discretion in working with, and around, supremecourt authority. Hence, in arguing an innovative view to an
intermediate court, it is best not to present precedent in terms of the
Creative Theories, and one should always provide to the intermediate
court avenues for appearing consistent with the announced rulings of
the supreme court. Use cases supporting the Flexible Theory.
Secondly, we are all familiar with what is involved in
distinguishing cases. If one keeps the Creative Theories in the back of
one's mind, the vast majority of cases can be distinguished from other
similar cases, at least to some degree. This makes the Creative
Theories extremely valuable as mind-sets for approaching legal
argument. Distinguishing one case from another is an ordinaryenough experience for the advocate. It involves showing that the
holding of one case is not the holding of another, that what is judicial
dictum in one case is obiter dictum in another, that an authoritative
expression of the law in one case does not apply to the facts of
another case, that a deliberate statement in one case would be
inappropriate when applied to a second case, and so forth.
Approaching the activity of distinguishing cases in an inventive spirit
is no doubt extremely helpful. Discovering differences is terribly
important. The Creative Theories release this kind of energy, when
embraced, but they do not require it. Moreover, distinguishing cases
is not something that is done simply in the context of discovery. It is
something that is done also in the context of justification. Distinctions
made amongst holdings must be vindicated, not just found or
invented.3° The third way in which the Creative Theories are helpful
306. The stimulus that the Creative Theories have on the mind should not be
underestimated. Ronald Dworkin, in effect, recommends that advocates find precedent by
reading an opinion, or group of opinions, and then inventing the rule of law which places those
opinions in their morally best light. See DWORKIN, supra note 260. Surely, this is a noble
approach to constructing (i.e., inventing) precedent. Surely, the creative spirit can be found both
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is in the presentation of the argument itself. When one is arguing for
change, and even when one is arguing for the status quo in the face of
immense pressure for change, argument must be given in a matrix
that recognizes and encourages judicial creativity. Emphasis on the
theme of narrowness of precedent in the Creative Theories is one way
to achieve this end. That emphasis may be explicit, or it may be
implicit. The emphasis is explicit when the advocate argues openly to
the panel that a given precedent "must" or "should be" conceived in
the narrowest-possible terms. It is argued implicitly when the holdings
of cases are simply formulated as narrowly as possible, and all
broader formulations are subject to critique.
But what are the other themes in the Creative Theories? What
about the twin themes of relativity and invention? Using the
techniques mandated by the Creative Theories in actual argument has
dimensions both of honesty and of disingenuity. Honesty arises
because, in applying the Creative Theories, it is absolutely necessary
to point out to appellate courts that an "analysis" of the holding of
the case differs from the surface of the text and perhaps from
received opinion. At the same time, a certain element of concealment
arises because it would probably be impolite to espouse the Creative
Theories expressly. Effective advocacy dictates that one should
probably not explicitly adopt the view that the formulation of binding
rules of law is a relative matter or, at least, a matter subject to
substantial relativity. Judges abhor legal skepticism, at least in
public.3 °7
On the other hand, one form of disingenuousness should
probably be resisted. Some appellate lawyers and many trial lawyers
feel tempted to argue that their interpretations of the law are
inevitable-dictated by text, analysis, or simple justice. Sometimes, no
doubt, this view is true. Many times, it simply is not. It is disingenuous
and ineffective to play the poseur and claim that it a view is inevitable
when it clearly is not. Is it not more honorable and more effective to
proceed in a more-subtle way and to argue that one's position is the
best-although not the only-reading of the opinion, or group of
opinions, under discussion? This kind of humility in adjudicative
in discovering and in justifying precedent as Dworkin conceives it. Thus, perhaps it is mistaken
to suggest that the Creative Theories are at home in the context of discovery but not in the
context of justification.
307. There are exceptions, of course. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND
REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1950); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
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advocacy is uncommon, except among the best advocates. Its very
rarity may call attention to itself, however, and this mode of
presentation may-under at least some circumstances-be the most
persuasive and be a good way to take legal argument seriously. This is
a very, very subtle matter. One does not wish to appear uncertain,
perplexed, overwhelmed, or in a quandary. Indeed, one wants one's
argument to have a tone of gentle inevitability. Expressions of
certainty in excess of actual knowledge, however, are almost always
shrill. Judges are quickly and profoundly turned off by the shrill.
CONCLUSION

There are important academic arguments surrounding the nature
of legal reasoning. Many of these can be arranged around the
question: Is legal reasoning, at its best, objective? 3°8 Legal Realists,
such as Jerome Frank, had their doubts. Every generation has its
skeptics; some eras have more than others. Post-modernists are the
current cultured despisers of objectivity everywhere, including the
law. Another important academic question is whether legal reasoning
is purely positivistic, in the broad sense spelled out by H.L.A. Hart
and his followers, 3 9 or whether it involves a moral component. 310 Of
course, if the foundation of legal reasoning involves a moral
component, then new questions about objectivity arise. Recently, the
idea of moral relativism has become popular once again among some
philosophers, as well as among college students and social scientists. 3 1
If one wishes to argue that law, conceived as fundamentally-moral, is
also objective at its best, one then has to give accounts of (1) the
nature of morality, and (2) the relationship between law and morality.
Prima facie, one would expect that law could be both moral and
objective only if there was One True Morality-only if, that is,
relativism and subjectivism are both false. In contrast, Markovits
believes that the law is objective, shot through with moral
considerations, and yet fundamentally-relativized to the differing
moral outlooks of different societies. How can this be?
These academic questions are all terribly important, although
most practicing lawyers sneer at those who raise them. This attitude
308. See KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY (1992).
309. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).

310. See MARKOVITS, supra note 21, at 53-78.
311. See GILBERT HARMON & JUDITH JARVIS THOMPSON, MORAL RELATIVISM AND
MORAL OBJECTIVITY (1996).
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may be a function of tone and time. At the same time, there are a
number of general questions about legal reasoning that concern
practical lawyers. Indeed, they are the same questions that concern
academics, just differently phrased. Practicing lawyers, like legal
academics, are concerned about the role of morality in legal
argument. Probably, most lawyers are more relativistic than
jurisprudentially-sophisticated academics. Indeed, the specter of
relativism is probably a reason many practical lawyers are skeptical
about moral argument. They want to protect the law precisely from
what they regard as pernicious and waffling subjectivism. It is
precisely because lawyers want objectivity that they suspect the
Doctrine of Natural Law. Lawyers know that litigated cases (such as
allegations of fiduciary-duty breaches) have to be decided as
objectively as possible within a relatively-short period of time. They
also know that the natures of charity, kindness, trust, and respect (for
example) have never been coherently explicated, that rules and
principles employing these concepts are murky at best, and that
attempts to use these moral ideas often lead to self-deception, which
is in turn used to justify selfishness, cruelty, self-dealing, and treating
people as means rather than ends. Morality seems mushy, ineffective,
and unreal. Law seems structured, hard-bodied, and real. Many
practicing lawyers try to use law-divorced from morality-to
somehow make social life better. How is that for consistency?
The skepticism many practicing lawyers have toward integrating
law and morality is short-sighted. It is not possible to give a
positivistic account of the nature of adjudication once the concept of
adjudication is linked to the ideal of the Rule of Law. When the Rule
of Law is taken to be fundamental to any legal system worthy of the
name, the law is, of necessity, linked to moral considerations. It is not
possible to specify an account of the Rule of Law without a fullblooded commitment to some version of the Doctrine of Natural
Law. It need not be a fully-Markovitsian version, wherein for every
elaborated legal-rights claim there is a correct answer. If to every
legal-rights claim, there are many wrong answers and only a few right
ones, then my case is secure.
In Part II.C above, I sketch what I think is involved in the
concept of the Rule of Law. The account includes "fundamental
postulates" and "regulative ideals." I do not seek to deduce them
from other, even-more-fundamental, axioms. Nevertheless, I believe
that if thoughtful lawyers are conversationally drawn out on the
underpinnings of the Rule of Law, they will affirm that the postulates
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I posit are all actually components of the Rule of Law. Articulate and
insightful citizens will also agree, I bet.
Serious legal reasoning involves a commitment to serious
reasoning, which-in turn-involves a twin commitment to reasoning
seriously and to giving serious reasons. Indeed, cases should be
decided upon the very best reasons realistically available, and they
should be decided in ways that will make sense to the populace. Thus,
cases must be decided on the basis of understandable principles that
are linked to both simple and reasonable values and to the
understood
past. Continuity and rationality require that
indistinguishable cases be decided in the same way. Serious legal
reasoning must, therefore, include precedent, and a theory of taking
legal reasoning seriously must encompass a theory of precedent.
At this point, things become interesting. The theory of precedent
is often regarded as unitary. If I have proved anything in this paper, it
is that there are different, non-equivalent, and potentially-conflicting
principles of precedent. Judges, to the extent that they understand
that there are different principles of precedent, conceal this fact by
speaking as if there were only one doctrine of stare decisis. Such a
concealment is a deception, when it is deliberate, and as such it is
inconsistent with fundamental principles of democracy. At the same
time, the suppression seems inevitable. Social life is always messy.
The use of unified, stable, bright-line principles and rules in complex
situations over time is unlikely. The use of a family of principles is
much more likely. Most of the time, the selection of the specific
doctrine of stare decisis will not matter much. Most legal questionsespecially those facing lower courts-are pretty simple. Occasionally,
it will matter, however.
What is tolerable to legal elites would be threatening to others.
Consequently, courts do not refer to different approaches to binding
precedent. Nevertheless, because there are different theories of
precedent, and because there is a fair amount of intellectual fog
covering the terrain where precedent, reasoning, and dicta coexist
uneasily, there is a danger not only of intellectual chicanery, but also
of serious, well-intended lapses in reasoning. If reasoning is devoted
to clarity, validity, truth, and soundness, then intellectual fog is always
the enemy. Paradoxically, however, some fog is necessary from a
social and political point of view. Thus, the requirements of stability
in the democratic order place some limitations on how crystalline
legal reasoning can be and, hence, how seriously it can be taken by
the rational mind.
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To the extent one is persuaded by any of this, one should be
uncomfortable. One source of discomfort is the democratic theory
itself. 2 On virtually any account of democracy, openness of
governmental processes and decision-making is important. Fog
enshrouds and, therefore, eliminates openness. Another source of
discomfort is to be found in Markovits's conception of moral
integrity. According to him, the person of moral integrity takes his
life seriously from a moral point of view. In doing so, he articulates
his moral obligations, considers them carefully, gives them
appropriate weight, and then, in all the areas which are not controlled
by these obligations, decides upon long-range courses of action in the
light of his personal-value convictions, having subjected them to
rational critique. Now, consider the lawyer who strives for moral
integrity. Any such person is committed to taking legal argument
seriously. He is, therefore, committed to clarity, truth, argumentative
validity, and morally-acceptable rhetoric. This person is, therefore,
committed to driving out fog. But the legal system appears
ineluctably committed to embracing patches of fog. This paper has
explored one such patch, and it does-indeed-seem to be present,
tolerated, necessary, and perhaps even cherished. Whither integrity?

312. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 151-52.

